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Abstract
In the United States today, there are 2.3 million people behind bars in jails and
prisons. Mass incarceration has swept up the United States to such a degree that we are
known globally for holding more people in correctional facilities than any other country
in the world. Although women have always reflected, and still do reflect, a smaller
proportion of the correctional population, over the last 40 years, their rates of
criminalization and imprisonment have far outpaced that of men. Drastic increases in the
criminalization of women are intimately connected to the entrenchment of social
disadvantage enabled under neoliberal globalization. Neoliberal transformations in the
economy have contributed to women’s poverty across the globe and have brought an
increasing number of women into contact with the criminal justice system. The rising
incarceration rate of women, and the disproportionate rate of women of color in U.S. prisons
is a timely and urgent issue and one that social work is poised to address. Indeed, some of

our most prominent national organizations recognize mass incarceration as an urgent
issue that merits the attention of social workers. As such, it is prudent to examine social
work’s engagement with this issue.
This study employed a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of social work
scholarship in order to: 1) explore current constructions of criminalized women in social
work; 2) understand the knowledge produced through such constructions; and 3) explore
how that knowledge supports/shapes practice with criminalized women. Specifically, this
study draws on Jäger and Maier’s (2009) framework for performing a Foucauldianinspired CDA. This approach centers Foucault’s conceptualizations of discourse and the
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workings of power and builds on the work of Jürgen Link to examine the function of
discourse in legitimizing and securing dominance.
Data include a sample of 49 articles published in social work high impact journals
from 2000-2018. A keyword search was performed to locate articles with an explicit
focus on incarcerated/criminalized women. Only articles dealing with a U.S. context were
included. Analysis occurred on two levels consisting of a structural analysis to identify
initial coding schema and a detailed analysis of select articles. Detailed analysis attended
to: context of text; surface of text; rhetorical means; content and ideological statements.
These two levels of analysis led to an overall synoptic analysis, or final assessment of the
overall discourse. Multiracial feminism, discourse theory, and Foucault’s concept of
governmentality anchored the research and provided the theoretical framework for
analysis.
The overarching finding is that social work high impact journals privilege a
psychological discourse and that the assessment and management of risk has supplanted a
holistic approach to meeting client needs and addressing mass incarceration. This, I
conclude, reflects a neoliberal political climate and aligns social work with penal
institutions in troubling ways. Criminalized women are overwhelmingly constructed as
risky in the sample. Embedded in this construction is a strong neoliberal discourse on
knowing and changing the “responsibilized” self. The implied knowledge claims that
flow from these constructions rely on the use of “objective” and often depoliticized
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement. I show how this depoliticization
is accomplished through a variety of neutralizing strategies, which ultimately serve to
depoliticize social work itself. I highlight how, by primarily constituting criminalized
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women as risky, social work necessarily responds to her with individualized service
delivery aimed at regulating and changing the behavior of individuals. I argue that in its
reliance on practices of risk management and a preference for micro-level service
delivery, social work deploys regulatory practices that further neoliberal governance
(Parton, 1998; Webb, 2003).
Further, I discovered a profound ethical dissonance between social work’s
engagement with criminalized women and social work values. Specifically, I found that
social work discourse passively accepts the logic of punishment and supports dominant
ideology surrounding gender and crime while concurrently attempting to redress the
consequences of such constructions through social justice values. I conceptualize this as a
discursive struggle over the meaning and purpose of social work, a struggle that
embodies some of the most salient historical and contemporary tensions in our field
related to our professional identity and an increasing drive toward professionalization
(Reisch, 2013).
I argue that social work’s growing dedication to practices that seek to adjust the
psychological fortitude of criminalized women relies on broader cultural discourses of
responsibilization, which reproduce, rather than interrupt, criminalization, and divert
attention away from the need for social and economic change. My analysis exposes how
social work is implicated in processes of criminalization, and propels a shift in emphasis
from individualized service delivery, aimed at changing the behavior of individuals, to
launching interventions that tackle structural injustice and inequity. Understanding the
subtle and productive work of power to undermine our “good intentions” and aspirations
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for social justice requires us to rethink explanations for crime and our understandings
regarding the purpose and necessity of the criminal justice system.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The last forty years have seen a dramatic increase in the incarceration of women
worldwide (Carlton & Segrave, 2016). Consequently, the mass incarceration of women
has become a growing and complex field of scholarly interest. There is a considerable
amount of research regarding women entangled in the criminal justice system and a range
of related issues including: “pathways” to criminal justice involvement, experiences in
prison, treatment options, and the consequences of criminalization for children, families,
and communities. Scholars have also begun to investigate the lives of women postincarceration and the ways in which criminalization extends beyond direct involvement
with the criminal justice system and intersects with other systems impacting the lives of
criminalized women, specifically social service systems. Such research has particular
implications for social work practice and research, yet it is a topic rarely covered in
schools of social work and marginally discussed in the literature. Therefore, it is difficult
to intuitively understand where social work stands in relation to issues of criminalized
women and what useful practice and research look like in this area.
The study that lies in these pages is a Critical Discourse Analysis of how
criminalized women are discursively constructed in social work high impact journals.
The aim was to make visible the current constructions of criminalized women in social
work, to understand the knowledge that is produced through such constructions, and to
explore how that knowledge supports/shapes certain kinds of research and practice with
criminalized women. This chapter is an introduction to the study and the organization of
the dissertation. First, I provide a discussion of my own background and what brought me
to this topic. Then I discuss the rationale, approach, and significance of the research. The
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last section provides an overview of how the dissertation is structured and what to expect
in each chapter.
Background and Interest in the Topic
Though my professional experience and academic studies have included a range
of seemingly disparate topics, a consistent interest and focus has included various aspects
of the increasing criminalization of women in the United States and other industrialized
nations. I first became aware of the issues facing criminalized women in 2004, while
interning at a mentoring program for youth with incarcerated parents. Concurrently, I was
attending an MSW program and learning more about the socio-political realities that
shape people’s lives. I was learning to think about the power relations embedded in the
helping relationship and to ultimately re-think everything I thought I knew about the
world and the way in which I imagined myself as a social worker. This presented
problems for me in the “real world” of social work practice.
The work at the mentoring program, like that of many social work agencies, relied
on narratives of blame and responsibility. The agency viewed the children of incarcerated
parents as victims, not of an unjust system or structural inequality, but of irresponsible
and “deviant” parents. Mothers were held particularly accountable. Because of their
deviations from the gendered expectations placed on motherhood, incarcerated mothers
were seen as being doubly deviant and especially at fault for their child’s predicament.
Thus, the mentoring agency further stigmatized the mothers for not conforming to
societal norms of motherhood and womanhood.
Alongside my experience at the mentoring program, I was learning about the
structural factors that often lead people to commit “crime” and about the racism deeply
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embedded within the criminal justice system. I was coming to see that crime and
imprisonment have more to do with social failings than individual failings. The culture
within the mentoring agency was driven by neoliberal discourse and ideology centered on
the myth of meritocracy, which saw people as responsible for their own positioning in the
world. I could not make sense of the contradictions between what I was learning in my
master’s program and the way these social workers practicing in the “real world”
engaged in their work. As a dewy eyed MSW student, I did not understand at the time
that this was, in fact, the norm; an MSW student intern who hung around and questioned
the agency’s entrenched narratives was not exactly a welcome entity. I felt alienated and
unsettled by the space between my education and the practice inside this agency.
Needless to say, my internship there was short lived. I moved on to placements that were
a better fit with my politics and values, and I was able to regain a certain sense of security
in social work. Still, the issue of incarcerated women had captured my attention and I
continued to explore this as a topic of study while in my MSW program.
I graduated from that program so excited and proud to be a social worker. Even
now, writing those words brings tears to my eyes. It’s disheartening to think about the
eager hopefulness embedded in my social work education and the almost immediate fall
from grace that came upon entering the world of doing social work as a job. I think of my
own students and the way I teach them to think about the world, their clients, and their
roles as social workers, and I wonder if I am doing them a disservice. Is it only a matter
of time before progressively minded students meet disillusionment and isolation in real
world social work practice? How do I prepare them for the dilemmas and contradictions
they will inevitably face?
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In the first draft of my proposal for this dissertation, my chair commented that I
did not leave much space for social work to interrupt the process of reifying neoliberal
ideology. I struggle with this because my initial education in social work is what brought
me to the place of even being able to notice, analyze, and ultimately challenge such
processes. I think about the keen optimism my education brought me and I wonder: when
did I become so cynical about social work? After much reflection, I do not think the
cynicism is completely unwarranted. My practice experience has taught me that social
workers often label, diagnose, and police clients “for their own good.” The conditions
that shape the lives of those same clients are rarely considered. Instead, practice strategies
are deployed which focus on the assessment and management of risk, all the while
claiming that that’s what is best for the client, or as Margolin (1997) puts it, “under the
cover of kindness.”
Upon entering my doctoral program, I wanted to resume studies regarding
incarcerated women, but I also needed to find a way to make sense of what I was seeing
in my own practice experience. It was from this that I became particularly interested in
the ways in which criminalization extends beyond the criminal justice system and the role
of social services in the expanding net of carceral control. It is here that feminist and
post-structural scholarship reinvigorated my intellectual life.
Governmentality and Social Work
Though I was not familiar with this term at the time, I realize now that much of
what I was struggling with in my own practice experience was trying to find my place in
what Foucault (1991) calls the web of governmentality in which social work participates.
Foucault conceptualized governmentality as a regime of power that permeates the fabric
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of society and dictates norms for behavior. Grounded in post-structural understandings of
power, governmentality rests on the assumption that power and knowledge join to create
discourse, and through discourse we come to accept reality. Discourse leads to shared
ideas, images, and representations that become dominant, or as Gramsci (1971) dubbed
them, hegemonic. Power, then, operates both structurally and ideologically and “is
exercised and relational rather than merely oppressive or repressive” (Strega, 2005, p.
225). It is everywhere and everything.
As Foucault saw it, the knowledge claims and practices of the social sciences play
a large role in governmentality by legitimizing notions of what is normal and healthy
(Parton, 1998). Individuals then internalize and act on these criteria for normalization and
go on to regulate their own behavior and the behavior of others based on such criteria.
According to Foucault, notions of power as being solely centralized are misleading and
incomplete (Rose, 2000). Rather, he saw power as diffuse and spread throughout society
and centered the idea that power does not just act on subjects, but also constitutes their
roles in society and their subjectivities (Larner, 2000).
Drawing on such analyses, Rossiter (2001) discusses governmentality in relation
to the discourses of helper and helped, which she sees as constituting social work’s
identity and practice. She states that “civilizing missions produce the Other in need of
help, thereby sustaining the identity of the helper as good, innocent, and helpful” (para.
6). She goes on to highlight how power relations between helper and helped are then
obscured while sustaining a singular identity and role for each. She argues that what we
think of as “doing social work is an identity position that facilitates governmentality”
(para. 16). Such analyses raise many questions regarding the “problem of helping,”

6
questions related to who has the power to define what help is or looks like, who gets to
decide what is best for another, what constitutes outcomes or success, and ultimately,
whose knowledge is privileged. Such questions weigh on me when I consider the nature
of social work practice. Orlie (1997) labels the deployment of expert knowledge as a
potential trespass, not for any malicious intent, but rather for what it leaves out. Social
workers manage and control the conduct of others through “common sense” (and I would
add that this common sense is often classed, racialized, and gendered) expectations for
behavior, which leave out many other explanations for behavior. For example, Pollack
(2013) demonstrates how women’s post-prison experiences and identities are shaped
through their relationships with mental health professionals and parole officers. The
women in her study highlight the ways in which discourses of risk are embedded in these
interactions. They speak of how professional narratives of risk often reign at the expense
of how they understood their own experiences and needs. Pollack contends that how we
are known and how we come to know ourselves through the discourses of those in power
are epistemic concerns. Her discussion highlights how professional discourse becomes
imbued with truth. In her study, mental health professionals had the power to decide how
a woman’s situation would/should be understood and what knowledge regarding a
woman’s identity would be considered valid. Therefore, the deployment of expert
knowledge has the potential to be not only an act of trespass, as seen by Orlie, but also an
act of epistemic violence (Pollack, 2013).
Governmentality analyses are not new to social work and have inspired much
discussion and debate on neoliberal evolutions in the welfare state and other forms of
governance (Parton, 1998; Pollack, 2008; Rossiter, 2000; Webb, 2003). Scholars have
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made the case that with the rise of privatization, managerialism, and professionalization,
social work is inevitably involved in processes of governmentality. Further,
governmentality scholars posit that social services and punishment are inextricably linked
under a neoliberal political framework and that “mechanisms of discipline” are not
confined solely within the boundaries of the criminal justice system (Garland, 2004;
Rivest & Moreau, 2015). For example, Green (2007) examined how risk plays out in
community-based services for adults. Drawing on Webb’s (2006) and Kemshall’s (2002)
analyses which linked the rise of risk societies in late modernity to a narrow focus on
individual choice, freedom, and responsibility in social policy and social work practice,
Green illustrated how various layers of risk thinking infiltrate the practice of social
workers so much that the pressure placed on practitioners to assess and manage risk is the
most influential force shaping their practice. He explains that as the obligations of social
workers become entrenched with the fulfillment of stringent regulations and procedures,
the demand placed upon them to assess and manage risk moves social workers away from
being in partnership with clients and toward governing them.
Similarly, scholars have noted that neoliberal processes and demands have moved
social work away from a commitment to social justice and macro level work toward a
preference for individual level service delivery (Gray & McDonald, 2006; Webb, 2001).
Gutierrez, Parsons, and Cox (1998) illustrate this point in their content analysis of the use
of empowerment in social work journals. They found that most articles claiming
empowerment focused on micro-level, individualized understandings of the concept.
Furthermore, they contend that the focus on self-control, autonomy, and choice strips
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empowerment of its political meaning rooted in raising consciousness in order to promote
collective action toward alleviating oppression.
Defining Criminalized Women
Before moving forward, it is important to discuss how I conceptualize the
criminalization of women. These conceptualizations anchor the rationale for this
research. Similar to governmentality scholars, feminist scholars have noted that the
meaning of women’s criminalization is “not to be found within official legal or penal
rhetoric, rather it [can] be located within the practices, conventions, and discourses of the
wider aspects of social life and social control” (Barton, 2005, p. 8). Social control occurs
at the micro and macro levels, through both overt and covert mechanisms such as the use
of force, ideology, socialization, and resource distribution. Foucault (1995) said, “In its
function, the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating”
(p.303). In line with this sentiment, I define the criminalization of women less in terms of
criminal behavior and more in terms of the social control of gender.
Rafter (1990) defines social control as “the mechanisms by which powerful
groups consciously or unconsciously attempt to restrain and to induce conformity, even
assent, among less powerful but nonetheless threatening segments of society” (p. 157).
Criminalization, then, refers to the selective application of criminal law to social behavior
and involves regulation of such behavior through surveillance, policing, and punishment
(Danner, 1996). The criminalization of women does so in uniquely gendered ways by
making certain acts that are more likely to be committed by women, such as sex work,
drug use while pregnant, low-level drug involvement, and certain crimes of poverty a
crime.
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Here, it is prudent to pause and discuss some problems with the category
“woman.” Scholars of color, lesbians, and working class feminists have critiqued feminist
scholarship that neglects attention to race, class, sexuality, and other dimensions of
difference when examining the experiences of women (Collins, 1990; Rubin, 1986;
Steedman, 1986). They argue that using gender as the only or primary analytic category
creates essentialized definitions of women and universalizes women’s experiences and
needs. Crenshaw (1991) and others highlight the importance of utilizing an intersectional
framework that examines how interlocking oppressions and intersecting identities shape
gendered experiences. An intersectional framework acknowledges that the meanings of
gender and women’s experiences are not universal, but rather bound up in other identities
such as race, class, and sexuality. While I acknowledge gender’s significance and utilize
the word “woman” throughout this dissertation, I also rely on an intersectional
framework that considers gender in relation to other identities. Because not all women are
criminalized in the same way or for the same things, and because women are subject to
social control based not on gender alone, but on how their multiple identities intersect, an
intersectional analysis is necessary in order to more fully understand how interlocking
oppressions and intersecting identities shape the gendered experiences of criminalized
women.
Feminist scholars have been at the forefront of challenging and interrogating the
social construction of crime, as well as the ways in which dominant discourses
individualize and pathologize women’s “criminality” (Boyd, 2006; Comack & Balfour,
2004; Faith, 1993; Laberge, 1991; Pollack, 2007). These scholars make the case that,
contrary to dominant ideology, criminal behavior and “crime” itself are defined more by
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policy and the prevailing socio-political and economic climate than by faults and
deficiencies located within the individual. From this analytic viewpoint, common labels
used to identify criminalized women, such as “criminal,” “female offender,” “woman in
conflict with the law,” and “woman in trouble,” obscure the structural factors (i.e.,
poverty) related to the context of law breaking. Further, such labels dehumanize those
entangled in disciplinary arrangements.
Laberge illustrates specific concerns with the category “criminal”:
Firstly, the notion reinforces the impression that crime is the manifestation of a
personal essence. By now, a large literature has developed around the recognition
that crime is an historical construct. There is no consensus on what constitutes
‘crime’, nor is the term itself neutral. Once this is recognized, it is impossible to
maintain that ‘crime’ is a fundamental characteristic of a given individual.
Secondly, what we study is a social product, the outcome of interactions between
women and state agencies. The nature of the correspondence between the ‘dark
figure’ of criminality and the official volume of criminality is unknown to
us….Thirdly, the designation of ‘criminal’ elicits powerful and usually very
negative images…..Even a summary examination of the criminality generated by
women very clearly reveals the non-dangerous nature of women’s infractions
(1991, p. 50).
Like Foucault (1995), Laberge situates her argument in the recognition of crime as a
social and historical construct. Highlighting the diverse meanings of “crime” across time
and space disrupts the belief that crime is a natural phenomenon occurring within
problematic individuals.
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The terms “criminalized women” and “women’s criminality” have very different
meanings and allow different pictures to unfold concerning what/who is problematic. In
the latter, the concern is on the behavior of an individual woman. In the former, the
concern is on how women are constructed as “criminal” and how they are regulated
because of that construction. Furthermore, the ways in which multiple identities and
social locations intersect to prescribe meaning and construct a woman as “criminal” are
crucial to understanding the underlying systems of oppression and inequality inherent in
the criminal justice system. As Neve and Pate (2005) state, “it is clear that it is the law
that is increasingly coming into conflict with people, especially poor, racialized, and
disabled women, rather than women who are coming into conflict with the law” (p. 27).
A sketch of the incarcerated female population helps bring these points into focus.
Women involved in the criminal justice system are disproportionately from economically
disadvantaged groups, with women of color being vastly overrepresented (Carson, 2018;
Kajstura, 2018). Nationally, the likelihood of being incarcerated is 1 in 118 for White
women, as compared to 1 in 45 for Hispanic women, and 1 in 19 for Black women
(Sentencing Project, 2018). The element of racism is so prevalent that Michelle
Alexander (2012) refers to mass incarceration as the most pressing racial justice issue of
our time. Women are increasingly (and mostly) incarcerated for drug offenses, property
crimes, and public order offenses1 (Carson, 2018; Kajstura, 2018). The violent crimes for
which women are typically incarcerated are largely in relation to defense or the murder of
an abusive partner (Comack, 2014). Constructions of incarcerated women (and I would
1

Public order offenses are comprised of violations that are seen to interfere with public life. Prostitution,
public drunkenness, and loitering are examples of public order offenses.
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say most incarcerated populations) as dangerous and a risk to public safety are
inaccurate; they are based on anomalies and sensationalized media representations, which
shape commonsense understandings (i.e. dominant discourses) of crime and what defines
a “criminal” (Comack, 2014).
A more accurate picture shows that women are primarily convicted for crimes of
poverty that reflect systemic inequalities and discrimination based on their gendered,
racialized, and classed social locations. Understanding the characteristics of who is likely
to be criminalized, and for what, highlights the role that race and poverty play in the lives
of criminalized women. When we are able to understand the nature and extent of
women’s law breaking as well as the context in which that law breaking takes place, we
can conceptualize that women are criminalized more than they are actual criminals.
Transcarceration as a Form of Governmentality
As discussed previously, institutions of governmentality that serve to regulate and
discipline behavior already exist; however, I would argue that once someone is
criminalized, the forms of governmentality that shape their life take on a different nature
and are largely responsible for contributing to “success” or reinforcing criminalization
(Maidment, 2006). Researchers have documented that criminalized women come into
contact with and are adversely impacted by various institutions of governmentality before
and long after incarceration (Carlton & Segrave, 2016; Maidment, 2006; Richie, 2001;
Shantz, Kilty, & Frigon, 2009). These institutions include child welfare, education,
health, and welfare: all spheres in which social work plays an obvious role. Bhattacharjee
(2002) discusses how such agencies are becoming infiltrated with a “culture of law
enforcement” increasingly serving policing and surveillance functions. For example,
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some scholars note how mandated workfare programs and increasingly stringent
eligibility criteria for welfare recipients mirror the techniques of surveillance, regulation,
and control embodied in the criminal justice system (McCorkel, 2004; Pollack, 2010).
Further, Parton (1998) highlights how penal risk management practices have become
ubiquitously taken up in child protective services through the use of risk assessments.
With the power to discursively define what appropriate behavior and “success” look like,
as well as to bestow needed resources, these institutions have taken a central role, right
alongside criminal justice, in maintaining dominant notions of social order2 (Johnson,
1996). In fact, researchers document that when people are no longer institutionalized,
other less visible social, legal, and medical structures step in more subtly to provide
regulation and control (Maidment, 2006). For example, community based programs (such
as mental health courts, mandated drug treatment programs, and house arrest, among
others) are utilized as less punitive “alternatives” to incarceration but still target and
regulate behaviors that would typically be criminalized. Scholars label this widening of
the net of social control as “transcarceration” (Lowman & Menzies, 1986; Maidment,
2006).
Transcarceration is a way of conceptualizing criminalization outside the
immediate context of the prison; it suggests that the primary mechanisms of control have
moved beyond institutionalization and into the community and home. Transcarceration
attends to the “shifting conceptual frontiers between social control and coercive control”
(Lowman, Menzies, & Palys, 1987, p. 2) and the blurring of boundaries between the two.
2

Dominant notions of social order can be thought of as acceptable patterns of relating and behaving.
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Building on Cohen’s (1985) conceptualizations of social control as inclusive (institutional
settings) and exclusive (community settings), transcarceration asserts a view of formal
social control that is broader than incarceration and institutionalization (Lowman &
Menzies, 1986). Shaped by white, middle class assumptions of normality, transcarceral
controls are also inherently gendered and racialized and include ideology and strategies
pertaining to welfare, reproduction, education, and health (Davis & Faith, 1987;
Maidment, 2006). Maidment (2006) expounds on this when she says,
Transcarceration, then, looks to cross-institutional arrangements between the
systems of criminal justice, mental health, and social welfare, in which ‘clients’ of
the criminal justice system are shuffled from one section of the help-control
continuum to another. By managing ‘clients’ in or outside the institutional setting,
the correctional machinery expands to encompass health, welfare, social services,
child protection, education, and housing—all of which translates into
decentralized control and increasingly entails the fitting together of subsystems
rather than the consolidation of one agency in isolation from its alternatives (p.
269).
In other words, social control is broader, less visible, and more effective (Davis &
Faith, 1987). Or as Balfour (2006) posits, punishment is relocated into the community. In
an analysis of a community-based electronic monitoring program, Maidment (2002)
illustrates how community corrections serve as a regulating force in women’s lives with
explicitly gendered outcomes. In her study, she traced the differences in the way men and
women experienced the program. She found that for men, the program was useful and a
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welcome change to life in prison; they had adequate amounts of support and usually lived
with women (mothers or partners) who would take care of their children and daily
household needs. For women, who often had sole responsibility for their homes and
children (and were also under supervision of child welfare), the electronic monitoring
proved to be a burden that was not always a welcome alternative to incarceration. The
women in her study were expected to be fully engaged mothers, but the restrictions
placed on their mobility through the electronic monitoring interfered with their ability to
adequately fulfill their responsibilities as heads of households and as mothers. Further,
whereas men’s relationships with women were often deemed a protective factor in that
they provided a solid support network to prevent parole violations and recidivism,
women’s relationships with men, especially if there had been a history of domestic
violence, were far more likely to be deemed as a risk factor for recidivism, thereby
increasing restrictions and monitoring. This is a stark example of the discursive and
material effects that come from conflating victimization with risk for women on parole.
The conflation constructs the woman as “risky,” which then prompts increased
restrictions and monitoring. Increased restrictions further limit her freedom and her
ability to meet the various mandates of the agencies she is bound up in, thereby evoking
more ill suited constructions of her identity (i.e. risky, dangerous, neglectful mother,
criminal) which prompt further regulation and intrusion into her life. The cycle goes on.
“Risk thinking” (which I will discuss more in depth later in this dissertation) normalizes
notions of appropriate conduct, thereby creating a “risky” other who then needs to be
further surveilled under the gaze of the “expert.”
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In this way, while women may avoid a return to prison, they seldom break free of
legal, medical, and “psy” professions. Social work plays a notable role here in relation to
being the managers of child welfare requirements, the gatekeepers for social assistance
provisions, and the deliverers of many mandated substance abuse and mental health
treatment programs. Intrusion into women’s lives is taken up by regulatory rather than
criminalizing processes, by community agencies that receive governmental funding. As
Balfour (2006) states, the “social control networks of surveillance and observation within
the community have expanded the gaze of the state” (p. 170). Thus, criminalization
extends beyond the context of the criminal justice system and includes transcarceral
mechanisms of control such as community supervision, behavioral restrictions, and
mandated treatment (Maidment, 2006). Transcarceration, as I see it, is a specifically
criminalized form of governmentality.
Social Work Responses
As others have noted, social work occupies a significant space in deploying
regulatory practices that further neoliberal governance (Carton, 2014; Parton, 2008;
Pollack, 2008). In particular, social work’s increased focus on the assessment and
management of risk and growing dedication to practices that seek to adjust the
psychological fortitude of individuals give it its increasing foothold in neoliberal
governance. Given the diffuse systems of social control that structure the lives of
criminalized women upon release from prison (as conceptualized by governmentality and
transcarceration), I believe it is necessary to turn our gaze toward the professional
systems that play a role in regulating the lives of criminalized women (Davis & Shaylor,
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2001). From the lens of governmentality, it is these professionals who play a role in
reinforcing or interrupting processes of criminalization.
Social work has historically been situated in a positivist school of criminological
thought regarding practice with “offenders” and crime prevention (Roberts & Springer,
2007; Wilson, 2010). The characteristics of positivist criminological thought include an
attempt to explain and predict criminal behavior and, thus, modify it through
individualized intervention. In an attempt to predict criminality, risk assessments are used
to identify and target people who are “at-risk” of certain behaviors. In other words, social
work, despite its embrace of an ecological model, has historically assumed a view that
crime and criminal behavior are caused by individual factors, such as mental illness
(Wilson, 2010). This is problematic because it frames women’s involvement in crime as
merely psychological in nature (Pollack, 2008) and lends itself to individualized
responses and interventions, which erase the link between inequality and criminality
(Donohue & Moore 2009; Kendall, 2004; Shaw & Hannah-Moffat, 2004). Still, as I will
show in this dissertation, individualized treatments (which focus on individual choice and
even empowerment) have become the dominant model of service delivery in social work
with criminalized women. They are deeply gendered and aimed at changing women’s
thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors (Balfour, 2006; McKim, 2008; Pollack, 2007).
For example, in an examination of the reintegration experiences of women
released from prison, Pollack (2010) illustrates how therapeutic programming with
criminalized women works in specifically gendered ways. She emphasizes the role that
the assessment and management of risk in social work practice plays in shaping women’s
subjectivities upon release from prison. Grounded in assumptions that criminal behavior
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in women is linked to low self-esteem, social work efforts to rehabilitate them focus on
reducing women’s risk by raising their self-esteem. The logic goes that greater selfesteem will empower women to make better decisions. Yet, as Pollack points out, this
logic ignores the reality that choice is constrained by social and power relations, and that
the choices people makes are not always the result of poor self-esteem, but rather the
result of the options and opportunities (or lack thereof) available to them.
Similarly, Goodkind (2009) illustrates how individualized framings are deeply
embedded in residential treatment programs for young women involved in the criminal
justice system. She found that programs, which professed a feminist approach to their
work with young women, operationalized their feminism by way of empowerment groups
which sought to build self-esteem and enhance confidence among the young women. Her
interviews with program staff revealed the underlying assumption that the enhancement
of self-esteem and independence was necessary to mitigating poor decision making and
reducing risk for recidivism. Goodkind contends that the focus on self-esteem is
ultimately disempowering because it ignores how one’s power to act is shaped by larger
social conditions and relations. Additionally, she points out that the available evidence
does not support a causal link between low self-esteem and delinquent behavior, which
further problematizes empowerment as a strategy for risk management.
These examples highlight how efforts to build self-esteem in order to reduce
deviant behavior miss the mark in that they conflate freedom and agency, and construct
the self as contained within the personal rather than as a product of larger social relations
(Hannah-Moffat, 2004). In effect, self-esteem based practices reify neoliberal discourse
and intensify patterns of transcarceration. Cruikshank (1993) explicitly links the
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bolstering of an individual’s self-esteem and self-determination to processes of
governmentality. She states, “Self-esteem is a technology of citizenship and selfgovernment for evaluating and acting upon ourselves so that the police, the guards, and
the doctors do not have to” (p. 330). By internalizing notions of normalization, people
can then become sensible managers of their own risk. Further, Pollack (2010) discusses
how a woman’s ability to attain things such as parole, welfare, housing, and custody of
her children hinges on her willingness to cooperate with efforts to normalize them.
In the context of mass incarceration and transcarceration, it is inevitable that
criminalized women will be answerable to and come in contact with many different
human service professionals, particularly social workers, in their daily lives. In turn,
many social workers can expect to work with criminalized populations. As stated in an
NASW report on the state of criminal justice social work in the United States:
There are many thousands of social workers working in criminal justice settings,
working with criminal justice populations, or both. It is likely that most criminal
justice social workers also practice in the areas of behavioral health and case
management (Wilson, 2010, p. 2).
The life experiences of many criminalized women include poverty, racism, severe
trauma, substance abuse, and mental health problems (Chesney-Lind, 2002; Franklin,
2008; Sokoloff, 2005). This creates a set of complex needs and challenges for
criminalized women, particularly when re-entering a community after incarceration,
while under community-based supervision, or while trying to access needed services
(Richie, 2001; Spjeldnes & Goodkind, 2009). The pressures and demands of child
welfare and criminal justice systems can be overwhelming, yet negotiating the
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complexities of these systems is central to their lives and crucial to their “success.”
Recognizing this, an National Association of Social Workers (2009) criminal justice
briefing makes the following recommendations:
•

Address issues surrounding and leading to disproportionate rates of incarceration
for individuals of racial or ethnic minorities, juveniles, women, and
undocumented individuals.

•

Increase participation of professional forensic social workers and other mental
health providers to assure culturally competent treatment and intervention for the
growing population of incarcerated individuals, including mental health and
substance abuse services.

•

Assure safe, humane, and equitable treatment for all incarcerated individuals.

•

Increase access to health care, educational, and vocational opportunities to assist
incarcerated individuals with transitioning back to their communities. (p. 331332)
Providers, immersed in their own area of practice, may not be adequately

informed of these complex issues and, thus, may be ill prepared to effectively meet the
needs of their criminal justice involved clientele or to assist them in navigating the terrain
(Roberts & Springer, 2007). Indeed, recent research and an NASW policy statement on
Social Work in the Criminal Justice System highlight the fact that despite increased
exposure to and practice with criminalized populations, it is a topic inadequately covered
in the social work curriculum and scantly addressed in the literature (Epperson et al.,
2013; Jemal & Graham, 2017; Wheeler & McClain, 2015). Still, instructors in schools of
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social work often rely on the scholarly literature as an important pedagogical tool. Given
the prominence of high impact journals, it is not unreasonable to assume that instructors
may, though perhaps not exclusively, rely on them on a regular basis. Thus, it is prudent
to explore how/if criminalized women and attendant issues are represented within that
literature.
Research Questions
As such, I focused my dissertation research on a critical examination of the
constructions of criminalized women that permeate the social work high impact journals.
Further, I examined the implications these constructions have for shaping social work
practice and research. Specifically, this dissertation examines social work high impact
journals as a form of social work discourse. Discourse here is defined as “a way of
knowing or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: A cluster of
ideas, images, or practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and
conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society”
(Hall, 1997, p. 5). Further, discourse is an “institutionalized way of talking that regulates
and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 35). The role of
discourse is paramount in constructing and creating meaning, attitudes, and knowledge
about people. My analysis focused on interpretations of discursive practices:
constructions and representations of criminalized women, how criminalized women are
positioned and discussed in the texts, the knowledge that emerges from these
constructions, and how social work(ers) is positioned and discussed in relation to
criminalized women.
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Using a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology, I investigated the following
questions:
1. How do social work high impact journals construct and represent criminalized
women?
2. What particular knowledge claims about criminalization and criminalized women
are made through these constructions?
3. What implications do these constructions and knowledge claims have for social
work practice and research with criminalized women?
Research Approach
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was particularly well suited to address these
questions for a number of reasons. Firstly, CDA addresses the way power and inequality
are enacted and reproduced in text (van Dijk, 2001). Additionally, it has the researcher
take an explicit political position by exposing and, ultimately, resisting dominance and
inequality. Further, rooted in Foucault’s theories of power and discourse, CDA begins
with the assertion that power and knowledge(s) emerge from discursive practices
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). CDA aims to identify knowledge(s) embedded in
discourse and to examine how such knowledge is then materialized and embodied in
social practices, how it creates subjects, and how it regulates conduct (Jäger & Maier,
2009). In other words, how knowledge is connected to power. Suffice it to say at this
point that this kind of critical exploration on discourse and knowledge has important
structural implications for the future of social work.
While framing criminalization as a social rather than individual problem, I used
CDA to explore how criminalized women are represented in social work high impact
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journals and the discursive effects these representations have on research and practice
with criminalized women. Further, I was interested in understanding how/if social work
participates in the criminalization/transcarceration of certain women as evidenced by this
literature.
Multiracial feminism, post-structural notions of discourse, and Foucault’s concept
of governmentality anchored this research and provided the theoretical and analytical lens
through which I explored the research questions. Situated within both critical and poststructural meta-theoretical frameworks, this structure provided a platform for attending to
issues related to material reality as well as the social constructions of power and identity.
Melding such distinct perspectives into a broader theoretical framework is not without its
tensions. Pease (2002) asks, “If we argue that power is widely diffused through networks
of social relations does it dissolve the critical theorists’ claim that dominant groups
possess power over subordinate groups?” (pg. 139). He thinks not, and goes on to assert
that Foucault’s view of power is not entirely incompatible with critical theory;
acknowledging that power is diffuse does not require an acknowledgment that power is
distributed, or used, equally among social actors. Further, Daly (1997) suggests that
“working the boundary between ‘the discursive’ and ‘the real world’ out there” (p. 42) is
not only possible, but also preferable. She contends that “working the boundary” provides
fuller analyses of the social world and opens theoretical space for methodological
innovation in the social sciences.
I agree with the assertions of Pease and Daly, and believe that the use of both
critical and post-structuralist perspectives allows me to reject essentialism while still
recognizing the very real ways subjectivities are constructed and confined by and within
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institutions. Denzin (2002) states that “everyday life represents a site where power,
ideology, gender and social class circulate and shape one another” (p. 27). From a critical
perspective, the intersections of sexism, racism, and classism shape how crime is
constructed, who is viewed as worthy and unworthy, innocent and guilty, how individuals
come into contact with the system, and the way the system responds to them once they
are there (Chesney-Lind, 2006). From a post-structural perspective, the articulation of
power plays out in the way language constructs subjectivities (Daley, 2010);
constructions of deviance and crime are used to control those who defy standards for
normality and to prescribe sanctions through which their conduct is regulated. Poststructuralism acknowledges gender and crime as social constructions, and therefore
allowed me to attend to the ways in which these constructions emerge to shape
knowledge about individuals as well as social work practice with them.
More specifically, my research focuses on the ways in which written language
prescribes meaning and how such meanings shape the manner in which social workers
intervene. This is more than just a semantic issue. Language is the primary vehicle
through which knowledge is embodied and legitimized, shaping what it is possible to
know in any given historical context (Foucault, 1972). Language sets the stage for the
development of identities and subject positions: both the “criminal” and the “expert”
identity/role. I pose these important discussions in the framing of my research as I wade
through the terrain of social work scholarship in relation to criminalized women.
As previously discussed, I utilized CDA to explore the language used to construct
images, representations, and knowledge about criminalized women in social work
discourse. The ultimate goal of my project was to make visible the current constructions
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of criminalized women in social work, what knowledge is produced through such
constructions, and how such knowledge sanctions certain kinds of research and practice
with criminalized women, for the purpose of opening spaces of possibility for alternative
discourses prescribing social work practice to emerge.
The implications of this research are significant. Social control/regulatory
practices operate across spheres and institutions to criminalize women, and social work is
likely to be one of these spheres. The need for this research is thus situated in a society
where women are increasingly subject to punitive sanctions for decidedly non-criminal
acts and where punishments continue to be inflicted long after women have been
incarcerated and released. As Bosworth and Flavin (2007) assert, “we create a climate
where the person’s debt to society is never paid. We are, in effect, permanently
disenfranchising an entire class of people and jeopardizing their survival” (p.218).
Therefore, I hope my analysis provides useful insights and tools for thinking differently
about criminalized women and the role of social work in relation to them.
Outline of the Chapters
Chapter 2 explains and contextualizes the criminalization of women using two
distinct yet compatible frameworks of analysis: multiracial feminism and Foucault’s
notion of governmentality. Used in conjunction, multiracial feminism and
governmentality offer a conceptual framework for exploring the construction of
criminalization of women in contemporary social work discourse. These major
theoretical models have informed my understanding of the issue and shaped my research
questions. Drawing on Foucault’s idea of governmentality, I outline how women are
uniquely regulated and criminalized by diffuse networks of power through neoliberal
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policy and ideology. Multiracial feminism helps explain how gender, race, class,
sexuality, and other categories determine which women are criminalized, what they are
criminalized for, and the severity of their criminalization. Together, they provide a
platform for analyzing the globalized political and economic realities that impact women
and lead to criminalization. These perspectives make it possible to dispute dominant
discourses concerning women’s offending which individualize and pathologize women;
they allow me to shift the focus away from individuals and onto the systems of social
control that serve to define and confine “normality” and “deviance.” In Chapter 2, each
theory is first explained and then analyzed in relation to the issue at hand. Though a bit
out of the ordinary, I believe that presenting theory before the literature review will give
readers a necessary lens through which to more fully understand my engagement with the
contemporary and historical context.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the relevant literature. Here, I more fully
locate the issue of criminalization within a broader sociopolitical context. This review
explores the experiences of criminalized women in relation to the power regimes in
which they are situated. I review historical and contemporary trends in order to trace the
major ideological threads that shape current day penal policy and contemporary social
service interventions. This is important because, by highlighting the various approaches
to dealing with criminal behavior across time, we can see that ideas of crime and “the
criminal” are socially constructed. Discourse both shapes and is shaped by social
practices (van Dijk, 2001), as such social work interventions can be seen as taking an
active role in constructing an “other” to be managed and “helped.” After all, in order for
there to be a deviant, there must be a normal; and in order to be a helped there must be a
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helper. Therefore, in the process of labeling and diagnosing clients, social work also
comes to define itself. Yet such distinctions are neither straightforward nor natural, as
such value-laden concepts are not impartial and are constituted in the discourses of those
in power. When the construction of something goes unquestioned, its significance
becomes naturalized and taken for granted (Juhila, Poso, Hall, & Parton, 2003).
Therefore, Chapter 3 (and this entire dissertation) is an attempt to disrupt taken-forgranted assumptions that drive research and practice.
Chapter 4 includes an overview of the methodology and research design. Tightly
wound with the chosen methodology of CDA are theories related to language, power, and
truth. Thus, in addition to a discussion of research pragmatics (methods and analysis),
this chapter includes an extended discussion of ontology, epistemology, and the
theoretical concepts framing CDA methodology. In closing Chapter 4, I review the
limitations of my research, evaluative criteria, and ethical considerations.
Chapter 5 presents the study findings and provides an analytic discussion
addressing the research questions. I discuss a number of co-existing constructions present
in the data, focusing heavily on the overriding construction of risk. I trace the manner in
which the construction of risk both relies on and reinscribes a strong neoliberal discourse
on knowing and changing the “responsibilized” self. I then show how depoliticized
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement emerge through these
constructions. I argue that these depoliticized knowledge claims serve to effectively
depoliticize social work itself and foster a larger discursive struggle over the meaning and
purpose of the profession. I end by highlighting how the construction of risk lends itself
to individualized responses and interventions aimed at regulating and changing the
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behavior of individuals. I argue that in its reliance on practices of risk management and a
preference toward micro-level service delivery, social work deploys regulatory practices
that further neoliberal governance (Parton, 1998; Webb, 2003).
In the concluding chapter, I summarize the analysis and implications of this study
and speak to the possibilities for future directions in social work research, practice, and
education. A central aspect of this discussion encourages an ongoing critique of risk
discourses and the ways in which hegemonic practice scripts within social work
contribute to processes of criminalization and the expansion of the carceral state.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Influences
This chapter discusses the theoretical influences that form the conceptual
framework of this research. As stated previously, multiracial feminism and Foucault’s
notion of governmentality have informed my conceptualization of the criminalization of
women as well as the development of my research questions. Specifically, they have
helped me connect women’s criminalization to the social, political, and economic
concerns generated by neoliberal globalization and to conceptualize how power functions
within social work practice. Together, they allow me to see how interlocking structural
inequalities interface with micro-level interactions to construct policy and ideology. This
conceptual framework attends to the role of discourse in shaping subjectivities and power
relations.
Multiracial Feminism
Unable to locate themselves within theories resting primarily on the lives of white
middle class women, women of color have articulated intersectional theories for
analyzing gender (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991; Mehrotra, 2010; Phoenix &
Pattynama, 2006). One such theory, multiracial feminism, was conceived by women of
color as a response to the tendency within mainstream feminism to universalize
experiences of gender. Multiracial feminism centers race as a pervasive structuring
category but also recognizes how “race shapes and is shaped by a variety of other social
relations” (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996, p. 325). The cornerstone of multiracial feminism
is its focus on power relations inherent in difference. It focuses on how privilege and
oppression shape individual opportunity and experience as well as larger cultural norms
and ideology.
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The following concepts distinguish multiracial feminism from other feminisms.
First, gender constructions and relations are based upon other intersecting and
interlocking identities (Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). In other
words, people are gendered in relation to other locations such as race, class, sexuality,
age, ability, etc. Additionally, people are socially situated within systems of power and
privilege. Patricia Hill Collins (1990) refers to systems of inequality that are interlocking,
not additive, which work together to shape identity and status as the “Matrix of
Domination.” Within this framework, systems and identities work through each other,
and people experience their identities in different ways depending on their intersecting
subjectivities within social structures.
Second, systems of power are seen to occur and intersect at all levels of society.
For instance, gender, race, class, and sexuality play out in micro-level social interactions,
cultural ideology, standards set for normality, and macro-level social policy (BurgessProctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). Systems of power operate together to create
privilege as well as oppression; systems of race, class, and gender work simultaneously to
create disadvantages for some, and opportunity and advantage for others. Individuals can
be both oppressed and privileged simultaneously. In this way, multiracial feminism
applies not only to racialized women, but also to white women and people of various
genders3, classes, and sexualities (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996).
Third, multiracial feminism highlights the relational nature of power. Power
relations structure women’s differences; differences are thought to be connected in
structured, systematic ways. (Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996).
3

A caveat being that multiracial feminism does not explicitly address the gender binary.
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Further, dominance and subordination mutually influence one another. In other words,
some women are privileged precisely because other women are disadvantaged and vice
versa. In this way, multiracial feminism avoids essentialism of the category “woman.”
Lastly, multiracial feminism attends to social structure as well as human agency
(Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996) in its recognition of how structured
systems of race, class, gender, etc. shape opportunity and available choices. In other
words, we make choices (exert agency) based on the conditions that shape our lives and
the opportunities available to us, which are largely shaped by our identities and social
locations.
By “underscoring race as a power system that interacts with other structured
inequalities to shape genders” (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996, p. 324), multiracial feminism
highlights the fact that race affects all women but in different ways, namely by
privileging some and disadvantaging others. This is particularly crucial in an analysis of
the criminalization of women because of how Whiteness works to construct idealized
notions of femininity and “appropriate” behavior, which then become held up as the norm
for all women.
Intersections of identity, social locations, and “crime.” As multiracial
feminism purports, social identities shape how we interact with our environment and how
we are constructed by society (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). Social identities reflect not
only how individuals experience themselves in the world, but also how the world
responds to them (Shields, 2008; Winker & Degele, 2011). Women are qualitatively as
well as quantitatively criminalized in different ways based on their social locations.
Intersecting identities define and shape how behavior is labeled as normal or deviant,
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who is more likely to be criminalized, and how woman are criminalized. Therefore,
interlocking systems of oppression contribute to what constitutes crime, who is defined as
“criminal,” and how those individuals are dealt with within systems of power.
Conceptions of crime, who is deemed as “criminal,” and the behaviors that are
constituted as “criminal” are based on dominant political, economic, and social
ideologies of any given time (Abramovitz, 1997). In Gregg Barak’s (2004) words:
To begin with, we regard the criminal justice system as a culturally powerful,
label conferring institution that has evolved in relation to the changing definitions
of ‘crime’ over time. Additionally, we view the defining of ‘crime’ and
‘criminals’ as a product of moral agents, social movements, political interests, and
media dissemination. In other words, what becomes a ‘crime’ and who becomes a
‘criminal’ are politically, economically, and socially constructed phenomena
reproduced daily through various discussions in the streets, the home, the school,
the church, the government, the courts, the airwaves, and other cultural bodies (p.
8).
The ways in which intersecting identities construct a woman as normal or deviant,
and by extension, a “criminal,” are crucial to understanding the underlying systems of
oppression and inequality inherent in the criminal justice system. As I will illustrate in
the next chapter, women have traditionally been judged based on concepts of
“appropriate” female behavior and ideological myths of womanhood. Women’s
involvement with the criminal justice system, in particular, has been fashioned by
historical notions of femininity, which in turn have been shaped by race, class, and
sexuality, among other categories. Dominant notions of femininity evolved in relation to
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white, heterosexual, and privileged class contexts. Simultaneously, racism, heterosexism,
and classism work to deny access to gender norms for certain groups of women.
Furthermore, women who do not or cannot meet idealized notions of femininity are
subject to various forms of suspicion, surveillance, and punitive measures. For instance,
Theodore Roosevelt once asserted that white women who did not, or refused to have,
large families were criminals against their race (Abramovitz, 1994).
Dominant notions of femininity not only color definitions of female criminality,
but also shape how women are judged and treated when they come into contact with the
law, both as victims and as perpetrators. For instance, Crenshaw (1989) discussed how
Black women have historically fallen outside the protection of rape statutes as courts
have instructed juries not to assume the chastity of Black women in the same way they do
for White women. Certain women, based on their intersecting identities, are more likely
to be labeled risky or deviant. This extends to social service systems as well. For
example, in a study of the child protection system, Reich (2005) illuminated how the risk
assessment of a mother’s likelihood to harm her child often involved the mother’s ability
to exhibit a readiness to put the needs of her children before her own.
While recognizing that criminalization is just one mechanism through which
privilege and inequality are maintained, the ways in which the criminal justice system
enacts and reinforces structural oppression are profound (Travis, 2002). The
disproportionate rates of incarceration among poor women and women of color are, in
and of themselves, telling. Yet they also reflect larger systems of discrimination and
structural sources of inequality. As Laberge (1991) said, “The combination of sex, race
and social class creates specific groups who vary in their capacity to elude penal
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treatment, or, if in contact with penal agencies, to neutralize its negative effects” (p. 51).
Surveillance and policing are concentrated in communities of color (Pewewardy &
Severson, 2003) and sentencing policies tend to be more punitive for people from
marginalized social locations (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008). For instance, white-collar
crimes, which have a devastating impact on society and are more likely to be committed
by privileged classed individuals, are less likely than other types of crimes to be noticed
and prosecuted; when they do garner attention, they are often dealt with in a much less
punitive manner than other types of crimes (Pewewardy & Severson, 2003). Further,
when people from more privileged positions do come into contact with the law, they are
less likely to be perceived at threatening or “risky” by the authorities and more likely to
have greater access to needed resources, such as quality defense attorneys. This allows
privileged individuals to subvert some of the more punitive sanctions that are readily
applied to those who occupy marginalized social locations (Sanchez, 2007).
Feminists are increasingly advocating for an intersectional approach to analyzing
the criminalization of women (Chesney-Lind, 2006; Ogle & Batton, 2009; Shields,
2008). Multiracial feminism is particularly useful in such an analysis because it shifts our
gaze from micro to macro, from individual behaviors to positions in society, which are
shaped by interlocking identities and “isms.” For example, Richie (1996) shows how
intersecting systems of gender, race, and class are correlated to the criminal offenses
committed by Black women who experience interpersonal violence. In her analysis,
Richie explains how “some women are forced or coerced into crime by their culturally
expected gender roles, the violence in their intimate relationships, and their social
position in the broader society” (p. 133).
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Multiracial feminism’s emphasis on race and interlocking oppressions that shape
opportunity and experience is particularly salient in relation to Foucault’s idea of
governmentality and its corresponding interrogation of neoliberalism. Viewed through
the conceptual lens of governmentality, government is re-conceptualized more broadly as
actions and interventions that influence, structure, or regulate conduct and is not limited
to the actions of the state, but also includes various institutions of socialization including
school, medicine, the family, and various helping professions, like social work. These
ideas are explained further in the following section.
Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Criminalization
Governmentality. Toward the end of his life, Foucault articulated the notion of
governmentality, which built on his previous ideas of power/knowledge and how they
join to create discourse through which we come to accept reality. According to Foucault,
notions of power as being solely centralized are misleading and incomplete (Rose, 2000).
Rather, power is diffuse and spread throughout society and centers the idea that “political
power does not just act on political subjects, but constructs them in particular ways”
(Larner, 2000, p. 19). Consequently, governmentality has inspired much discussion and
debate on neoliberal evolutions in the welfare state and other forms of governance.
Emerging out of increasing globalization and deindustrialization, neoliberal ideology
rests on the central tenets of individualism, choice and responsibility, market driven
economics, laissez faire, and minimal government (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Comack,
2006; Mallory, 2006; Pollack, 2008). This set of values has driven shifts in policy
agendas from a Keynesian approach, which saw government as necessary to ensure the
basic social wellbeing of all, to one of deregulation and privatization (Larner, 2000).
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Neoliberal ideology eroded government commitment to social welfare and brought forth
the evisceration of health, education, and social services in favor of policies that focus on
individual responsibility and market based rationalities (Comack, 2006; Neve & Pate,
2005). The dismantling of state responsibility for public good has brought with it a hyper
focus on the individual as both the cause of and the solution to social problems. With this
we see an increased reliance on disciplinary measures to manage social ills (Fisher &
Reese, 2010). In other words, the expansion of neoliberal policies involved a rolling back
of the welfare state and a rolling out of the carceral state. The consequences of this are
staggering: high rates of unemployment, inadequate tax structures, and subsequent cuts in
social, welfare, educational, and medical spending. The depletion of a strong social safety
net has thus resulted in high rates of poverty, homelessness, substance abuse, violence,
and inequality (Sudbury, 2002).
Furthermore, viewed from the conceptual lens of governmentality,
neoliberalism’s decree for less government does not equate to less governance, but rather
shifting forms of governance (Carton, 2014). According to the ideas of governmentality,
neoliberalism can be seen as “shaping both political programs and individual
subjectivities” (Larner, 2000, p. 9) which in turn creates a populace of individual actors,
groups, communities, and agencies that regulate society because they have internalized
and adopted neoliberal notions of security and responsibilization; what Pollack and
Rossiter (2010) refer to as the “entrepreneurial subject.” Governmentality is described by
Sanchez (2007) as the “tactics, technologies, and institutions that constitute governance
through populations” (p. 169). In essence, larger geographical spaces and operations of
social control based on neoliberal ideology are created and diffused throughout society.
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Rose (2000) points out that under neoliberal strategies of rule, people and places
are governed not from above (the state) but through diverse and diffuse technologies of
government, which include ideologies and practices, infused into the very fabric of
existence. Everyday places such as the workplace, educational institutions, and health and
welfare agencies become mechanisms for surveillance, regulation, and control of
conduct. Technologies of government congeal so as to become commonplace and
invisible (Sanchez, 2007). Under this framework, non-conformity, rather than illegal acts,
implicitly becomes the focus of governance. Like the critique provided by multiracial
feminism, governmentality highlights a system of power in which individuals become
governed by themselves and their social interactions through the production,
internalization, and regulation of norms, rather than just through the application of law.
Rose (2000) portrays neoliberal societies as designed for inclusion and exclusion.
Inclusive spaces are created to ensure security and keep outsiders out. Insider and
outsider status are shaped by social locations, which are structured into society across
lines of race, class, and gender. People from marginalized social locations tend to occupy
spaces of “exclusion” and are subject to multiple forms of risk management, such as
surveillance and policing, to which those from more privileged positions are not. In
addition, social and penal policies tend to be more punitive for people from marginalized
social locations (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Travis, 2002). Larner
(2000) states that “neo-liberalism is both a political discourse about the nature of rule and
a set of practices that facilitate the governing of individuals from a distance” (p. 6). As
such, understanding contemporary neoliberal strategies as a form of governmentality
provides a practical method of exploring the criminalization of women in contemporary
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society; criminalized women often occupy multiple zones of exclusion, and these
theoretical understandings can help shed light on why and how women are being
criminalized and punished in increasing numbers.
Social work and discourses of risk. As stated previously, neoliberalism has
brought forth a slew of political rationalities and governmental technologies that enable
shifting forms of governance. That is, governance is no longer limited to actions of the
state. Increasingly, non-state actors are stepping in to prescribe and regulate a politics of
conduct that ultimately aligns with governmental interests. Social work figures
prominently in this space and the last 40 years have seen a drastic reconfiguration in the
role of social work. A push toward managerialism4 and professionalization alongside
obligations to funders that value efficiency over effectiveness, adherence to evidencebased practice interventions, and documentation of measurable outcomes has transformed
social work in a number of ways. Social work has seen an increasing emphasis on
resource management and individual level service delivery over community organizing
and macro-level analysis/change. Subsequently, the assessment and management of risk
has supplanted a more holistic approach to meeting client needs. Such changes reflect the
neoliberal political climate and align social work with penal institutions in troubling
ways.
Pollack (2013) contends that the narrow definitions of “success” that flow out of
evidence-based practices limit practitioners’ ability to engage effectively with

4

Managerialism emphasizes a reliance on economic efficiency and calls for accountability marked by
superficial counts of contacts, time in service, targets, etc. It is argued that the social democratic goals of
social work are undermined as the administration of social services increasingly reflects management
practices typical of the private sector (Harlow, 2003; Rogowski, 2011).
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criminalized women and take away women’s ability to define their experience and needs
for themselves. For instance, in qualitative studies, peer counseling and support has been
found effective in helping women successfully reintegrate into the community upon
release from prison (Richie, 2001; Sowards et al., 2006). However, stringent rules applied
to women after they have been criminalized (by both welfare systems and penal systems)
often hinge their success on staying out of contact with peers (Pollack, 2013). This is
premised on a logic embedded in “risk thinking” that sees interactions with other
offenders as a risk factor rather than a resilience factor. Therefore, an aspect of
reintegration that women view as helpful toward meeting their goals not only goes
unrecognized, but is also penalized. Pollack (2013) further argues that the underlying
philosophy of risk reduction strategies is problematic because it embeds social work
practice in a framework of risk rather than welfare.
Feminist scholars label risk management strategies, which define needs in terms
of risk, as “risk thinking,” and view it as a product of neoliberal governing (Pollack,
2008). Risk thinking has a long history in penal systems (Hannah-Moffat, 2006) and has
increasingly become ubiquitous in social work practice (Parton, 1998). A central element
of risk thinking involves predicting the likelihood of harm to self, others, or society.
Individual level interventions based on notions of empowerment and choice are closely
aligned with risk thinking. Such interventions not only reinforce notions of an individual
needing to be fixed (Donohue & Moore, 2009; Maidment, 2007; Pollack, 2008), but in
their reliance on “self-surveillance” and “self-regulation” also serve as another form of
governmentality. Risk based interventions often emphasize empowerment, “healthy”
choices, and the development of self-esteem and self-management skills. Such
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interventions function to create subjects who can act upon themselves so the authorities
do not have to. Women who internalize discourses of choice and responsibility are more
likely to be seen as lower risk and therefore have increased eligibility for parole and other
leniencies.
This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, placing emphasis on the
management and regulation of individual risk obscures structural factors, such as poverty,
addiction, unemployment, homelessness, and inadequate social assistance that bring
women into contact with the criminal justice system (Hannah-Moffat, 2006; Pollack,
2008). Second, practices built on risk thinking consequently pathologize women’s coping
skills and resistance to poverty and violence. After all, it is often social exclusion that
propels many women to engage in strategies of survival that become branded as
“criminal.” Rather than examining factors such as poverty, exposure to violence,
unemployment, and lack of childcare as structural factors needing to be remedied, risk
thinking turns the consequences of social exclusion and oppression into individual issues
that should then be effectively managed and resolved through therapy and empowerment
(Pollack, 2008). Within this framework, men who use violence and forms of institutional
violence are not considered to be the risk in need of intervention. This issue is
exemplified in violence prevention programming that relies on educating girls and
women about healthy relationships and strategies to keep themselves safe. Though a
necessary component to violence prevention work, the practice reifies the dominant
discourse that holds girls and women responsible for the violence they experience.
Lastly, thinking in terms of risk is a powerful normalization mechanism and relies
on universalized notions of “woman.” For women, issues of normality and risk are bound
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up in dominant notions of femininity. When one is deemed to fall outside of what is
considered a universal “normal,” actions are then taken to change the character, selfesteem, or thinking patterns of the “risky” person (Pollack, 2008). Further, within
neoliberal rationalities, risk-avoiding behavior is seen as a moral imperative as it involves
issues of self-control, responsibility, and self-improvement (Lupton, 1999).
Neoliberalism would have us believe that “crime” is a result of a failure of a
defective individual. A Foucauldian analysis, on the other hand, recognizes crime as a
historical construct situated in time and space (Laberge, 1991; Rose, 2000). The
construction of risk is no different. Pollack (2008) states,
The many biases inherent within risk assessments have been clearly illustrated. It
has been argued that risk assessments themselves play a large role in constituting
what is defined as risk. Risk assessments have also been found to be highly
subjective and moralistic enterprises (p. 1274).
Hannah-Moffat (2006) asserts that interpreting social exclusion, victimization, and needs
as risk essentializes differences among women, neglects attention to structural
disadvantages, and imposes normative criteria for success that are often based on white
middle class values. As such, strategies of risk management and “preventative”
community programs can be said to expand, rather than displace, the reach of the
criminal justice system.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed multiracial feminism and governmentality as theoretical
lenses through which to further explore the construction of criminalization of women in
contemporary social work discourse. These theoretical perspectives examine the
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relationship between criminalization, structural inequality, and neoliberal globalization.
They help me conceptualize power as not only repressive, but also productive in terms of
shaping subjectivities. Through this conceptual framework, one can see how the role of
social work(er) is reconfigured under a neoliberal climate so as to function as a part of the
widening net of transcarceral control. The next chapter provides an overview of the
relevant literature in order to examine the lager sociopolitical and historical context
within which this research is situated.
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Chapter 3: Contextualizing the Research
This chapter surveys the relevant literature related to the criminalization of
women in order to provide a larger context to locate this study of how criminalized
women are constructed in the social work academic literature. Having a detailed review
of the broader socio-political and historical context on hand is necessary for my project
because CDA requires multiple dimensions of analysis. CDA requires the analyst to
move between text and context in order to focus on what the discourse says, what it does,
and the conditions that make the discourse possible. Text analysis alone can take one
only so far; texts need to be analyzed, not in isolation, but rather as situated within their
larger contexts.
This review of the literature discusses (1) the sociopolitical context that has given
rise to mass incarceration and increased criminalization of women; (2) the consequences
of increased criminalization and mass incarceration; and (3) historical and more
contemporary perspectives on, and interventions with, criminalized women. It is my hope
that the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapter provides the basis for a
deeper understanding of the elements discussed in this literature review.
Sociopolitical Context
The 1970s marked a period of systematic mass imprisonment and heavy reliance
on formal social controls targeted primarily at marginalized populations (Sokoloff, 2005).
Since the mid-seventies, the war on drugs and the rise of the prison industrial complex
has spawned a dramatic increase in the incarceration of women worldwide (Bagley &
Merlo, 1995; Chandler, 2003; Sokoloff, 2005). Poor women and women of color
disproportionately fill the space in prisons, jails, and community corrections and the
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majority are incarcerated for non-violent crimes5 (Sentencing Project, 2018b). The United
States, in particular, has the fastest growing rate and the highest number of incarcerated
women in the world (Chandler, 2003). Between 1950 and1980, the United States opened
two to three new state and federal facilities for women every ten years. Beginning in the
1980s, women began to be criminalized and incarcerated at unprecedented rates; in 1970
there were 5,600 women in jails and prisons, by 1995 there were 75,000 (Sudbury, 2002),
in 2016 there were 213,722 (Carson, 2018). To accommodate these sharp increases, 34
new facilities for women were opened in the U.S. during the 1980s alone (Chesney-Lind,
2002).
It is important to note that the population of imprisoned men (particularly men of
color) also grew dramatically during the same time. Although women have always, and
still do, reflect a smaller proportion of the imprisoned population, their rates of
imprisonment have far outpaced that of men’s (Sentencing Project, 2018b; Sudbury,
2002). While the number of incarcerated men doubled between 1985 and 1995, the
number of women tripled (Sudbury, 2002). Currently 1.2 million women are under the
supervision of the criminal justice system, including prison, jail, probation, and parole
(Sentencing Project, 2018). Community supervision (parole and probation) accounts for
the largest proportion at just fewer than 1.1 million. This latter number is significant
because, as Angela Davis reminds us, mass incarceration is not just about physical bodies
that are celled, but also about all the people who are doing time on the outside (Praxis
Center, 2018). Furthermore, community supervision mechanisms, despite professed
intentions of diversion, often function as a back door to incarceration.
5

Disproportionate to white, privilege classed women.
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Dramatic increases in criminalization are largely attributed to punitive social
policies and sentencing enhancements that have emerged in the later part of the 20th
century, such as “three strikes you’re out,” mandatory minimums, and truth in sentencing
(Franklin, 2008; Mauer & King, 2007; Sentencing Project, 2018b). Sentencing
enhancements have been adopted on both the federal and state level and have been driven
largely by the “war on drugs” (Zhang et al., 2009). Mandatory minimum sentencing
guidelines have replaced treatment and community service options when drugs are
involved and reflect a policy choice to treat substance use and addiction as a criminal
issue rather than a public health problem (Mauer & King, 2007). Mandatory minimums
increase not only the number of people being sentenced to prison but also the time they
spend there, causing rates of incarceration and overcrowding to increase dramatically
(Mascharka, 2000; Pallone & Henessey, 2003; Zhang et.al,. 2009).
Sentencing enhancements frame incarceration as the intervention best suited to
deal with the problem of “crime” (Drake, Aos & Miller, 2009; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007;
Tripodi et. al., 2011). However, research has shown that the widespread belief that
incarceration, as well as the threat of longer-term sentences acts as a deterrent, is
inaccurate (JFA Institute, 2007; Mascharka, 2000; Mauer, 2011; Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission, 2011). In order for the deterrence argument to hold water, one must have
some understanding of the consequences of an action before committing said action and
one must also actively think about those consequences before committing an act.
However, studies have shown that offenders in general, and ones under the influence in
particular, are less likely to think about the consequences of their actions in the moment
of committing them (JFA Institute, 2007; Mauer, 2011). Further, scholars note that many
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people who commit crimes do not have prior knowledge of sentencing laws necessary in
order to be deterred from their consequences (JFA Institute, 2007; Mascharka, 2000;
Mauer, 2011). Overall, increased sentencing has not been shown to have a deterrent
effect and research does not support the use of increased sentencing as an effective drug
control strategy (Greene, 2004; Pew, 2009).
In fact, as documented in their meta-analysis of correctional rehabilitation, Lipsey
and Cullen (2007) show that incarceration actually works to increase recidivism.
Likewise, research on mandatory minimum sentencing policies has shown that they are
ineffective at reducing crime and result in increased incarceration rates and criminal
justice spending (Gill, 2008; Vincent & Hofer, 1994). For instance, Oregon enacted its
first mandatory minimum (Measure 11) in 1995, increasing the prison population by 66%
in the first year (Greene, 2004; Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 2011). To
accommodate these increases, Oregon’s correctional budget has since increased more
than 250% to spending that is currently at about $1.4 billion dollars per year (Oregon
Legislative Fiscal Office, 2011). Sentencing expert Michael Tonry states, “As
instruments of public policy, mandatory minimums do little good and much harm” (as
quoted in Gill, 2008, p. 56).
Advocates of strict sentencing guidelines posit that removing discretion in the
sentencing process creates uniformity in sentencing and counteracts racial disparities in
the criminal justice system (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Comack, 2006). What these
proponents fail to account for is the myriad ways in which discretion based on
discrimination occurs before a defendant even steps foot in court, including surveillance,
policing, and prosecution (Small, 2001). For instance, though judges are bound by
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sentencing guidelines, prosecutors can still use their discretion in determining the charge
a defendant faces. Further, police routinely use their discretion, which many (myself
included) would argue is shaped by cultural bias, in law enforcement practices. Thus,
discretion is not removed but transferred (Mascharka, 2000; Tonry, 2007; Zhang et al.,
2009). Additionally, instead of judiciary discretion, prosecutors are afforded more
leverage when in the plea bargaining process (Oregon Criminal Justice Commission,
2011). Prosecutors decide the charge and the charge decides the sentence. This is
problematic for many reasons.
First, prosecutorial decisions and plea-bargaining take place behind closed doors;
therefore they are not subject to public scrutiny in the same way judicial decision-making
may be (Mascharka, 2000; Tonry, 2006). Tonry (2006) states, “the resulting hypocrisy
and lack of transparency compound the problems of unjust sentences and stark
disparities” (p. 46). By removing accountability, the justice system is ultimately
counterproductive toward the goal of uniformity in sentencing.
Second, research shows that in the plea bargaining process, higher-level drug
dealers are more likely to give information for reduced sentences (Mascharka, 2000;
Zhang et al., 2009). They often exchange the names of others, lower in the drug trade, for
reduced charges. As a result, unintended populations, without the valuable information
needed to plea, are brought into the court’s grasp. So, although mandatory minimums
intend to target high-level dealers in the drug trade, the plea-bargaining process instead
criminalizes many others who hold only minor roles in the drug trade. Furthermore, it has
been noted that high-level drug dealers are rarely caught with large amounts of drugs;
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they often employ couriers or “mules” who, if caught, often have no information to offer
in exchange for a plea (Tonry, 2006).
Lastly, it has been noted that the plea-bargaining process uniquely and
differentially impacts women (Allen et al., 2010; Balfour, 2006; Jefferson Smith &
Young, 2003). Women are the most likely to be low-level foot soldiers in the drug trade,
working for, or with, people they will not or cannot willingly hand over to the authorities.
Therefore, women are also the most vulnerable to arrest and punishment (Sudbury, 2002;
Toscano, 2005). In this manner, the war on drugs has criminalized alarmingly more
women than men (Balfour 2006; Sudbury, 2002; Toscano, 2005). In 2016, 25% of
females in state prisons and 56% in federal prisons were convicted of a drug offense,
compared to 14% and 47% of male prisoners respectively (Carson, 2018).
Social and economic neoliberalism. Mass incarceration and increased
criminalization also reflect neoliberal social and economic changes within an already
stratified society. Neoliberal transformations in the economy have contributed to
women’s poverty across the globe and have brought an increasing number of women into
contact with the criminal justice system (Pollack, 2008). Increases in imprisonment rates
have occurred concurrently with decreased spending in the areas of social services,
education, and health. Research has shown that women’s economic disadvantage coupled
with the divestment of health and social services may increase their involvement in
property crimes (Chesney-Lind, 2002). Indeed, it becomes clear that punitive changes in
welfare and sentencing policies have contributed to women’s lack of opportunity and
subsequent increased criminalization.
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Here, I must draw attention to the fact that although all women are susceptible to
the negative impacts of neoliberalism, poor women, trans women, and women of color
are more adversely affected than white and privileged classed women (Chandler, 2003;
Neve & Pate, 2005). For instance, pregnant women of color are disproportionately
subjected to discriminatory drug testing from the medical profession (Sudbury, 2002;
Toscano, 2005). Although research proves no serious health effects for infants whose
mothers used drugs without other confounding factors such as poverty and lack of
prenatal care and nutrition, prenatal drug use is sanctioned in many states as a measure of
child abuse or neglect and medical professionals are required to report suspected use of
drugs during pregnancy to Child Protective Services (Sudbury, 2002; Toscano, 2005).
Women who are pregnant and found using drugs may then be indicted on charges of
manslaughter or child abuse and have their parental rights terminated (Bosworth, 2007;
Chesney-Lind, 2002; Solinger et al., 2010). Punitive policies such as these have not been
found to act as a deterrent to substance use, but they have been shown to act as a
deterrent to accessing prenatal care which could mitigate or prevent any serious health
effects of substance use for both mothers and infants (Stengel, 2014; Young, 1994).
Furthermore, current drug sentencing policies systematically imprison poor
women of color because they target women and communities of color in specific and
unique ways—so much so that some refer to the war on drugs as the “war on poor Black
women” (Sokoloff, 2005). People of color are disproportionately impacted by punitive
drug polices, particularly in the case of crack, for which the punishment is 100 times
harsher than for that of powder cocaine (Pewewardy & Severson, 2003). According to
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records, although only 34% of crack users are African American, in 1994 they
represented 90% of those charged with federal crack offenses (Pewewardy & Severson,
2003). Further, as women of color are most likely to be the low level foot soldiers within
the transnational drug trade, they are also the most susceptible to arrest and punishment
(Sudbury, 2002; Toscano, 2005).
Many scholars note that the policy and funding changes which came about with
the war on drugs and welfare reform are aimed at restricting upward mobility of the poor
and blaming them for their plight (Bagley & Merlo, 1995; Bosworth, 2007; ChesneyLind, 2002; Franklin, 2008; Sheldon, 2008; Sokoloff, 2005; Solinger et al., 2010). Fine
and Weis (2000) centralize the discourse around structural violence:
While crime and violence are central concerns for poor and working-class
women, building more and more prisons accelerates the undermining of poor and
working class communities, and disrupts the lives of children who are then
exported through the foster care system (p. 1144).
By decreasing funding for services for the poor and increasing funding for prisons,
poverty is perversely criminalized. In other words, there is a direct relationship between
neoliberal policies and the increased criminalization of poor women of color (Neve &
Pate, 2005).
The impact of neoliberal penal practices has had a profound effect on immigration
policy as well. Gripped by anti-immigration sentiments, the U.S. has produced new
regulations creating an increase in the incarceration of immigrant women (Bosworth,
2007; Solinger et al., 2010). Currently, the targets of these policies are primarily Latina
women. What’s unique to the past two or three decades are the ways in which prison
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building businesses are involved in creating and lobbying for punitive immigration
policies. Now dubbed the “prison industrial complex,” criminal justice is increasingly
being farmed out by the state to for-profit industries (Chandler, 2003; Mallory, 2006;
Neve & Pate, 2005). The prison industrial complex describes the relationship among
criminal justice, corporations, and policymakers, which serves the financial interests of
the elite and results in the mass incarceration of marginalized populations. Fisher and
Reece (2010) describe the prison industrial complex as “the broad range of powerful
interests benefiting from and promoting incarceration” (p.5). Scholars and activists
critical of the prison industrial complex are increasingly responding to it as an inherently
racist system that is used as an inadequate response to social problems caused by
globalization and neoliberalism (Sudbury, 2002). For the purpose of bolstering profit, the
prison industrial complex has been proven to be a driving force for punitive immigration
policy (Bosworth, 2007; Solinger et al., 2010). New for-profit detention centers are being
built to accommodate solely immigrant women and children (Bosworth, 2007; Solinger et
al., 2010). The long-reaching effects of neoliberal policies are compounded when
collateral consequences, which serve to limit the opportunities and citizenship rights of
those incarcerated and formerly incarcerated, are imposed at state and federal levels
(Travis, 2002).
Collateral consequences. In addition to the visible embodiment of punishment
experienced through incarceration and community corrections, there are also a plethora of
less visible sanctions, called collateral consequences (Balfour, 2006; Travis, 2002).
Collateral consequences refer to the “laws and regulations that serve to diminish the
rights and privileges of those convicted of crimes” (Travis, 2002, p. 16). This relatively
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invisible punishment, unlike expansion of the prison and criminal justice system, goes
largely unnoticed by society at large. Policies in child welfare, social assistance, voting,
employment, education, and housing, to name a few, intersect in complex ways to exert
social control and social exclusion before, during, and after contact with the law
(Bosworth & Flavin, 2007; Comack, 2006; Travis, 2002).
Collateral consequences are molded out of regulatory policies, enacted on the
federal, state, and sometimes local level. They provide sanctions to those with
convictions that extend beyond the prison walls. To name but a few: individuals
convicted of a felony are permanently denied access to many of the rights of citizenship
such as the right to vote, to own guns, and to hold public office (Travis, 2002). Those
with felony convictions are denied access to federal student loans (Travis, 2002). In many
states, those convicted of drug offenses can have their driver’s license suspended and be
denied access to public assistance (welfare), public housing, and food stamps (Travis,
2002). With expanded access to criminal background checks, many employers and rental
agencies/landlords can deny jobs and housing based on past offenses (Brewer & Heitzeg,
2008). These examples are particularly problematic since the conditions of
probation/parole often include securing employment; likewise, welfare reform of 1996
requires that individuals work a certain number of hours in order to receive public
assistance. All this becomes more and more unattainable for those convicted of felonies.
In effect, collateral sanctions serve to restrict the mobility of “offenders,” limit options
for survival, and reinforce their status as criminalized. They undermine the goals of
reintegration and increase recidivism rates.
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Further, such regulatory policies have uniquely gendered impacts. For instance,
many women in prison are mothers who had primary care of the children before
incarceration (Bosworth, 2007; Chesney-Lind, 2002; Solinger et al., 2010). The passage
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 initiates mandatory termination
of parental rights after 15 months of a child’s placement in foster care, thus serving as a
double punishment for women with drug offenses whose sentences may start at 15
months as dictated by mandatory minimums (Bosworth, 2007; Chesney-Lind, 2002;
Solinger et al., 2010). Additionally, child welfare requirements often include the ability to
secure and maintain stable housing. However, the potential to be denied housing based on
past convictions creates extra barriers for women who are trying to regain custody of
their children. These examples highlight the gendered impact of intersecting punitive
criminal justice and social/child welfare policies. Furthermore, given that women from
marginalized social locations are more likely to be criminalized, it follows that
marginalized communities will be differentially impacted by collateral sanctions. In this
manner, criminalization serves to reinforce and perpetuate larger societal inequalities.
Brewer and Heitzeg (2008) profoundly state:
The scale, scope, and extremes of negative consequences—both direct and
collateral—for communities of color are new, especially for women, but the role
of criminal justice in policing, prosecuting, imprisoning, and executing people of
color has deep historical roots. What is not new is the racist and classist economic
and political agenda that is foundational. The paradigms shift from essentialist to
color blind and the practices of oppression are refined and renamed, but the

54
resulting inequality remains much the same. The law and its attendant machinery
were, and still are, enforcers of both White supremacy and capitalist interests (p.
630).
As I have shown, the consequences of criminalizing women do not begin or end
with the criminal justice system. Ultimately, research shows that punitive sanctions and
policies, in or out of prison, serve to further isolate and exclude already marginalized
members of society (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007; Pollack, 2005), and “fail to challenge the
logic of punishment as a response to social problems” (Sudbury, 2000, p. 137). Felony
disenfranchisement is yet another thread in the transcarceral net of control.
Historical Context
Mary Bosworth (2000) calls for the examination of the beliefs and social
institutions of a society in a given time in order to accurately analyze women’s
criminalization. This is important because the current trends in criminalization reflect
historical patterns of oppression and injustice across lines of gender, race, and class.
Feminist historians highlight how the intersections of race, class, sexuality, and gender
have “shaped not only which women were incarcerated, but also how they were treated
inside” (Bosworth, 2000, p. 267). Today, these intersections also shape how they are
treated once they return to their communities. In essence, female criminality cannot be
explained, examined, or defined without including the historical context of gender
constructions and unequal power relations in society at large. Therefore, the historical
review that follows is an attempt to trace the emergence of discourses regarding sexuality
and femininity that serve as the basis for criminalizing women who fall outside of
dominant norms and expectations. In order to discuss differential treatment among
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various groups of women and to highlight the role that race, class, and sexuality play in
shaping women’s lives and the justifications for punishment, it is necessary to first set the
stage by explaining larger dominant ideologies regarding gender and the forces that have
established gender norms. I offer this as a caveat to the reader in order to make explicit
that these dominant ideologies are built on standards to which not all women can
conform. This historical review allows for a more thorough understanding of the
development of the various approaches to explaining and penalizing female criminality as
well as the role of social work in responding to the plight of criminalized women and
shaping interventions for them.
The “Cult of True Womanhood.” Prior to the 18th century, gender norms did
not serve to define femininity in the same ways as in later times. This is largely attributed
to the agrarian economy of the time, in which economic production took place within
households. The 19th century brought forth a shift in market relations and the
development of a middle class (Colvin, 1997; Pollock, 1995; Sheldon, 2008; Young &
Spencer, 2007). With the rise of a market economy, economic production was taken out
of the household and the role of the “woman” began to change. No longer needed for
economic production, women were relegated to roles of childbearing, nurturing, and daily
household chores. This shift marked the introduction of a separate “women’s sphere” in
which home came to be seen as the realm of women, and work the domain of men
(Colvin, 1997; Pollock, 1995). These material changes to economic and social life
brought discursive changes to the ideology regarding femininity. The development of a
“women’s sphere” ushered forth notions of women’s morality and sexual purity that did
not exist in public discourse prior to the 19th century (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995).
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Ideas of “True Womanhood” which asserted that a woman’s true nature is pure,
selfless, asexual, and weak began to shape the lives of women (Colvin, 1997; Freedman,
1981; Pollock, 1995; Sheldon, 2008). Some women could conform to this new role more
easily than others, but for those who could not or would not, deviations were met with
disapproval and punishment (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983;
Sheldon, 2008; Young & Spencer, 2007). Women had historically been punished for
moral crimes and crimes of poverty, but these crimes now took on a new meaning based
on a woman’s social location. As Zedner (1991) remarks, “The female criminal, the
prostitute, and the female drunk were held up as the very negation of the feminine ideal, a
warning to other women to conform” (p. 320). Women who committed crimes were
viewed in one of two ways, both based on the ideal of true womanhood. They were
considered either 1) inherently different from most women, morally depraved, and
unredeemable; or 2) “pure” women who were simply the victims of male lust. The former
was the predominant view prior to the Civil War. In 1833, Francis Leiber stated, “A
woman, when she commits a crime, acts more in contradiction to her whole moral
organization, i.e., must be more depraved, must have sunk already deeper than a man”
(Rafter, 1983, p. 138). It was thought that women, as the moral gatekeepers for society,
injured society more through their criminality than men through theirs. Moreover, women
were seen as responsible for men’s immoral behavior (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981;
Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008).
The latter perspective, which purported a view of female criminality that held
men responsible for the moral downfall of women, came out of the Female Reform
Societies, largely led by feminists and social workers of the time, and had the greatest
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impact on policy during the late 19th century (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock,
1995; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). The approach of the Reform Societies marks a
discursive distinction from viewing women who committed crimes as dangerous to
viewing them as risky and at-risk (Lupton, 1999). The Reform Societies saw women as
“civilizers of male society” and in need of rehabilitation as opposed to punishment.
However, the reformers had little impact on treatment of criminal women until the rise of
the reformatories in the progressive era. In Antebellum America, female offenders were
often referred to as “fallen women.” The times epitomized the Madonna/whore duality in
which women were viewed as “virginal, pure, asexual, and an uplifting influence. Yet, at
the same time, women were also seen as Eve-like, both corrupt and corrupting” (Zedner,
1991, p. 320). However, this view of femininity did not apply to all women. Poor women
and Black women were more likely than their White counterparts to be incarcerated and
were viewed as especially heinous and beyond redemption (Young & Spencer, 2007).
The mid 19th century marked an increase in the criminalization of poverty among
women. Women were displaced from factory work by immigration, and poverty among
single women began to grow. During this time there was a decline in reform efforts
among feminists and social reformers and an increase in charitable work, the emergence
of which fit with larger societal beliefs of the time that held the poor responsible for their
plight (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Sheldon, 2008). Later, in the 1860s, the sphere of
the woman once again expanded in response to the needs of a civil war (Colvin, 1997;
Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). Increasing numbers of privileged classed,
White women capitalized on society’s belief in maternal nature embedded in the ideal of
true womanhood to gain work and assist in the war effort.
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Social feminism. Estelle Freedman (1979) describes the social feminism
embedded in the Progressive Era as “an era of separate female organization and
institution building” (p. 517). After the Civil War, middle and upper class women were
increasingly being educated and seeking ways to use their newfound skills in a male
dominated world that systematically excluded women from professions. Notably, women
entered the field6 of social work in high numbers during this time (Abrams & Curran,
2000). These women turned their attention, once again, to social reform efforts. They
were “imbued with the mission of bringing their female values to bear on the entire
society” (Freedman, 1979, p. 518). Unlike radical feminists of the time, social feminists
sought to mitigate oppressive social conditions, not change them. They embraced and
bolstered assumptions about gender and femininity by introducing sexist sentiments into
public policy (Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983). Freedman states,
Like the separate but equal racial ideology, however, social feminist strategy
rested on a contradictory definition of equality. The 19th century prison reformers
did seek to expand women’s rights when they argued for greater authority over
public policy and improved treatment for women prisoners. But at the heart of
their program was the principle of innate sexual difference, not sexual equality
(1981, p. 47).
Though perhaps well intended, these efforts shaped and continue to shape the gender
norms that form the foundation of criminal justice and social work practice with
criminalized women today.

6

Field is a broader term than profession or discipline and is used throughout this document to account for
those without formal training/education in social work, as well as both academics and practitioners.
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Social reformers, including social workers from Settlement Houses, focused their
energies on many areas of reform targeted specifically at women, including women’s
prison reform efforts (Abrams & Curran, 2000; Freedman, 1981; Sheldon, 2008).
Scholars note that the social reform movements of the time involved mostly middle class
White women, who participated in a “variety of reforms aimed at improving the lot of the
dependent and defective classes” (Rafter, 1983, p. 153). Reformers purported a belief in
women’s superior morality and saw the prison as a source of impurity. Their mission,
then, was to protect and reform women. They advocated for complete segregation by age,
gender, and degree of crime. Treatment/intervention was then dictated in accordance with
women’s “true nature” and was to be provided by feminine women. The reformatory
model was deemed suitable for this purpose.
Rise of the Reformatories. In 1870 the American Prison Association held its first
annual convention in Cincinnati and established the American Correctional Association’s
Initial Declaration of Principles, consisting of 37 principles, which lay the foundation of
some of the disparate treatment in criminal justice that we see today. Among other things,
these principles called for: separate institutions for women; indeterminate sentencing; and
training and education for inmates (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Friedman, 1993;
Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). Historians note that these principles moved penology from
taking an environmental approach, which looked at societal causes for crime, to a more
medical approach, which attempted to correct flaws and rehabilitate the wayward
(Colvin, 1997; Friedman, 1993; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008).
By melding the Declaration of Principles with ideas about what it means to be
feminine (and a staunch belief regarding fundamental differences between the sexes),
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women reformers were instrumental in shifting the discourse about women’s penology
(Rafter, 1983). Indeterminate sentences dictated by this new approach to penology
explicated a “three-year law” specifically for women, based not on the severity of a crime
but on the need to “reform.” The three-year law declared that women could serve up to
three year sentences for misdemeanors such as “disorderly conduct, vagrancy, lewd
behavior.” These types of offenses were often used as a stand-in for suspected
prostitution (Colvin, 1997, p. 157).
Meanwhile, men commonly served much shorter sentences or simply received a
fine for similar offenses, continuing a longstanding gendered pattern of differential
sentencing. Differential sentencing was upheld on the grounds that more time was needed
for the reform of the “fallen” woman, while men’s behavior was seen as “normal” and
not in need of rehabilitation. In 1865 an annual report of the Indiana Reformatory
Institution stated that they aimed to reform women so that they could “occupy the
position assigned to them by God, viz., wives, mothers and educators of children”
(Colvin, 1997, p. 163). Thus began a legacy of a double standard, which promoted and
enforced stereotypes of femininity that did not and do not apply to men.
After the convention, widespread establishment of the female reformatory was set
in motion. The reformatory was conceived by Elizabeth Fry as a “notion of prison
exclusively for women, administered by women, in which inmates would receive moral
and domestic training” (Rafter, 1983, p. 146). During this time there was also a societal
shift in the discourse regarding “fallen” women; they came to be seen as childlike and led
astray, not depraved and beyond redemption (Agonito, 1977; Freedman, 1979; Freedman,
1981; Rafter, 1983). Reformatories primarily housed White women convicted of

61
misdemeanors, as they were thought to be capable of salvation and reform7 (Freedman,
1981; Rafter, 1983). Women of color, however, were excluded from reformatories as
they were seen as less worthy of effort, not capable of “true femininity,” and less capable
of reform; consequently they were primarily sentenced to harsher custodial institutions
(Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995). Women reformers saw themselves as
protectors of morality, and the goal of the reformatory was to create “good” women. In
her historical analysis regarding the incarceration of women, Nicole Rafter (1983) notes
that the reformatory model was primarily based on already established institutions for
children. Women were governed in a maternal fashion and disciplined like children. A
point system, in which women lost points for un-ladylike behavior (talking loudly,
pouting) was utilized.
The reformatories were run by middle and upper class women and focused on
training women for domestic duties (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995;
Rafter, 1983). The “rehabilitation” consisted of training defined in “gender-specific”
terms:
Instructions were tailored to what was considered the childlike, domestic, and
asexual nature of the true woman. In the course of establishing prisons that would,
proponents hoped, transform fallen women into true women, reformatory
advocates institutionalized the double standard. From today’s perspective, their
efforts to save seemed to have condemned their charges both to narrow programs

7

It is important to note that such offenses were either not recognized as offenses in men or men were
simply fined and/or served brief sentences (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983).
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and to care which, because it assumed adult women were childlike, was often
infantilizing (Rafter, 1983, p.150).
Reformers insisted on an all women staff for a variety of reasons: they sought to
eliminate sexual exploitation by male guards; they assumed that middle/upper-class
women could serve as positive role models for “fallen” women; and they believed
women were more able to understand the needs and concerns of other women. Given the
differences in class and social status between matrons and their charges, the idea of
“understanding role models” is questionable (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter,
1983). Rafter states:
It is not clear that these administrators were well prepared to understand the
inmates’ problems, particularly those that related to social class, work and
independence. On the contrary, it was in part the failure of the founders of
reformatories to tolerate sexual and other mildly deviant behaviors of working
class women, which led to the founding of reformatories in the first place (1983,
pp. 159-160).
With an increase in antagonism toward the poor during the close of the 19th century,
reformatories were used to restore “true womanhood” and overcome what were thought
of as inherent defects of the poor. While intended to protect women from harsh treatment
in the custodial institutions, the invention of the reformatory also served as an expansion
of the state’s control over women. In line with a Foucauldian analysis, the reformatories’
approach to rehabilitation and treatment represents new forms of punishment and
governance, rather than alternatives to it. Social work’s role in these reform efforts
highlights an historical legacy of the profession that is firmly rooted in social control. As
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opposed to challenging the social oppression of women, the reformers, in fact, kept
women in their “proper place” by encouraging “propriety but certainly not upward
mobility” (Rafter, 1983, p. 160).
Reconstruction and the South. At the same time that White women in the north
were being sentenced to reformatories, the racial composition of the prison population in
the South underwent radical changes. After the Civil War, with the “official” end of
slavery, the South was in shambles and in need of a new source of labor. Now that
slavery was illegal and unconstitutional, the South sought to ensure a captive labor force
by redefining crime. Black Codes, vagrancy laws, and the convict lease system were all
used to ensure a system of forced labor (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007; Schneider, 2003).
African Americans were no longer slaves but they were certainly not free. The Black
Codes, which made unemployment for African Americans a crime, used the criminal
justice system to restrict adult mobility and prevent African Americans from leaving the
plantation (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007). This reintroduced involuntary servitude.
Further, felony laws began to change. During slavery, Black people were not
readily imprisoned because they were treated as a commodity. Punishment was dealt with
primarily by slave owners (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007; Rafter, 1983; Young & Spencer,
2007). After reconstruction, Black people were imprisoned for minor offenses and the
prison population began to swell. Convict leasing, a practice in which states leased
prisoners through a contractor for work, was then deployed to provide the South with an
involuntary workforce (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007). When convict leasing went out of
fashion, forced labor laws remained intact through the implementation of prison/state run
public works projects for prisoners. For example, during WWI and WWII the South
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implemented “fight or work” programs. These programs applied vagrancy laws to
African American women in order to compensate for labor shortages. Black women, like
White women, worked in their homes taking care of their families. However, despite
working unpaid in their homes, Black women were forced to either get jobs or be charged
with vagrancy laws and sentenced to work, while White women in similar circumstances
were not held to the same expectation (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007). Herein lies another
example of how Black women have historically not had access to the dominant norms
established for femininity. Feminist analyses of “separate spheres”8 are not necessarily
relevant to the lives of Black women (Crenshaw, 1991). Historically, Black women were
not relegated to the realm of the home in the same way that White women were; in fact,
they were forced into economic production outside the home. In this way, racism creates
conflicts with their ability to access established dominant gender norms. The history of
racism embedded in the criminal justice system continues to shape the lives of women of
color and to justify the ways in which they are criminalized today.
Social purity crusades. Toward the end of the 19th century, the discourse in
penology began to include medicalized explanations, seeing the biology of offenders as
the source of criminality. In this, offenders were seen as abnormal and defective.
Immigrants and people of color were especially harmed by this atavistic approach. And
as Zedner (1991) notes, the shift in relation to women was more vivid than that of men.
Women “criminals” were seen as “more depraved and hardened than the male” (Rafter,
1983, p. 138) because, in order to offend, they must have strayed further from their “true”

8

Feminist concerns with women’s exclusion from the workplace excludes the racial issues present in the
lives of Black women and essentializes the experiences of women.
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nature. It was thought that as the moral gatekeepers for society, women injured society
more through their criminality than men through theirs. Moreover, they were seen as
responsible for men’s immoral behavior (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollack, 1995;
Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008).
Historians note an overall increase in the criminal convictions of women during
the latter part of the 19th century (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983). Not
unlike how the policy changes emerging out of neoliberalism and the war on drugs have
caused increased incarceration rates in contemporary times, the increase in criminal
convictions at the close of the 19th century is largely attributed to emerging antiprostitution and anti-abortion laws. For much of the 1800s, many states lacked laws that
explicitly criminalized prostitution (Friedman, 1993, p. 224). However, by the late 19th
century, the Social Purity Crusades initiated changes in both policy and public opinion
regarding prostitution (Wahab, 2002). The Social Purists consisted of female reform
leaders, including social workers from a casework orientation, whose goals were overtly
geared toward the social control of dangerous classes as opposed to the betterment of
conditions for moral uplift (Abrams & Curran, 2000; Rafter, 1983). The Social Purity
Movement was driven by a newfound belief in the medical model and in scientific
understanding as a way to propel the human race forward (Abrams & Curran, 2000).
“Impelled by anxieties about alcoholism, immigration, prostitution, urbanization,
venereal disease, and the like, the social purity movement generally sought to reaffirm
and bolster traditional Anglo-Saxon standards” (Rafter, 1983, p. 154). The Social Purity
Crusades succeeded in condemning prostitution as a public health problem in addition to
a moral one (Freedman, 1981; Friedman, 1993; Pollock, 1995; Sheldon, 2008).
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Abortion laws also changed drastically in the late 19th century (Colvin, 1997;
Freedman, 1981; Friedman, 1993). Prior to this time, many states did not regulate
abortion and the legislation that did exist was loosely enforced. In the 1860s abortion
laws tightened and grew. More than 40 new abortion laws were passed in the latter half
of the 1800s (Friedman, 1993). In 1864 Oregon law declared abortion manslaughter and
sentenced women to 1–45 years for getting an abortion (Myers, 1995). Since marriage
and motherhood were viewed as a woman’s primary purpose and ultimate calling in life,
abortion was seen as a crime against women’s “true nature.” The anti-abortion sentiment
was also a reaction to anxieties around immigration and an attempt to bolster and purify
the native born population (Friedman, 1993).
Further, the sexual double standard for criminality persisted. Women continued to
be convicted of crimes against chastity (which included adultery, common night walkers,
fornication, lewd co-habitation, or lewdness) and crimes against the public order
(drunkenness, idle and disorderly behavior, and stubbornness). In 1895, of the 336
women incarcerated in a Massachusetts women’s institution, 39 were for crimes against
persons and property (26 of which were larceny); 83 were for crimes again chastity; and
the rest were for crimes against public order (Friedman, 1993). During the same time
period only three men were committed for crimes against chastity (Friedman, 1993).
Women sent to reformatories during this time continued to be of a certain type: primarily
white and convicted of misdemeanors rather than serious felonies. In addition, many of
the women now being placed in the reformatories were of the “new woman” and
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“working girl” type ushered in by urbanization (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter,
1983).
The Mann Act, also known as the White Slavery Act, was passed in 1910, and
stipulated “felony penalties for any person who in any way knowingly aided or enticed a
woman or girl to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose” (Colvin, 1997, p. 175). The ambiguous
language of the act allowed for selective prosecutions and discrimination toward
minorities and immigrants. The Mann Act also established special courts to detain and
confine women on moral charges and, thus, brought many more women into contact with
the criminal justice system (Colvin, 1997).
Around the same time that the Mann Act was passed, eugenics theories entered
reformatories. Those who prescribed to eugenics argued that sentences in reformatories
should be indefinite so that “genetically inferior women could be removed from sexual
circulation” (Rafter, 1983, p. 162). Josephine Shaw Lowell was a prominent figure in
women’s prison reform and an early leader in eugenics. She thought that promiscuous
women were depraved and immoral and therefore produced undesirables.
“Feebleminded” women, including poor, immigrant, and/or Black women and prostitutes,
did not go to the “gentler” reformatories; instead, they were sent to custodial institutions
because they were thought to be beyond reform (Colvin, 1997; Rafter, 1983). Lowell
advocated for long term commitments for women under thirty who were convicted of
misdemeanors and/or gave birth to illegitimate children. Notions of propriety became
institutionalized in the reformatory and “fallen women were removed from sexual
circulation” (Rafter, 1983, p. 154).
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As ideas of “White Slavery” came into vogue, the social purists sought to
eradicate prostitution with renewed fervor (Colvin, 1997; Rafter, 1983). Eugenics gave
reformatories a new purpose, to “segregate prostitutes and identify those who were
mentally defective” (Colvin, 1997, p. 180). Eugenicists claimed a relationship between
deviance and low IQ. Under the leadership of the likes of Lowell, reformatories began to
routinely administer biased IQ tests, based on White middle class American norms, to all
women who entered. Women with low scores were sent to custodial institutions and
committed for life to keep them from breeding. They were often sterilized while in
confinement (Colvin, 1997; Flavin, 2007; Rafter, 1983).
World War I marked another dramatic shift in the discourse on women’s
criminality, as prostitution became the scapegoat for dramatic outbreaks of venereal
disease among soldiers (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981). Prostitutes were blamed not
only for venereal disease but also for drunkenness in soldiers, and were charged with
threatening the war effort. This excited a lot of societal loathing for prostitutes and any
woman even resembling a prostitute. Myers (1995) states that “the inseparable
association of prostitutes with venereal disease caused the public to fear the fallen woman
it had once seen as a victim” (p. 125). Society began to view men as pure and women as
depraved seducers responsible for men’s transgressions and ill health.
The Commission of Training Camp Activities (CTCA) implemented broad antiprostitution policies which resulted in a mass increase in arrests and incarceration of
prostitutes (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981). Additionally, venereal disease in women was
seen as proof of prostitution and, thus, grounds for incarceration. Men with venereal
disease were viewed as victims and thus educated and provided treatment. Colvin (1997)
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states that the “purpose of imprisoning women was no longer to provide for their
protection and reformation, but to promote societal protection through punishment” (p.
181). The increasing numbers of female inmates brought about by CTCA policies
necessitated expansion of women’s reformatories and prisons. These new institutions
were justified in terms of cost-benefit because it was cheaper to lock up women as a
preventative measure than to treat a soldier for venereal disease (Freedman, 1981;
Sheldon, 2008).
Driven by eugenics and an emerging disdain for women, the reformatories began
to collapse during WWI and take on a more custodial model (Colvin, 1997; Freedman,
1981; Rafter, 1983). Reformatories now held all women prisoners for all offenses,
instituted heightened surveillance and security, and practiced harsh punishments and
sterilizations. By the 1920s, eugenics had successfully supplanted the idea of
rehabilitation (Colvin, 1997). Largely due to a practical and economic need for the
penitentiary, a series of policies that would eventually result in the complete demise of
the reformatory took hold after the war. In 1919, State v. Heitman, a Kansas decision,
“permitted separate sentencing policies for each sex” and legally recognized femininity
as different from masculinity and in need of “special considerations” (Freedman, 1981, p.
148). These special considerations included longer sentences for reform, separate
institutions, and increased training in domestic homemaking (Freedman, 1981, p. 149).
Historians note that this decision marked the beginning of the centralization of hundreds
of women into one institution (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon,
2008). The first federal prison for women, thus, emerged in 1927 (Colvin, 1997;
Friedman, 1993):
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The initial impetus for the federal institution came in the years immediately after
WWI, when the number of women imprisoned for federal offenses more than
doubled as a result of the Harrison Act (1914), which outlawed narcotics; the
Volstead Act (1919), which implemented prohibition; and the Jones-Miller Act
(1922), which made automobile theft a federal offense (Freedman, 1981, p. 145).
These new punitive laws changed the composition of women in reformatories and
created conditions of overcrowding and sub-par conditions. Reformatories were no
longer utilized for their original purpose and no longer adequate to house the growing
population of prisoners (Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983). The 1930s saw the almost
complete demise of reformatories (Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983).
Contemporary Institutional Responses
During the middle decades of the 20th century, attitudes regarding women’s
criminality still focused on individual deficiencies but with renewed interest in
rehabilitation and treatment. Due to the focus on treatment and the availability of social
services, the female “criminal” population was relatively stable during this time. Hostile
attitudes and stereotypes remained and “treatments” were questionable. The 1950s
brought with it a rise in psychiatric commitments for “deviancy” in which electroshock,
psychotropic and experimental drugs, and lobotomies were all common (Chesney-Lind,
2002; Colvin, 1997; Sheldon, 2008). Out of these practices grew many current models for
“treatment” of criminalized women today that emphasize the role of choice in their
decision-making processes. Some refer to current day psychological interventions as
“thera-punitive” (Pollack, 2008).
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Psy-professions take hold. Feminists once again entered the dialogue concerning
the criminalization of women in the 70s and 80s. By attending to life stories and
narratives they began to see patterns of violence and victimization among women
involved with the law. The larger social movement of the time, problematizing violence
against women, allowed feminists to make links and draw attention to women’s
victimization and their contact with the law (Chesney-Lind, 1997; Comack, 2006).
Although limited by a tendency to construct women solely as victims, these attempts
began to locate women’s “criminal” activity within a broader context and made claims
that women’s “choices” are largely influenced by the conditions that shape their lives.
The victimization discourse led the way to a general “pathways” approach to looking
at/explaining crime. Proponents of a pathways approach critiqued the “add women and
stir” approach to criminological and therapeutic interventions that had been dominant for
much of the 20th century. Looking at pathways requires attending to difference. Many
criminologists now recognize that women have different “pathways” into crime and
subsequently different needs along the way.
From the pathways approach emerged a focus on “gender sensitivity” and “gender
responsive” programming for criminalized women, a trend that has gained a lot of
traction in Canadian and U.S. treatment contexts. Gender responsive programming
echoes the ideology of the reformatory and has been critiqued for its tendency to focus on
the psychological effects of gender oppression. The gender-responsive focus is troubling
because it strips gender of its social, political, and economic significance and relies on
essentialized notions of “women” (Pollack, 2006). As with the pathways approach,
gender responsiveness is limited because it does not address how and why certain

72
behaviors by certain people become constituted as crimes. The focus of gender
responsivity remains on correcting individual flaws and managing risk, rather than
ameliorating the social and economic underpinnings of crime. Furthermore, feminists
have documented that the activities, expectations, and the implementation of gender
responsive programming are premised heavily on stereotypical gendered and racialized
notions of criminality and femininity (Goodkind & Miller, 2006; McKim, 2008).
For instance, Goodkind and Miller’s (2006) study of an art therapy program for
young women involved in the criminal justice system reveals how the program’s policies
and practices reinforced gendered notions of appropriateness. While the young men in
this residential facility engaged in other kinds of treatment and education programs, the
art therapy was only for the females. The program also relied on traditionally feminized
undertakings, such as crafting identity dolls, and centered activities on gendered themes,
such as building self-esteem. When participants tried to exert agency and engage in
activities that felt more meaningful to them, they were sanctioned for being inappropriate.
Goodkind and Miller (2006) assert that “in this way, the art therapy program creates and
enacts meanings of gender through determining what is, and what is not, appropriate” (p.
57). Gender responsive programming echoes sentiments about femininity embedded in
the reformatory movement. Like the reformatories, the program described by Goodkind
and Miller was arranged so as to mold the young women into idealized versions of
femininity with little reference to race and class.
Much of the therapeutic programming for criminalized women in contemporary
times is aimed at reducing substance use, alleviating mental health symptoms, and
assuaging the negative impacts of trauma; all of which are assumed to lead to improved
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“functioning” and consequently decreased “criminal behavior.” Subsequently, outcomes
for criminalized women in treatment programs are typically measured in terms of
psychological indicators and recidivism rates, and progress in treatment is largely
monitored in relation to a woman’s ability/willingness to internalize treatment discourses
and thereby fulfill the function of self-governance.
Pollack (2013) asserts that the current “truth regime” guiding what can be known
within human services and correctional practice is rooted in evidence-based research and
practice. For instance, cognitive and dialectical behavioral therapies (CBT/DBT) are
advocated for strongly as “evidence-based” policy options for reducing crime (Drake,
Aos & Miller, 2009; Tripodi, et. al., 2011). Similarly, risk assessments have become a
dominant “evidence-based” tool in both criminal justice and human services. Both CBT
and risk assessments (when used to identify appropriate interventions) have been found
effective in reducing recidivism, particularly with female offenders (Andrews & Dowden,
2006). However, feminist scholars (Goodkind & Miller, 2006; Maidment, 2002; Pollack,
2004) dispute and trouble the claims regarding the “effectiveness” of such practices for a
number of reasons.
First, dependence on recidivism rates, as a measure of success, neglects other
possible and preferable outcomes, such as gainful employment, safe housing, and
reunification with children, to name but a few. Further, reliance on recidivism rates as a
measure of success ignores the reality that despite not “reoffending,” many women who
have been criminalized continue to live in conditions of abject poverty and social
exclusion (Kendall, 2004).
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Second, as Shaw and Hannah-Moffat (2004) argue, the current use of risk/needs
assessments has “resulted in the reconceptualization of needs and certain social structural
barriers as risk factors” (p. 94). Thus, women in crisis are judged as “risky” rather than as
vulnerable or in need. In order to manage the “risky,” punitive strategies are deployed,
funneling women deeper into the criminal justice system.
Last, individualizing treatment discourses pathologizes individual women’s
choices while neglecting the structural factors that lead to crime and criminalization. As
discussed previously, factors such as poverty and violence play a large role in the nature
and extent of women’s involvement in crime. Therefore, such factors need to be
addressed in order to provide women with a meaningful range of life choices that could
potentially lead to a reduction in crime and recidivism rates. As Kendall (2004) states,
when criminalization is seen as a structural problem, reliance on “what works” is “weak
and problematic” (p. 77). This is because “what works” is typically rooted in “what
works” for individual psychological change, not what works to provide more
social/economic opportunity and mobility.
Conclusion
Current trends in the confinement and rehabilitation of women have developed
out of a long history of shifting discourses related to crime and feminine morality.
Although the past forty years have marked a stark increase in the criminalization of
women in the United States, many feminist criminologists point out that, with the
exception of drugs, the nature of women’s “crime” has not changed (Chesney-Lind,
2006; Comack, 2006; Jacobsen, 2008). Women are still criminalized primarily for nonviolent crimes and crimes of poverty. What has changed is neoliberalism’s intersection
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with criminalization through the increased evisceration of a social safety net, the
increased use of punitive responses to deal with the social problems, which have been
exacerbated by the erosion of social welfare9, and the ways in which social
control/regulatory practices operate across institutions to punish/regulate women.
Historically, the female offender has been judged primarily as an “inappropriate”
woman. Concepts of “appropriate” female behavior have been and are now known to
construct definitions of female criminality. Societal responses to female “criminality” are
largely based on gender norms, and a look at history illustrates that traditional roles and
gender norms are not natural or innate, do not apply to all women, and emerged from the
changes in economic production of the 18th century. Bosworth (2000) suggests that
historically and currently, the incarceration of women has been central to more
generalized strategies of social control. She states:
Ideas of gender are apparent in the reasons used to justify the confinement of
many women, and in the tasks given to them during their incarceration. Both the
early modern and the modern periods undertook to control and punish particular
types of women though incarceration. Unwanted wives, pregnant or sexually
active girls, prostitutes, thieves and others, were punished by confinement from
the 17th century on. Given the types of women incarcerated, it seems that the
prison was used to control gender as often as it was used to control crime (p. 277).

9

For instance, women are increasingly arrested when calling the police for help in domestic violence
situations (Neve & Pate, 2005; Jacobsen, 2008). Zero tolerance policies and domestic violence mandatory
arrest policies that have emerged within the last 25 years with the passage of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) fail to consider the construction of women’s violence. Thus, women are often criminalized
“because of their efforts to resist victimization” (Ogle & Batton, 2009, p. 162).
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Although the concept of true womanhood has been largely discarded, the gender
norms established and certain laws based on them10 remain with us today. “True
womanhood” is an ideology that has served to criminalize women and blame them for
larger social problems (Abramovitz, 1997). As Zedner (1991) remarks, “moral concepts
of ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ women underpin modern analysis” (p. 309). Female deviance
continues to be explained in terms of gendered stereotypes that are grounded in outdated
and racialized understandings of women’s “true” nature. This holds true beyond simply
explaining and regulating “deviance.” Moral concepts and essentialized notions of gender
also underpin a broad range of social control mechanisms that play out in everyday and
interpersonal interactions to shape the experience of women. History also reveals how
criminality is defined largely based on the norms and political/economic context of the
time. The preceding historical review gives stark examples of how “new” crimes are
increasingly legislated into existence and, thus, reveals the social construction of crime.
Still, few contemporary interventions call into question the problematic category of
“crime” and, thus, they seek to intervene on the level of what to do about “crime” as
opposed to what to do about policies that create crime.
A look at the nature and extent of women’s involvement in “crime” begins to
paint a picture of how gender, race, and class inequalities shape who is likely to be
criminalized. This is important because it allows us to better locate criminalization within
the context of systemic inequality, which is a major force contributing to women’s

10

Examples include public order offenses such as anti-prostitution laws that criminalize behavior that
defies conventional social norms. However, the maintenance of social/public order is not relegated solely to
the criminal justice system, and transcarceral control mechanisms are regularly deployed for such offenses
in order to manage behavior and people that are deemed a threat to social stability.
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involvement in illegal behavior. However, mainstream attempts at explaining and dealing
with women’s “criminality” neglect attention to such contexts and rely primarily on the
individualizing discourses of the “psy” professions (Pollack, 2008).
Indeed, much of the literature regarding interventions and institutional responses
related to criminalized women is rooted in an individualistic, often pathologizing,
analysis of women who are involved with the criminal justice system. Subsequently,
many dominant interventions involving criminalized women are aimed solely at changing
women’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors, thereby locating the problem within the
individual woman. McCorkel (2004) argues that such interventions form the basis for
therapeutic governance in that they systematically attempt to create citizens who can
police themselves so that the authorities do not have to. Because systems of governance
function through discourse, it is important to consider the discourses that shape social
work’s understanding of criminalized women. Therefore, the next chapter presents
Critical Discourse Analysis Methodology and the research design. It will illustrate my
understanding of the heavy conceptual nature of Critical Discourse Analysis and will link
the study’s research questions and theoretical foundations to the chosen methodology.
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Chapter 4: Research Design
This chapter discusses Critical Discourse Analysis methodology (CDA) and the
research design. My study is grounded in a feminist post-structural epistemology, thereby
merging both critical and post-structural understanding of power and knowledge. Staller
(2013) explains that a researcher’s choice of methods makes sense only when firmly
anchored in their understanding of what constitutes reality (ontology) and how they
believe we can come to know that reality (epistemology), thus presenting an overarching
philosophical positioning for the research, or methodology. In other words, it is necessary
to discuss the theoretical considerations that serve as the basis for the development of
methods. Accordingly, this chapter presents the methodology of the research and is
divided into three primary sections: (1) ontology and epistemology; (2) Critical Discourse
Analysis methodology; and (3) methods and analysis.
Ontology and Epistemology
To illustrate the ontological foundations grounding this research, I borrow the
words of Susan Strega (2005): “Reality is about the meaning that people create in the
course of their social interactions; the world is not about facts but about the meaning
attached to facts, and people negotiate and create meaning” (p. 206). Though CDA does
not present a unifying theoretical framework, it does have fundamental ontological and
epistemological assumptions. Ontology raises questions about the nature of reality, the
nature of human beings in the world, and what constitutes truth. To begin, discourse is
seen not only as a part of reality, but also as what constitutes it. Reality is seen as
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subjective and contextual, changing in time and place. Truth and knowledge are not seen
as existing outside the discontinuity of historical processes.
Social reality (practices, labels, knowledge) then exists only in a discursive sense:
it exists and means something only because we attach meaning to it. As Potts and Brown
(2005) say, “truth does not exist, it is made. Therefore, we are not looking for a ‘truth’;
we are looking for meaning, for understanding, for the power to change.” (p. 261).
Knowledge is tentative at best.
Epistemology is concerned with how we know what we know. Susan Strega
(2005) makes the case that “the epistemological foundation of methodology prescribes
what good research involves, justifies why research is done, gives a value base to
research, and provides ethical principles for conducting research” (p. 211). Thus, all vital
aspects of a research endeavor are forged from epistemological assumptions and
commitments (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). My epistemological allegiances in this project
rest in both feminisms and post-structuralism.
The theoretical foundations of feminist post-structuralism are transdisciplinary in
origin and have relevant application to social work research and practice (Strega, 2005).
Post-structuralism, as an umbrella theoretical perspective, has a variety of definitions and
is informed by the work of many scholars. There exist a range of applications for poststructural analyses, from apolitical deconstructions to the examination of the discursive
dimensions of power and inequality. A common element of post-structural analysis is
language (Meyer & Wodak, 2009). Language, in post-structuralism, is the place where
reality is created and also the place where reality may be deconstructed and challenged.
The deconstructive strategies associated with post-structuralism are helpful in naming
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power relations and debunking the taken-for-granted assumptions of dominant
discourses. Foucault, for instance, explored discourses in order to unsettle disciplines and
disciplinary knowledge and practices. In doing so he exposed the historical and
discursive processes through which things come to be seen as normal and natural.
Through such exploration, aspects of social life, which are typically seen as stable and
enduring (that which is taken to be “truth”), can be disrupted.
Whereas post-structuralism may not necessarily be political, feminist
epistemologies are explicitly political and have a specific agenda toward social change
(Fonow & Cook, 2005; Gringeri, Wahab, & Anderson-Nathe, 2010; Olesen, 2005). Poststructural understandings of power as diffuse and discursive can complement and deepen
feminist critiques of structural power and dominance. A feminist, post-structural
epistemology therefore can be seen as “a mode of knowledge production which uses
post-structuralist theories of language, subjectivity, social processes and institutions to
understand existing power relations and to identify areas and strategies for change”
(Weedon, 1997, p. 40-41). In other words, feminist post-structuralism provides a lens
through which to problematize the taken-for-granted truths embedded in social work
academic journals and the constructions of criminalized women within their pages.
Additionally, in line with a feminist post-structural epistemology, CDA requires
researchers to examine their own values, social locations, and subjectivities and to make
those visible in the research (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). I embrace subjectivity and do not
strive for a bias free analysis (which I think is impossible) but rather a more “critical
subjectivity” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) which aligns well with CDA as the researcher is
required to bring their own knowledge and context to bear in analysis.
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These ontological and epistemological commitments are central to CDA for three
reasons: (1) Notions of absolute truth and a quest for objectivity are irrelevant in any
CDA research endeavor. With roots in both discourse theory and critical theory, CDA
starts from the assumption that reality is socially constructed and changing; at the same
time the impact of material conditions and how they shape people’s lives is
acknowledged. Therefore, while accepting subjectivity, issues concerning oppression,
power, and social inequality are always central to any CDA endeavor (Fairclough et al.,
2013). (2) The interpretation of texts stems from the theoretical assumption that social
practices are discursive. In other words, discourse shapes the way people understand their
experiences and the way they act in the world. This is important to keep in mind when
considering question three11 of my research because much of the interpretative work
toward highlighting implications stems from the assertion that discourse is both socially
constitutive and socially conditioned12 (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). It is also important to
note that the researcher, who is constructed and shaped by discourses, does the
interpretation of texts. Thus, interpretation is open to constant interrogation, as it does not
sit outside the influence of discourse. (3) Unlike objectivist epistemologies, CDA does
not require the researcher to erase herself from the process. Rather, CDA requires that
researchers make their own positions and interests explicit and visible. Further, the

11

Q3: What implications do these constructions and knowledge claims have for social work practice and
research with criminalized women?
12

It is constitutive in the sense that it constitutes (shapes or gives meaning to) people, situations, objects of
knowledge, social identities and relationships, etc.
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theoretical assumptions CDA is premised on hold true for the research process as well13.
Since it is theoretically understood that discourses are historical, discourses must then be
analyzed with reference to context in order to be fully understood. Therefore, the
historical and contextual knowledge I bring to bear regarding criminalized women and
social work shaped the lens through which I approached analysis and served as an
important analytic tool.
Critical Discourse Analysis Methodology
CDA has its roots in the humanities and was born out of a critique of
Enlightenment epistemologies (Wodak, 2013). Within the literature there is much
diversity regarding what constitutes the core aspects of CDA. Depending on conceptual
and theoretical framework utilized, CDA can mean very different things. Here I outline
how I conceptualize CDA within the framework of this research and elucidate some key
concepts and the ways I draw on them in this study.
Unlike more traditional discourse analyses established in linguistics, CDA is not
exclusively concerned with the minutiae of linguistic units or the structure of grammar,
but rather with the construction of larger social phenomena. CDA has been described as
the study of language as a social practice with an intention toward social critique and
social change (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). CDA starts from the assumption that reality is
socially constructed through discourse. Concepts of discourse, power, and knowledge are
central to CDA.

13

The research process is recognized as a discursive social practice in and of itself; in other words, the
process of interpretation and analysis are also subject to the rules of discourse.
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Discourse. Foucault used the concept of an episteme to refer to the structure of
knowing that dominates and governs a certain period of time. An episteme differs from a
thinker, theory, or concept because it is not isolated to one person, genre, or discipline.
Rather, it cuts across disciplines and refers to how we collectively comprise the world. In
other words, it is spread through society and constitutes what is normative for a given
time period. An episteme constrains what can be known and creates the rules of
formation and exclusion in society. Epistemes are made up of and defined by discourses,
or practices that shape reality. Foucault saw language as a primary vehicle through which
knowledge gets embodied, shaping an episteme. He believed that meaning and reality
cannot be separated from how we classify things and that the ideas and attitudes we hold
are shaped by the larger episteme in which they are situated.
For the purpose of this project, discourse is defined as “an institutionalized way of
talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Link, 1983, as
cited in Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 35). In other words, discourse refers to context specific
frameworks of meaning-making that inform action and (re)create the limits of what can
be known (Fairclough, 2009, p. 162). It is through discourse that we give the world
meaning. Social practices constitute and are constituted by discourse. Therefore,
discourse itself is understood as a social practice.
Discourse defines, allows, and limits what can be known, what can be done and
said, and how people can behave. Discourses actually construct, not just reflect, reality
(objects, people, and events). Therefore, discourse enables and constrains what can be
known. Discourses are culturally and historically situated. Dominant discourses privilege
certain subject positions and notions of social reality, and become “commonsense”
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notions of the world. Dominant discourses become so taken for granted that we can’t see
other ways of doing/thinking about things. Multiple dominant discourses of gender, race,
crime, and poverty, to name a few, shape criminalized women. In turn, analyses that seek
to unearth how/if these discourses are normalized, reinforced, or disrupted in social work
are useful toward understanding how power relations play out within the field.
Power and knowledge. Theorists from post-structural traditions have explored
the power of discourse in creating social reality. They stress the ways in which language
and thought are tied together, thereby producing knowledge of social reality that in turn
shapes our thinking and being (Arrigo, 1997). The relationship between discourse and
social life is therefore a dialectical one. As previously discussed, discourses do not just
reflect reality but also actively create it. Discourse constitutes and is constituted by
subjects, social practices, and institutions. It is through discourse that meaning is applied
to material and social reality. Therefore, written and spoken language can be seen as an
act of meaning-making which contributes to “reproducing and/or transforming society
and culture, including power relations” (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 370). This highlights
the way language, knowledge, and power are intertwined. Therein lies the power of texts
to shape reality and reproduce or disrupt the reproduction of power and inequality. As
Fairclough and Wodak (1997) state:
Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it constitutes
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships
between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it
helps sustain and reproduce the status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to
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transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to
important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological
effects—that is they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations
between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural
majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and
position people (as quoted in Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 6).
Further, discourses are also entangled with institutional practices. For instance, becoming
“the client” in a social work discourse means that one becomes an object of interest to
social workers and may thus be identified and formed in the process of intervention as
part of the practice of social work. In this sense, there are subject positions that are
created out of these institutional practices, for both the worker and the client.
Subject positions. Discourse brings with it particular understandings which
construct subjects. Therefore, in a Foucauldian sense, discourse defines and creates
subjectivities. Subjects are then positioned in society in relation to these understandings
and definitions. We position ourselves and come to understand ourselves within
discourses. Through discourse we create our sense of ourselves as well as our sense of the
“other.” This is important because how subjects and problems are seen and defined
shapes how they are interacted with in the world.
Under a CDA framework, discourse is explicitly related to power in a number of
ways. First, the context of discourse (i.e. education, media, politics) can be a power
resource. Second, discourse has the power to influence and shape people’s minds.
Further, it is believed that cognition and social representations influence action and
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behavior. Thus, discourse indirectly forms our actions and behavior through knowledge.
Knowledge is therefore power because of its discursive effects. In other words,
knowledge is power because it directly shapes behavior and action. Thus, the discursive
nature of reality is typically seen as a starting assumption for studying social phenomena.
Finally, those with access and control over the most contextually influential discourse
will have the most power in terms of influencing the thoughts and actions of others.
There are different ways to represent criminalized women. According to discourse theory
(Wodak & Meyer, 2009), those representations will shape how other people think of and
interact with them. This includes social workers and their subsequent practice and
research with criminalized women.
Methods and Analysis
This study draws on the framework proposed by Jäger and Maier (2009) for
performing a Foucauldian inspired CDA. I emphasize inspired because although this
approach draws on aspects of how Foucault conceptualized discourse and the workings of
power (as outlined above), it is not in the strictest sense a Foucauldian discourse analysis
(such as an in depth genealogy or archaeology of knowledge). Jäger and Maier’s (2009)
framework builds on the work of Jurgen Link (1982) and focuses on:
•

Analysis of current discourses and their power effects;

•

Uncovering collective symbolism (which has, of course, been guided by
discourses themselves); and

•

The function of discourse in legitimizing and securing dominance.
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I found this framework useful for my project as it draws on the theoretical
propositions discussed thus far concerning discourse, power, and knowledge and offers a
concrete platform for attending to their linguistic expressions (i.e. metaphors, references,
symbolism, style, presuppositions, implied meaning, argumentation strategies). Further, it
provided a practical structure and procedure to engage in complex theoretical analysis.
Structure of discourse. To begin the discussion of specific methods and analysis,
Jäger and Maier (2009) offer a useful breakdown of the structure of discourse, which
makes it amenable to analysis. In this section, I describe this structure and characterize
each aspect in relation to the study. I then provide a more in-depth discussion offering
justification for the chosen study material.
Special discourse and interdiscourse. Jäger and Maier (2009) differentiate
between “special discourses” and “inter-discourse” whereas special discourses refer to
discourses situated in the sciences that feed continuously into inter-discourse, which
constitutes non-scientific discourses. From this position, social work as an academic field
firmly rooted in the social sciences (at least in a North American context) would be
considered a special discourse.
Discourse strands and discourse fragments. Simply stated, discourse strands are
streams of discourse centered on a shared topic. Discourse strands can be thought of as
the concrete manifestation of the more abstract concept of discourse. Jäger and Maier
(2009) describe them as “performances located on the surface of texts” (p. 46). Put more
simply, discourse strands can be thought of as general themes that one is exploring—for
instance, criminalization. Discourse strands have diachronic (concerning elements
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through time and history) and synchronic (concerning a particular point in time) aspects.
A synchronic analysis examines that which is said and sayable in any given moment. In
order to analyze texts that represent the current socio-political and economic context, I
conducted a synchronic analysis of the discourse strand of criminalized women in social
work. Specifically, my analysis focused on articles that were published in the 21st
century14. Furthermore, discourse strands are made up of multiple discourse fragments.
Discourse fragments are texts, or parts of texts, that form a discourse strand. In my
analysis, specific journal articles, or parts of articles, that deal with the topic of
criminalized women constituted the discourse fragments.
Discourse planes and discourse sectors. Discourse planes are the “social
locations from which speaking takes place” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 48). This study
investigated how the discourse strand of criminalized women operates on/in the discourse
plane of social work. Discourse planes do not operate in isolation; they influence and are
influenced by, interact with, and sometimes merge with other discourse planes. For
instance, within the social work plane, I found that discourse fragments from the special
discourses of psychology and criminal justice were often taken up to influence the
discourse on criminalized women in social work.
Discourse planes are composed of various discourse sectors. These sectors take up
different angles and positions but, nonetheless, can be considered a major aspect of a
discourse plane. For this project, I explored the discourse sector of the academic literature

14

Further justification of the chosen texts under examination is provided in the later discussion of my
sample selection.
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in the discourse plane of social work. Social work constitutes a unique discourse plane
and the academic journals constitute an important sector therein.
Sample: Academic literature and high impact social work journals.
Fairclough (2009) defines texts as a “point of entry” into discourse analysis. According to
Jäger and Maier (2009), it is necessary to provide justification for the chosen texts
because from a Foucauldian perspective all texts have a discursive function. Therefore, it
is essential to emphasize the explicit role and function of an analyst’s chosen texts. As
previously stated, the primary data used for this project came from the discourse sector of
academic journals within the discourse plane of social work.
The importance of published academic literature in establishing professional
discourse cannot be overstated. Indeed, journals serve as an authority guiding research,
education, and practice (Barretti, 2015; Lindsey & Kirk, 1992; Tsang, 2001). Thus, the
discursive (re)constitution of subjects within the published literature is worthy of
investigation because as Weiler (2006) states, “this is where power is exercised” (p.18).
Therefore, I see the social work academic literature as an important site of engagement
for this project.
A scholar’s work is legitimized through the publication process and thus endowed
with a level of “specialness” and authority; this gives published literature an undeniably
influential position in the process of knowledge production. Indeed, the context of such
authority and its persuasive power to shape mental representations and social practices is
at the theoretical core of CDA, as it represents how discourse is involved in dominance
(van Dijk, 2001). The published academic literature in social work not only drives the
research agenda but also shapes policy and interventions in the field. Additionally, the
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published academic literature is used as primary learning material in academia, which
then influences conceptualizations practitioners bring with them into the field. As Tsang
(2001) states, the selection of academic literature, though “obviously not representative
of the totality of the social work discourse, can be taken as reflective of some of its major
structures” (p. 232).
Van Dijk (2001) underlines the relevance of “mind control” within a CDA
framework. Critical Discourse Analysis rests on the assumption that discourse influences
mental models and societal representations. Discursive influence is formed by the context
as well as the structure and form of texts. For instance, people may be persuaded and
influenced by argumentation (structure) in and of itself, but are more likely to be
influenced by argumentation from sources they see as authoritative or credible, such as
experts, professionals, and doctors (context). Van Dijk (2001) further highlights the
powerful influence of academic contexts in the formation and shaping of mental models.
Therefore, I see social work journals as an important context for exerting influence on the
mental models of social workers and thus their research and practice behavior.
It is well accepted that the purpose of scientific inquiry/knowledge production in
social work is to shape policy and practice in the field (Marsh & Reed, 2016). Thus,
journal articles are frequently the subject of research in social work. Humble et al. (2012)
examined the framing of HIV/AIDS in social work journals to ascertain how/if the
changing knowledge in the field of HIV/AIDS was reflected in the knowledge base of the
profession. Hardy (2013) assessed social work journals for their coverage of the Black
Church and African American Christianity. Tsang (2001) explored the role of social work
journals in constructing ethnicity. All these studies started from the assumption that
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social work journals are an important and credible source of knowledge within the
profession and serve a crucial role in shaping the thinking and behavior of practitioners.
Therefore, the knowledge contained in journals may be representative of some of the
larger trends in social work.
Academic journals contain both conceptual and instrumental knowledge.
Conceptual knowledge shapes the ways problems are considered, solutions/interventions
are formulated, and understandings of professional context emerge. Instrumental
knowledge is related to interventions and effectiveness. Despite social work’s increasing
emphasis on instrumental knowledge, particularly in the form of evidence-based practice
and competence-based education, a study conducted by Cha, Kuo, and Marsh (2006)
found that practitioners reported both conceptual and instrumental knowledge as being
equally useful in helping them make practice decisions. Therefore, both are included in
my analysis.
Academic journals serve a primary role in the formation of disciplines and
professions (Tsang, 2001); they both shape and reflect values, knowledge, and priorities.
Editors and their selected reviewers serve a gatekeeping function in defining the
boundaries of knowledge production of a given discipline/profession15. Though social
workers obviously write in and draw from other (inter)disciplinary sources, it is also
important to examine disciplinary boundaries themselves for what they signify. There
may be distinct differences in what is reviewed and accepted in social work journals

15

Though I recognize that social work’s status as a discipline and/or profession is and has been debated due
to its lack of a distinct and specialized body of knowledge, engagement with that debate is outside the
scope of this dissertation. Despite where one comes down in relation to this debate, it may be amenable to
both sides to say that social work is a field with discursive limits.
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versus what is reviewed and accepted in, for example, criminology journals, sociology
journals, or counseling journals; despite coverage of similar topics, the discourses
represented may vary. Though there may be shared elements, each discipline/profession
has its own language, culture, value base, and general orientation to the social world, and
their journals can be seen as representative of the major elements of a field’s internal
form and coherence. Therefore, an explicitly social work distinction in my selection of
journals for this research is important because I am interested in the distinct discourse of
social work.
For instance, a dominant theme in the criminological literature is “criminogenic
need,” which focuses on identifying risk factors for recidivism and tailoring intervention
programs to address those risks (Latessa & Lowenkamp, 2005). The language of
“criminogenic need,” though not entirely disregarded by social work, is deficit-based and
largely neglectful of context with a focus on changing individual behavior. Though
similar risk frameworks are certainly adopted by social work, one would expect that the
profession’s values around humanitarianism, strengths-based practice, self-determination,
and social justice largely impel social work scholars to speak in a different (specific)
way. Still, despite embracing these values, dominant cultural narratives are likely to seep
into the work that social work performs. As Tsang (2001) states, “the profession is not
totally immune to the influences of the dominant discourses of society” (p. 229). For
example, in a Critical Discourse Analysis regarding social work’s role in immigration,
Park and Kemp (2006) show that social work discourse supports dominant ideology
surrounding immigration while simultaneously attempting to redress the consequences of
such ideology and discourses. This has profound consequences for how we work with
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people who inhabit liminal spaces, such as women on community supervision who dwell
in a world between “free” and “not free.”
Further, though critical analyses of the construction of criminalized women have
been done in relation to criminological and penal literature, I am unaware of any in depth
explorations as to how criminalized women are constructed in the social work literature.
Indeed, compared to the larger body of work coming out of criminology, law, and
psychology, social work appears to pay scant attention to criminalized women (Wheeler
& McClain, 2015).
I selected social work high impact journals (journals that are read and cited more
frequently) because they represent an array of political and professional priorities and
may possibly provide a spectrum of representations within the field. Additionally, the
high citation rates of these journals illustrate their conferred legitimacy and acceptance as
a source of information and knowledge within social work (Jäger & Maier, 2009).
Though imperfect, high impact journals have been recognized as serving an influential
role in disseminating information and, over time, shaping practice behavior (Lindsey &
Kirk, 1992; Marsh & Reed, 2015). Though many practitioners do not have easy access to
these journals, I argue that the ideas and ways of thinking embedded in “high impact”
research filter to practice both indirectly, through students who eventually become
practitioners, and directly, through funding agencies which allot funding for “evidencebased practices” that are often tested and legitimized through academic scholarship.
Though high impact journals represent only one tendril of academic scholarship,
neoliberal forces and values influence researchers and organizations in such a way so as
to elevate and hold high impact journals to a greater esteem.
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Further, high impact journals impart legitimacy and authority to social work
researchers and scholars often regarded as “experts.” In this, I believe high impact
journals can provide an understanding of the kind of scholarship that shapes social work
discourse and vice versa. Still, I want to be clear that my choice of using high impact
journals as my sample is not linked with assumptions regarding the quality of a journal or
publication. Rather, it is linked to an assumption of influence.
Limitations of high impact journals. Despite the practical and theoretical reasons
for using a sample consisting of high impact journals, it is worth noting some inherent
limitations with this approach. Flaws and biases within citation indexing databases have
been widely recognized (Bornmann et al., 2012; Kurmis, 2003). A range of factors other
than quality or actual influence can influence impact scores, including ease of journal
access, publication frequency, and type of material published by a journal. Impact scores
for a journal are generally calculated by dividing the number of times articles published
in a two-year period were cited by the total number of “citable” articles16. Therefore, only
a small proportion of its articles may influence the impact factor of a journal.
Furthermore, a large percentage of published articles never get cited, which could
exclude articles from my sample that may be representative but not widely known.
Additionally, citation-indexing systems do not include all journals in any given
field (regardless of number of times their articles have been cited) and the criteria for
inclusion remains unclear. This can present problems when assuming influence. For

16

Not all items published in journals (such as editorial and news articles) get factored into the impact
factor.
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instance, it has been noted that publications not included in the Scientific Citation Index
Database sometimes have more citations than those that are included (Kurmis, 2003).
Lastly, authors who are cited frequently are more likely to be known in a field and
to publish work that is easily recognizable and sought after by other scholars. Therefore,
the use of the impact factor in this research may have contributed to encountering the
same authors and types of work again and again, which is more representative of
institutionally reinforced popularity rather than the discourse of the field at large. In this
sense, the use of high impact journals may have potentially made my sample more
homogenous than desired. However, given that I drew my sample from a range of the
listed high impact journals, rather than just the top five or ten, I found a good amount of
variability within the sample.
Sample selection. I identified high impact social work journals using Eigenfactor.
Eigenfactor is a project established through the University of Washington which
evaluates the importance of scholarly journals and provides a searchable database of the
most influential journals by ISI subject category17. Though Eigenfactor scores are
calculated a bit differently than the more well-known ISI Impact Factor, Eigenfactor is
freely available and is considered a good proxy for the Impact Factor (Davis, 2008). The
journal citation data for Eigenfactor comes from the Journal Citation Reports (which is
the proprietary database for ISI Impact Factors). Therefore, all of the journals that appear
in Eigenfactor are also listed in Journal Citation Reports. Eigenfactor uses a five-year

17

Institute for Scientific Information subject categories are generally interpreted as providing a disciplinary
structure of science.
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citation average rather than the two-year period for ISI Impact Factors18. Eigenfactor also
provides a weighted citation count, which takes into account the size of the journal, rather
than just a raw citation count as provided by the ISI Impact Factor.
Eigenfactor helped me identify high impact journals that are categorized under the
“social work” ISI subject category. However, not all of them were explicitly social work
journals, so I did some elimination. Eigenfactor generated an initial list (latest calculation
from 2015) of 41 journals. I excluded those that were not in English (2) and those that
would not be expected to have articles of relevance to the North American context19. Of
the remaining 37 journals, 13 were researched further to ensure that they were explicitly
social work identified. I eliminated multi-disciplinary/interdisciplinary journals, unless
their editorial board was made up of social workers, which resulted in the exclusion of 12
more journals, for a remaining total of 25 social work journals. Appendix A shows the
remaining 25 journals from which the sample was drawn.
I utilized the list of journals generated by Eigenfactor and searched the Web of
Science with topic/keywords AND [journal title] as publication name. I did separate
searches for each journal in order to keep things organized. Key words included:
criminal/ criminalization/ criminality/ prison/ incarceration/ criminal justice/ corrections/
reentry/ diversion/ offender / offense/ re-offense/ recidivism/ parole/ probation AND
women/ woman/ female/ mother AND date range [2000-2017]. The above key words are
those that are commonly found in the literature regarding women involved in the criminal
18

Calculating averages over longer periods of time results in less variability and provides more of an
enduring sense of the journal’s influence.
19

Though research could certainly look at the discourse generated in a larger global social work context,
my project is explicitly framed within a U.S socio-political context. Therefore, I include articles only of
relevance to or generated in relation to such a context.
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justice system and include women who may be currently and formerly incarcerated.
Furthermore, because children of incarcerated parents are a growing topic of interest to
social workers, mother/motherhood was included in addition to women/woman/female as
keywords in the sample.
Only articles dealing explicitly with criminalized women were selected. To
account for the diversity and difference among women necessitated by both multiracial
feminism and post-structuralism, “woman” was defined broadly and included trans
women. Initial selection was made mainly on the basis of abstracts; I scanned abstracts to
ensure that a primary focus in the article included criminalized women (using the key
words offered above). Searching journal articles through key words also allowed me to
see and look for discursive entanglements with other discourse strands.
In order to conduct a synchronic analysis of texts that represent the current sociopolitical and economic context, my sample was comprised of articles that were published
in the 21st century. This time frame provided a lens through which to view the long-range
impacts of punitive sentencing policies that emerged in the latter part of the 20th century
and early part of the 21st century. As I previously discussed, such policies have caused an
increase in criminalization and incarceration, and the effects are reverberating today.
Further, because the topic of criminalized women is not always treated extensively, it
made sense to evaluate journal articles from this longer period of time in order to ensure
that the qualitative nature and variety of the discourse strand became apparent.
My initial search revealed 273 citations. Next, I reviewed article titles to eliminate
those that clearly did not fit within the inclusion criteria of the study. Such eliminations
included articles focused on issues such as juvenile justice, foster care, women as victims
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of crime, and other completely unrelated topics. Next, I reviewed abstracts and looked
more closely (reviewing full texts when necessary) at articles focused on children of
incarcerated parents, domestic violence, child abuse, and those about criminal justice but
ambiguous about a gender focus to ensure that they fit parameters for the study. Applying
exclusion criteria (e.g. outside of a U.S. context, book reviews, criminalized women not
an explicit focus) resulted in 51 citations. I retrieved the full text for each of these
citations. During the course of my initial read through of all the articles, two additional
articles were removed from the sample because the focus was not ultimately on
criminalized women. My final sample consisted of 49 articles from 12 journals, which I
think is telling in and of itself; in almost two decades of scholarship in the context of
mass incarceration, with women being the fastest growing correctional population, only
49 articles on this issue come out of the profession’s quote un-quote most influential
journals. Appendix B provides a list of the articles included in the dataset. It is also
notable that of the 25 journals I searched, my final sample came from only half (n=12) of
the original list. The other half did not contain articles meeting inclusion criteria from the
specified time period. Appendix C provides a breakdown of the number of articles per
journal included in the dataset.
Analysis process. A synchronic analysis investigates what is sayable20 within any
given context at a certain point in time. In other words, it identifies the current state of a
particular discourse and the knowledge embedded therein. This study drew on an analysis
plan offered by Jäger and Maier (2009). Analysis occurred on two levels consisting of 1)

20

Different from what is said in that what is sayable refers to what is even possible to say or think within a
given context.
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a structural analysis on the discourse strand; and 2) a detailed analysis on smaller text
units. These two levels of analysis led to an overall synoptic analysis, or final assessment
of the overall state of the discourse on criminalized women in social work. According to
Jäger and Maier (2009), the researcher can expect to go through several cycles of analysis
in order to discover connections and to develop and strengthen interpretations. As such,
the articles in my sample were subjected to repeated analysis involving iterative
“coding"21 utilizing Jäger and Maier’s analytical guidelines described below. Ultimately,
CDA requires a particular orientation when engaging with texts; for me, this meant that I
was consistently looking at how meaning was constructed in the texts, questioning what
was implied through the texts as well as what was missing or left out (Jäger & Maier,
2009; Wood & Kroger, 2000). Janks (1997) explains that CDA necessitates that analysts
deliberately partake in an “estranged reader” position; that is, “reading against a text” in
order to resist its “apparent naturalness” (p. 331). However, Janks warns that
“estrangement without engagement is a refusal to leave the confines of one’s own
subjectivity, a refusal to allow otherness to enter” (p. 331). Therefore, it is important to
also “read with a text” in order to decipher the intended meanings and dominant readings

21

In CDA, traditional notions of ‘coding’ are not typically used. Rather, there is a close focus on how
meaning is constructed in texts, which requires analysts to make sense of the function of various textual
features. For instance, the discourse analyst may focus on lexical choices and the ways such choices mark
particular assumptions or imply particular meanings. At times, I attempted to employ traditional coding
strategies for ease of organization and extracting examples from the data. However, this proved challenging
because coding in this manner pulled the data out of its larger context and thus interfered with interpreting
its meaning. Instead, I annotated as I read, grouped articles according to particular discursive themes and
patterns that emerged in the structural analysis, and worked with data analysis templates. When it came
time to isolate examples during the writing process, I would then revisit a text in its entirety, along with its
annotations and completed data analysis templates. This required me to think and re-think, analyze and reanalyze as I wrote. In this way, writing became an integral part of the inquiry process.
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of a text. For this reason, I considered the idealized reader perspective22 in my analysis.
Huckin (1995) describes the idealized reader as one who is looking for the general picture
of the text without trying to deconstruct it. An idealized reader framework considers the
intended meanings of a text as well as aspects of the text that a “typical reader” would be
likely to focus on. In relation to academic journal articles, the idealized reader might be a
busy scholar, or perhaps student or practitioner, who reads for a gist or to support their
own work; someone who may not have either the time to spend or the effort to exert on
analyzing the text beyond skimming the title, abstract, introduction, and conclusions. As
such, these aspects of the texts were given extra thought in my analysis due to the
likelihood that many readers may be exposed only to them. The idealized reader
perspective helped me consider the power of a text and its effect within the process of
knowledge production and dissemination. I continued analysis until I reached
“completeness” or saturation (Jäger & Maier, 2009). Completeness was identified when
themes and interpretations began to repeat themselves.
Structural analysis. The structural analysis included multiple readings which helped
me identify broad discursive themes and specific pieces for detailed analysis (Wood &
Kroger, 2000). In the structural analysis, I essentially searched for what was typical
within the sample and identified discourse positions. Jäger and Maier (2009) contend that
within any discourse plane or sector, dominant discourses as well as counter-discourses
may emerge. This proved true and served as a launching point for understanding the
discursive limits of the discourse strand.

22

Similar to Derrida’s analytic strategy of ‘double reading.’
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The structural analysis consisted of a broad overall analysis of the texts that made
up the discourse strand and consisted of the following steps. First, I compiled a list of all
relevant articles and their identifying characteristics. This included bibliographic
information, information related to the journal, basic information on the authors, and
general notes on what the articles covered. I began the structural analysis by reading all
of the articles in alphabetical order. As I read, I annotated the articles and kept memos
and notes in a reflexive audit trail. It soon became apparent that different authors and
themes emerged from and coalesced in different journals. At this point, I created a
detailed breakdown of articles per journal (see Appendix D). I then re-read all of the
articles in a different order, this time based on journal. After this reading, I noted the
major themes and trends coming from each journal.
Next, I worked with Jäger and Maier’s (2009) outline for the structural analysis to
capture the overall characteristics of each article. This included the topics and subtopics
covered, use of collective symbols (cultural stereotypes or topoi), arguments that were
made, vocabulary that was used, and attitudes that emerged. As I continued to read and
re-read through the articles, I adapted this outline to capture other points of interest that
emerged in the initial readings (these included reliance on risk, use of social justice
values, binaries and contradictions, strategies for staying neutral, and textual silences)
and created a structural analysis data template (See Appendix E). I then read through
each article again, using the structural data analysis template. This process helped me
identify what was typical in the sample (typical arguments, positions, vocabulary, etc.)
and helped identify discourse fragments (i.e. articles and parts of articles) for detailed
analysis.
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Moving through the structural analysis also helped me to refine which aspects of
grammar would be most fruitful to examine more in depth in the detailed analysis. For
example, I began to notice that the vocabulary and word choice identified throughout an
article would often reveal the overall discourse position or discursive pattern of an article.
So later in the detailed analysis, taking a closer look at nouns, verbs, and adjectives
helped shed light on the sort of logic the text implied and what judgments the text passed
on certain groups. For instance, risk emerged as a defining feature of the discourse strand.
However, there were distinct ways that risk was portrayed and framed through the use of
language. The strongest framing of risk occurred through the use of criminogenic
language, which invoked images of criminal women. Riskiness was also portrayed
through the language of psychology. Observing this distinction led me to wonder if there
was a distinct psychologized construction of risk that is more about the “fallen” or pitiful
women in need of help and treatment, rather than the dangerous or criminal woman in
need of containment and surveillance (Rafter, 1983). At first, I did not make a distinction
between different invocations of risk. However, upon closer examination of the lexical
choices I saw that, though both constructions (psychologized and criminogenic) imply
individualized notions of choice and individualized understandings of crime and
women’s involvement in the criminal justice system, they do so in different ways. The
language of psychology focused on women’s individual psyches and called for treatment
in order to promote healing, whereas the use of criminogenic language focused on
neoliberal notions of responsibility and called for treatment in order to reduce risk and
increase surveillance. This led to the creation of distinct categories for the construction of
risk: the risky woman and the vulnerable woman/object of pity.
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In the structural analysis I also identified discursive entanglements. Texts often
reference various topics and discourse strands. An analysis of discursive entanglements
looks at how different discourse strands are entangled, in other words, the associations
between different concepts. For instance, I found that the discourse of child welfare was
often entangled with the discourse of criminal justice, the discourse of social services was
often entangled with discourses of psychology, and the discourse of trauma was often
entangled with the discourse of attachment. Locating discursive entanglements allowed
me to further discover the discourse position within a given text. A discourse position is
“the ideological position from which subjects, including individuals, groups, and
institutions, participate in and evaluate discourse” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 49).
Discourse positions are essentially overarching worldviews that are developed from being
immersed in various discourse strands.
Lastly, I summarized the topics and subtopics of the sample into groups. The
frequency with which the subtopics appeared (those that were focused on more heavily
and those that were marginal) was noted. Further, any subtopics/issues that were
conspicuously absent were also noted. I kept memos to include descriptions of these
groups, within-group trends, and the significance of each grouping within the context of
the sample. This helped me further articulate discursive themes within the entire sample.
Detailed analysis of typical discourse fragments. To further analyze discourse
positions and their effects, discourse fragments that were typical or representative of a
specific discourse position were subjected to detailed analysis. Analysis at this level
involved establishing connections between language form, function, and context. In my
analysis, specific journal articles (and parts of articles) that embodied key discursive
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themes found in the structural analysis constituted the discourse fragments. Jäger and
Maier (2009) organize the detailed analysis under the following headings:
1. Context of Text. Analysis of the context considers aspects regarding the text
production such as who wrote it, the journal it was published in, and under what
conditions. The context in which a text is produced gives many clues to its status,
legitimacy, and degree of power (Jäger & Maier, 2009). The surrounding sociopolitical context within which the text is written and framed should also be
considered in order to more fully understand what is said or left out of the text.
Here, I consistently kept in mind the overarching place high impact journals hold
in the enterprise of knowledge production. I also thought about how the larger
socio-political context was reflected in, or left out of, the texts and how it
informed the arguments being made.
2. Surface of Text. An analysis of the surface of a text looks at what is actually
present in the text. This includes the layout, graphs, how the text is organized into
units of meaning, and the topics covered. Such factors frame the meaning of a text
and are therefore considered in analysis. In terms of topics, I looked at the key
themes that were communicated about a topic and the general statements that
could be derived from these themes. In line with the expectations of the discourse
sector of academic journal articles, the general structure of the articles in my
sample was relatively stable, showing little variability in organization and layout.
Therefore, what became fruitful for me in terms of examining the layout of these
texts was considering the role that the tile, abstract, introduction, and conclusion
had in the overall scheme of things. Given that these components of academic
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journal articles are more prominent in terms of usage, I spent extra time analyzing
them as specific sites of power.
3. Rhetorical Means. Analysis of rhetorical means looks at the argumentation,
collective symbolism, how subjects are constructed, use of lexical choices (choice
of vocabulary), and other grammar features. Rhetoric, or rather how something is
said, is important because it can signal certain value orientations and serves to
shape the ideological implications and discourse positions present in a text. Here,
I found that also looking at the use of evidentialities helped illuminate not only
the overarching tone of an article, but also how the text would “naturalize” certain
statements as common sense. I also spent time looking at intertextuality, or the
references made to other sources, and the function and use that certain sources
served in shaping the overall argument.
4. Content and Ideological Statements. An analysis of content and ideological
statements attends to the overall worldview portrayed by a text. Here, I looked at
how the ideology was framed and justified in the texts. For instance, depoliticized
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement were actively produced
through a mode of reasoning that decontextualized representations of women’s
behaviors and situations. Another key aspect of this analysis included what was
excluded, or only implied in the text.
5. Other peculiarities of the article and the overall discourse position and message.
Jäger and Maier (2009) offer a detailed outline of specific questions to guide each
aspect of the detailed analysis, which served as a useful heuristic device in my analysis
(p. 55). As suggested by Jäger and Maier, I used their questions as “sensitizing concepts”
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rather than constructs that were applied mechanically. I adapted their outline to
conceptually align with my study, and with what I was learning in the structural phase of
analysis. Table 1 shows the adapted version of Jäger and Maier’s framework for detailed
analysis. Appendix F includes an illustration of both phases of analysis (structural and
detailed) on the same article. Jäger and Maier (2009) highlight that meaning is always
emergent and analysis will not always move directly from one level of analysis to the
next. I found this to be true in my own process and sometimes found myself moving
through detailed analysis while simultaneously engaged with structural analysis.
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Table 1. Jäger and Maier’s (2009) Adapted Framework for Detailed Analysis

23

1.

Context
a. Why was the article selected for detailed analysis? Why is it typical?
b. Who is the author? What is their position and status within social work? What is their
area of expertise, and so on?
c. In which section of the journal does the article appear? What kind of article is it?
(empirical, conceptual?) Is the article a part of a special issue?
d. What year was the article written? Any significance of time?
e. What meaning does the text attribute to other sources? Does it imply knowledge of
another subject matter?

2.

Surface of the Text
a. What is emphasized in the title and abstract? Introduction/conclusion?
b. What are the headings and subheadings? How is the article structured into units of
meaning?
c. What topics are touched upon in the article?
d. How do the topics relate to each other and overlap? (discursive entanglements)

3.

Rhetorical Means23
a. What kind and form of argumentation does the article follow? What argumentation
strategy is used? What logic underlies the composition of the article?
b. What implications and allusions does the article contain?
c. What collective symbolism is used?
d. What idioms, metaphors, sayings, and clichés are used?
e. What are the vocabulary and style? (lexical choices, coded language, modality,
evidentialities, binaries)
f. What actors are mentioned, and how are they portrayed?
g. What references are made? (e.g. cultural references, references to other
disciplines/professions, media or policy referenced, does the text imply knowledge
from other sources?)

4.

Content and Ideological Statements
a. What concepts of social work does the article presuppose and convey?
b. What concepts of “client” does the article presuppose and convey?
c. What concepts of crime, criminality, and punishment does the article presuppose and
convey?
d. What explanations for criminalization are given? Where does the problem for a
woman’s crime/criminalization lie? (i.e. individual? structural? socially constructed? a
pathology?) Who/what needs to change?
e. What concepts of practice and intervention does the article presuppose and convey?
What is deemed as “effective” practice? How are outcomes defined?
f. What frameworks of thought/rationalities are these practices embedded in? (i.e. Risk?
Welfare? Morality?)
g. How are gender, race, and class discussed, explained, and exposed?
h. What content or background is missing?

5.

Discourse Position and Overall Message of the Article.

To supplement these questions, I generated a list of categories during the structural analysis which served
as a guide for things to be on the lookout for, at the level of language (see Appendix G)
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Synoptic analysis and final assessment. Synoptic analysis is typically the final
step of CDA and consists of analyzing the structural analysis and detailed analysis in
relation to each other and comparing and contrasting the findings to gain an overall
assessment of the discourse position(s). Throughout their discussion of analysis, Jäger
and Maier (2009) are clear that analysis is an iterative process with ongoing
interpretations and revisions. I originally envisioned moving cleanly from one step of the
analysis to the next. However, I found that, in line with the principles of CDA, I needed
to be much more flexible and creative in building my project and in moving through and
among the different levels of analysis and interpretation. Rather than the previously
outlined stages of analysis being discrete, I found a lot of slippage between them. The
phases of analysis often occurred simultaneously. As I moved back and forth between
paper copies and electronic versions, oscillating between these different data artifacts, I
was able to hone in on different details.
Though I began with some useful heuristic devices, CDA does not consist of
specific formulas or methods that can be applied across the board to research projects
(Fairclough, 2009; Jäger & Maier, 2009; Wood & Kroger, 2000). This was initially a
point of contention for me. As a novice discourse analyst, I found myself wanting to find
certainty and a procedure that I could follow which would allow me to do things the
“right” way. This was an ironic anxiety given that the epistemological nature of this study
lingers in the realms of uncertainty and provisional knowledge. Ultimately, I saw myself
as experimenting with this methodology using Jäger and Maier’s framework as a helpful
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starting point and adapting it as I progressed24. After all, as Jäger and Maier (2009) state,
“the best way to learn CDA is to do CDA” (p. 56).
Researcher Position
I positioned myself in this research as a “transformative intellectual” (Guba &
Lincoln, 2005). I find the notion of transformative intellectual to be most in line with my
goals and values. Still, I find this an uneasy alliance. Both words, transformative and
intellectual, burst forth with such confident claims toward authority. As a first generation
college student, I often feel displaced in an environment of academic politics and forced
intellectualism. I struggle to “keep up” but more so to stay engaged and find inspiration.
Further, as a woman, I have been adequately socialized into a more humble position of
doubt and uncertainty. Instinctively, I wonder about my ability to do justice to the label
of “transformative intellectual” and I ask “who am I to claim this role?” But then again,
as a feminist scholar with a strong allegiance toward social justice claims and toward
challenging entrenched beliefs about who can be a knower, I also have to ask, “who am I
not to claim this role?” Therefore, I tentatively embraced the position of transformative
intellectual within my research. In the next chapters, as I communicate my
interpretations, I practice centering myself as legitimate while still recognizing the limits
of my understanding.
The post-structural concepts I have discussed thus far—discourse, power,
knowledge, and subject positions—apply to my position in this research as well. I,
myself, am bound up in the larger discourses of society and the discourses of social work.
24

Because of the emergent nature of my project, I kept detailed notes on the research protocol and
how/why it evolved throughout the process.
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My own subject position and understandings of the world have been deeply shaped
through these discourses. This, in part, may have helped me understand implicit
meanings while engaged in analysis, but it also formed the boundaries of my
interpretations.
Evaluative Criteria and Ethical Considerations
Within CDA there is a marked lack of conversation around quality criteria.
Common markers of quality criteria in qualitative research include 1) Attention to
“contexts of production”—including research relationships, the institutional, cultural, and
historical settings; 2) Attention to representation—including questions related to selection
of what to tell and what to leave out; 3) Attention to the construction of knowledge—
including “questions of whose version of reality is privileged, who can tell a story and
who can change it”; and 4) Attention to dissemination (Seale, 2002; Mertens & Ginsberg,
2008; Gilgun & Abrams, 2002).
Like others before me, I reject “standard notions of rigor or validity as evaluative
criteria” (Strega, 2005, p. 228). Judgments of quality that are borne out of an
Enlightenment epistemology are not useful in work that explicitly rejects notions of truth
and objectivity (Strega, 2005). Strega (2005) outlines three standards for assessing
feminist, post-structural research that I find compatible with CDA and with my expressed
ontological and epistemological assumptions.
First, assessment is based on the goals of social justice. The research takes
seriously its usefulness and political implications and should have the capacity to
instigate progressive change for marginalized people and communities. This research
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puts the gaze on the profession of social work and seeks to activate a deeper, critical
analysis of the ways in which we think and talk about the people with whom we work.
Therefore, a critical analysis of the discourses surrounding criminalized women in social
work journals has the potential to change the way social workers understand and apply
academic knowledge in their research and practice and thereby improve the experience of
criminalized women involved in social work research and services.
Secondly, the research should consider dissemination that is rooted in an “ethic of
care and personal responsibility.” Along these lines, van Dijk (2009) proposes
accessibility as a quality criterion for CDA. Thus, findings should be accessible and
readable, particularly for those whom the research is “about.” Gilgun and Abrams (2002)
further highlight the ethical nature of dissemination. In their view, attention to audience
includes considerations regarding who needs to hear the results as well as accessibility. In
dissemination lies the potential for the research to “disrupt oppressive social processes”
(Chase, 2005, p. 667) and reflects larger ethical commitments to social change. Here, I
could comment on the importance of making sure my work gets published as a
transgressive act. Certainly social work researchers, educators, and practitioners would
fall into the category of who needs to hear the results. After all, scholarship that gets
published is garnered with a certain level of legitimacy, and legitimacy for work that
seeks to examine and disrupt the status quo propels that disruption forward. Still, there is
an enormous tension for me here. In this project, I have written a dissertation for a
specialized audience and I was thus compelled to adhere to the established criteria set for
this endeavor—whether this is a situational excuse or a cop-out remains to be seen. From
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here, I will move forward into a career in academia. Though I will no longer be operating
under the constraints of “student,” my personal advancement will once again rely on my
ability to meet certain metrics for success, publications being one of these. Academia
privileges certain ways of speaking and writing. Scholar reputation is not unhinged from
journal reputation. This raises question about (1) how much I will try to subvert the
dominant talk of academia and risk not being published; and (2) how much I will attempt
to bring my work into other venues, where it may have more practical applications, but
less for career advancement.
Ultimately, I have many questions regarding the social justice claims that any of
us in academia make. We are so deeply embedded in an elitist institution that has
historically been exclusionary. By virtue of our participation, we are to a certain extent
complicit in that exclusion. Further, for my specific project, I recognize the heady nature
of much of what is involved in CDA. It is firmly grounded in inaccessible language and
discussions that emerge out of academic theory and jargon, which is an ironic turn given
that its goal is to unsettle dominant narratives. I don’t have a good resolution for this
tension. But every day I am acutely aware that I am participating in something that
alienates me from my friends and family as well as from the people whom social work
serves. Therein lies another layer of tension for me. The excitement of passionate inquiry
is tinged with a shade of isolation and despair.
Lastly, evaluation can be determined through the extent of critical reflexivity.
This impels researchers to make themselves, their biases, and their interpretations visible
in the process as well as acknowledging and addressing the tensions that arise (Finlay,
2002; Strega, 2005). In other words, dealing with “the politics of reality” (Lal, 1996, p.
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207). Here, I will say more about power and reflexivity as it is central to ethical research
as well as quality research. Strega (2005) asserts that “a critical measure by which our
work needs to be assessed is the extent to which we are complicit with or challenging of
dominant discourses” (p. 231). Daley (2010) distinguished reflexivity, as reflecting in
action, from reflection, as reflection on action. In her assessment, the former considers
power relations in the research process and the latter considers the effects of structural
arrangements on the research. Thus, reflexivity, as I understand it, goes beyond reflection
and simply locating oneself in their research. It stretches us to consider seriously the
ways in which we are complicit in systems of oppression. As a social worker and
academic myself, I am deeply implicated in (re)creating the power dynamics and
relations which I seek to unsettle and critique. I do not sit outside of these institutions;
indeed, I have been intimately shaped by their discourses, perhaps in ways outside of my
conscious understanding. This is often a troubling space to inhabit and there is a need to
guard against slippage into neoliberal thinking that is so prominent in both social work
and academia. Reflexivity, then, was crucial throughout the research process in order to
recognize and own my privileged position and how it played out in analysis, to either
challenge or uphold dominant structures and power relations. This is particularly salient
in work that critically pushes back on a profession with which I actively identify.
Reflexivity, therefore, makes it known that subjective interpretation is taking place and
gives the researcher space to not only situate themselves in their interpretations but to
also put themselves in conversations with their interpretations, which I attempted to make
visible in my writing.
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For this project I engaged with reflexivity primarily by keeping a reflexive audit
trail. This audit trail served as a repository for my understandings and experiences with
the data that I visited and revisited throughout the research process. In it, I documented
my processes, thoughts, ideas, and questions, as well as my anxieties and uncertainties
regarding the problematic of interpretation. These notes helped me track the research
process and to record concepts and issues that needed further thought and exploration.
Additionally, I found myself paying attention to places where resistance, existential
quandaries, and epistemological tensions surfaced during the course of this research. I
have found that engaging with these more intellectually and emotionally challenging
aspects of the research allowed for deeper levels of meaning-making to occur—regarding
both my interpretations of the data and of myself as a researcher and citizen of this world.
This level of meaning-making is the terrain in which I negotiate my subjectivity as an
academic who wants her work to be useful and noble.
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Chapter 5: Findings and Analytical Discussion
My overarching research question examined how criminalized women are
constructed in social work high impact journals. There were also two other research
questions related to knowledge and practice because the aim was to make visible the
current constructions of criminalized women in social work, to understand the knowledge
that is produced through those constructions, and to explore how that knowledge
supports/shapes certain kinds of research and practice. The three research questions are
shown below:
1) How do social work high impact journals construct and represent criminalized
women?
2) What particular knowledge claims about criminalization and criminalized
women are made through these constructions?
3) What implications do these constructions and knowledge claims have for social
work practice and research with criminalized women?
The purpose of this chapter is to share the study findings and provide an analytical
discussion to address the research questions. Attempting to articulate the results in this
manner has been a challenging endeavor. There are certain threads from the data which
can be neatly reviewed and discussed, but much else remains indistinct and incoherent,
emerging only through immanent tension and apparent contradictions. I noted multiple
competing discourses both among and within texts; about criminalized women as well as
the nature and purpose of social work. What becomes clear through such contestation is
that in constructing criminalized women, social work also constructs itself.
Throughout this project, I kept returning to Foucault’s assertion that discourse
analysis looks not just at what a text says, but also at what it does. This question of doing
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continually strikes me when examining the data. There’s the doing of individual texts,
and the doing between and among them. In this way, all of the individual texts, taken
together, can be read as a larger text doing something different, something more
substantial, than each individual part. Analyzed from this point of view, what emerges
from the data is not just a contestation over the construction of criminalized women, but a
discursive struggle over the very nature and meaning of social work itself. I observe this
struggle as one of dualities; dualities regarding levels of practice (micro/macro),
epistemological advantage (positivism/interpretativism), mission (social change/social
control), and professional identity (professionalization/politicization). Of course, this
tension is nothing new. Debates regarding the dichotomous nature of social work practice
have been raging since its inception. As I watched this discursive struggle unfold in my
analysis, I began to wonder if the contradictions I saw constituted a contradiction at all,
or if this core tension actually constitutes what social work is. In other words, a struggle
of dualities not only defines a singular aspect of social work, but also produces the very
structure of social work and the discursive space in which it exists and is thereby
recognizable.
However, thinking in terms of duality, or even the paradox of dualities, seems
insufficient to explain social work. Derrida (1981) argues that dualisms are always
already troubled. He invokes the undecidable, something that cannot conform to either
side of an opposition. An example is the Greek word pharmakon, which means both
poison and remedy; or a ghost, which is both present and absent. Undecidables contain
“both contradiction and noncontradiction—and the contradiction and noncontradiction
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between contradiction and noncontradiction” (Derrida, 1981, p. 221). The undecidable
disrupts binary logic, displacing either/or dualism with an ambiguity that occupies both
sides of the dialectic while also destabilizing it from within. Derrida (1981) describes
undecidables as “the ‘between’, whether it names fusion or separation, that thus carries
all the force of the operation” (p. 220). I argue that social work acts as such an
undecidable.
Derrida (1981) stresses that undecidability contains the presence of an
“inexhaustible ambivalence.” An ambivalence, which determines that the undecidable
can always be defined in more than one way. The undecidable cannot be fully decided,
and it is in this undecidability that the “conditions of possibility for acting and deciding”
are actually created (Caputo, 1997, p. 137). As such, the dualistic debates that have
framed social work practice for decades are part of the praxis of the undecidable. For
instance, social work is neither driven toward micro or macro practice, but
simultaneously both—each side of the dialectic mutually enabling the other. This links
Derrida’s work with Foucault’s discussions of power. In Foucauldian terms, power is not
only repressive, it is also productive. It operates in and through relations to produce
knowledge and subjectivities. It is within a discursive struggle of dualities that social
work as an undecidable comes into being, and that we as social workers claim our
identities and priorities within the profession.
Undecidability also reveals paradoxes involved in the project of social work,
where the profession’s conditions of possibility are at the same time its conditions of
impossibility. For instance, social work upholds aspirational values toward social justice
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while simultaneously functioning as an agent of social control. Throughout my analysis, I
watched this specific paradox reveal itself time and time again. Authors in my dataset
would simultaneously uphold the neoliberal mantel of individualism while clinging to the
reclamation of a larger social obligation. I was often confused about what was happening
in a text or where an author stood in relation to the carceral state. I found myself
wondering about the intent of what I was reading and doubting my own analysis.
Notwithstanding the problematic of interpretation that is always present, I was knee-deep
in an ambiguity embedded in the texts related to how they embodied the competing
interests of the profession. In one moment, I read a text as upholding social justice and in
the next, undermining it25. I couldn't decide. In Derridean terms, it is the “the ghost of
undecidability” that marks and constitutes the profession, “for the undecidability is never
set aside, never over and done with. It hovers over a situation before, during and after the
decision, like a specter of justice, disturbing it from within, divesting it of absolute self
assurance” (Caputo, 1997, p. 138). I have found this increasingly difficult to capture
within the bounds of writing that necessarily needs to be defined and limited. Therefore, I
foreground the undecidable as the discursive space in which to hold all subsequent
discussions of results that unfold in the remainder of these pages.
The discussions in this chapter are organized around the research questions.
However, while the three questions may appear to be discrete and linear, there is
25

Because of the imperative within social work to perform some enactment of social justice (even if it is a
performance without substance), one reading of this phenomenon could be that authors were simply giving
lip service to the values of social justice (and, as you will see in the coming pages, it is a reading I have not
entirely discarded). However, over time I became less and less convinced of this interpretation. It seemed
like perhaps something less nefarious, less cynical was occurring in the data. I continually had/have to fight
the urge to grasp at the certainty of the cynical reading, knowing my own subjectivity, being so firmly
formed by and embedded in the macro side of the micro/macro ambivalence, predisposes me to such an
analysis. An analysis that, I hold, is important, albeit constrained.
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considerable overlap in the assumed perspectives of each. The levels of organization and
analysis are not always distinct and often draw on multiple discourses simultaneously.
Though I have attempted to organize this chapter around each individual research
question, they are also so deeply integrated, each operating beyond the confines of
specific examples to produce knowledge, subjectivities, and social practice (Hook, 2001)
that analysis should more accurately be viewed as a whole. I offer this as a caveat to the
reader so they may read with an eye to the conceptual slippage between questions. As for
comprehensibility, given the heavy theoretical nature of my project, I found it impossible
(or perhaps incomprehensible) to discuss the findings outside of my sense-making
process. While I recognize that, traditionally, results are discussed separately from the
analytical discussion, in this chapter these elements are integrated so as to adhere to the
epistemological integrity of my project.
Here, it may also be worth noting the slippery terrain of interpretation. I want to
stress that this analysis is my own and it is but one reading of a very complicated
landscape. Throughout my discussion of the results I draw on examples from the dataset.
This is not to disparage or critique any individual author, but rather to highlight an overall
trend in the larger discourse that we share. Putting the deepest preoccupations of our lives
to paper is a vulnerable endeavor. As such, I felt a lot of hesitancy and unease in taking
the words of other scholars down to the bare bones, making judgments, and naming
specific authors in my analysis. What if I am wrong? What if they intended something
totally different than what I think they accomplished? Why is my reading “better” or
more right than any other? And here again, we revisit the problematic of interpretation: I
am wrong; and I am not. I make no claims toward objectivity or to “truth.” To do so
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would be an epistemic fallacy under the umbrella of CDA. My view is inherently partial
and explicitly political. It is shaped by my own values and interests, by my relationship to
the profession, and by my desire to more deeply understand how social work participates
in processes of criminalization. I respect the efforts of the authors whose work has
enabled my own. The eye of critique here is not on individual scholars; it is turned back
on social work as a profession and a knowledge producing enterprise. Though it often felt
like I was analyzing an Other—“those social work scholars”—my critique comes from
within, from what Patti Lather (2003) calls a “critical intimacy.” As such, I am deeply
implicated in whatever accusations my critiques levy.
This chapter begins by identifying the constructions of criminalized women based
on the vocabulary and framing choices within the dataset. Though I discuss a number of
co-existing constructions present in the data, there is an overriding construction of
criminalized women as risky. Embedded in this construction is a strong neoliberal
discourse on knowing and changing the “responsibilized” self. I go on to provide a
discussion of the implied knowledge claims that flow from these constructions, focusing
deeply on the use of “objective” and often depoliticized explanations for crime and
criminal justice involvement found in the data. I show how this depoliticization is
accomplished through a variety of what I call neutralizing strategies. These neutralizing
strategies ultimately serve to depoliticize social work itself. I highlight how by primarily
constituting criminalized women as risky, social work necessarily responds to her with
individualized service delivery aimed at regulating and changing the behavior of
individuals. I argue that in its reliance on practices of risk management and a preference
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toward micro-level service delivery, social work deploys regulatory practices that further
neoliberal governance (Parton, 1998; Webb, 2003).
Despite observing a very clear dominant discourse of risk and responsibility in the
data, there was also a powerful counter-discourse, both embedded as a contradiction
within the dominant discourse and encompassed outside of it, in distinct articles. The
pieces in this counter-discursive thread firmly anchor their analysis in explanations of
structural inequity, disrupt the underlying construction of crime, and question the logic of
punishment. Accordingly, they move away from reliance on the criminal justice system
as a means of dealing with social problems. Though just a small subset of my sample, I
see these emergent counter-discourses as indicative of the larger discursive struggle
within the profession and as critical to fostering spaces of hope and possibility. Dominant
discourses have power because they naturalize their subject matter and make certain
things seem self-evident (Foucault, 1972). Therefore, a look at the discourses that exist
on the margins helps us disrupt what comes to be known as normal and natural. As Fadyl,
Nicholls, and McPherson (2012) state:
…those practices on the boundaries, which occupy the areas of ‘possible but
outside the mainstream’, allow an exploration of what could be. Exploring the
boundaries between what is allowed and not allowed, between what makes sense
and what seems absurd, highlights those things that are thinkable and doable but
not self-evident, and thus helps to make current discourse and its material effects
more visible. (p. 492).
In other words, by attending to the discursive, we can see how discourse is contested and
contestable, productive in expanding possibilities for resistance. As such, I close this
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chapter with a discussion of an emergent counter-discourse. Please note that for purposes
of clarity, all excerpts from the data that are longer than one line are displayed in single
spaced block quotes.
Constructing Criminalized Women
Question #1: How do social work high impact journals construct and represent
criminalized women?
In this section, I outline the main constructions of criminalized women identified
in the data. Though there are a number of representations found in the data, there is an
overriding construction of risk. Through a variety of discursive mechanisms, criminalized
women are framed most often as risky. A less pronounced, yet still significant
construction is that of vulnerability (fragile/vulnerable/tragic). Though these two
constructions (risk and vulnerability) may seem disparate, both ultimately mobilize the
logic of risk management and can be seen as different sides of the same risk/needs coin.
Through these constructions, criminalized women emerge as a subject of governance for
social work. I outline how these constructions, rather than offering a unique social work
construction, parallel the dominant and historical constructions of criminalized women.
The Construction of Risk. The construction of risk varies in its nature and
articulation. It shows up both explicitly and implicitly in the dataset26. Explicitly, through
the repeated use of the word as a descriptor for both women and interventions: “at risk,”
“risk assessment,” “risk-reduction.” And implicitly, through what has been dubbed risk
thinking (Rose, 1998). According to Rose (2000), risk thinking is “concerned with
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Though there is a staggering amount of explicit discussion on risk and risk factors, appearing in 42 of the
49 articles, I also found myriad ways that authors invoke discourses of risk without actually naming it.
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bringing possible future undesired events into calculations in the present, making their
avoidance the central object of decision-making processes, and administering individuals,
institutions, expertise and resources in the service of that ambition” (pg. 332). He goes on
to assert that risk thinking has become “central to the management of exclusion in postwelfare strategies of control” (pg. 332). Understood in this way, Green (2007) argues that
the prediction and management of risk has become a central organizing principle of
health and welfare programs in a neoliberal context. Based on my analysis of the
literature in high impact social work journals, I would argue further that the prediction
and management of risk has also become central to the process of knowledge production
in social work.
Many scholars discuss the emergence of risk as a product of modernity (Giddens,
1990; Beck, 2002; Lupton, 1999). Lupton (1999) explains how with the onset of
modernity, society moved from thinking about dangerousness to riskiness. Rather than
attributing danger to fortune, fate, or the gods, as was common in pre-modern times, the
concept of risk localizes danger in individual choices. As Beck (2002) states, risk
“presumes decision making. As soon as we speak in terms of ‘risk’ we are talking about
calculating the incalculable, colonizing the future” (p. 40).
Hannah-Moffat (2005) discusses risk thinking in relation to gendered strategies of
control. She explains that risk thinking emerges through the conflation of women’s needs
and vulnerabilities with risks, and leads to the framing of women’s involvement in the
criminal justice system as a result of individual deficits or deviance that need to be
managed or corrected. In other words, risk thinking is a “narrative that rejects social
context and privileges attitudinal and psychological factors” (Pollack, 2010, p. 1273).
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Indeed, throughout the dataset, the individualization of structural concerns emerged as a
key discursive practice. For example, in the introduction to an article advocating for the
expansion of gender responsive programming in U.S. prisons, White (2012) states:
The number of women arrested and incarcerated is at an all-time high. As a result
of two distinct arms of the War on Drugs (legislative changes and the social
construction of the drug user as a criminal), women have become more
vulnerable to arrest for drug crimes than they were in the past. Add to this a group
of conspiracy laws used to prosecute women who are acquainted with a drug
dealer, and the numbers escalate even more (Merolla, 2008). Poverty and a lack of
education often lead women to make poor choices and engage in high-risk
behavior [emphasis added] (pg. 284).
This is a typical discursive move made in the literature I examined. White clearly
acknowledges the impact that social policy has on increasing the number of women in
prison. However, the author immediately reframes it as an issue related to “poor choices”
and “high-risk behavior.” In this way, structural risks, such as poverty, are recast as
personal risks. Despite naming “legislative changes and the social construction of the
drug user as criminal” in the introduction, the author marginalizes these points
throughout the remainder of the article in favor of a focus on individual choices and high
risk behavior. Similarly, Salina et al. (2011) state:
....when they return home, most have not developed more positive coping skills,
have not received training, and have not been offered referrals and/or other
resources or the opportunity to make any positive changes. For example, poor
housing status, limited social support, lack of drug treatment, and poor services
utilization all are associated with post release relapse into drug or alcohol abuse
(Healey, 1999). As a result, many return to the criminal justice system. Thus,
programming must focus on developing the skills necessary to keep women from
returning to high-risk behaviors after they leave the correctional system, but more
importantly, [emphasis added] women need to learn to identify positive supports
and resources that will help them avoid the drug-using or criminal networks that
do not promote healthy living (pg. 368).
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In the above excerpt, the authors make multiple discursive moves in one
paragraph. First, they name socio-economic issues that criminalized women face during
reentry, such as lack of housing and lack of access to treatment, but rather than highlight
a systemic lack of these resources, the authors reduce structural barriers to a lack of
individual coping skills, lack of individual change, and poor service utilization on the part
of individual women. The supposition being that services and resources are not only
abundant but also accessible, and that women are not being proactive enough in their
recovery to find and utilize them. Furthermore, the authors deploy notions of “positive
supports” and “healthy living” which rely on normative understandings of what
constitutes healthy behavior and positive relationships, thereby reinforcing notions of
what constitutes risky behavior. Such strategies of normalization were consistently
deployed throughout the dataset. O’Malley (1996) describes normalization as the method
by which norms of behavior are identified. He argues that normalization is the primary
technique of disciplinary power and that “normalization, in the disciplinary sense implies
‘correction’ of the individual, and the development of a causal knowledge of deviance
and normalization” (pg. 189). Therefore, through processes of normalization, social work
enables its function as a form of governance.
The previous excerpt from Salina et al. (2011) also exemplifies how risk-thinking
manifests through the use of narrow and positivistic outcome measures that are primarily
focused on recidivism as an indicator of success. The authors in the above statement
associate recidivism solely with individual behaviors and assert that programming must
focus on skill development. They go on to suggest that the more important thing is that
women must learn to identify positive supports and resources to help them change and
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avoid a life of crime. The use of the phrase “more importantly” emphasizes individual
responsibility in identifying resources and supports, and renders invisible the very real
possibility that resources and support may not be readily available or equally accessible
to all women. This type of individualizing related to the causes of recidivism was
abundant in the dataset, with 24 of the 49 articles focusing on recidivism as the primary
outcome for success. Overemphasis on recidivism as a marker for success fails to reflect
the sociopolitical realities that women face and relies primarily on individualized
understandings of how and why women get entangled and re-entangled with the criminal
justice system. Further, an emphasis on recidivism neglects other outcomes that women
may define as success for themselves, such as obtaining housing, regaining custody of
their children, or gaining employment (Pollack, 2007).
Here, we see evidence of what Hannah-Moffat (2005) calls the “transformative
risk subject.” The transformative risk subject emerges when need is fused to risk. Unlike
the static risk subject, the transformative risk subject has “intervenable needs” (i.e.
substance abuse, attitudes, and behaviors), which are “amenable to targeted therapeutic
interventions” that when addressed will lower the risk of recidivism (Hannah-Moffat
2005, pg. 31). The creation of intervenable needs is emblematic of a wider shift in
governing; intervenable needs facilitate governing at a distance as women become
regulated through their needs rather than direct repression (Hannah-Moffat, 2001). In the
examples from the dataset listed above, the transformative risk subject is constructed by
first translating women’s gender specific socio-economic oppression into gender specific
psychological deficits. In so doing, her criminal behavior is linked to her inability to
reason and choose. An inability to make good choices is then interpreted as an essential
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part of her riskiness (Pollack, 2007). To take the argument further, I would highlight how
the creation of intervenable needs may be inherently related to the neoliberal economy of
knowledge production: intervenable need = intervention = $$$ (i.e. funding) = research =
publications = tenure and recognition and all those prized accomplishments that go along
with being an academic. Taken to this point, we can see how whole academic careers are
built on the (re)construction of risk.
The use of value-laden and judgmental language to invoke images of risk and
responsibility was littered throughout the data set. This raises a number of key concerns
regarding the discriminate application of even basic social work values in the process of
knowledge production. Social justice is a particularly thorny problem in the analysis and
will be discussed more in depth later in this chapter. Of particular concern at this point
are the social work values related to: dignity and worth of the individual; the importance
of human relationships; and integrity. It seems as though authors apply these social work
values discriminately (i.e. to children and not mothers, and unevenly among participants
in their studies). This points to the active construction of worthiness in the social work
discourse, in regards to not only who deserves services but also who deserves
decency. Indeed, deservingness was constructed time and time again in the dataset
through specific lexical choices.
Discourse analysts note that lexical choice is significant because it allows authors
to lay out a lexical field which signals certain values, judgments, and identities (Mayr &
Machin, 2012). For example, the use of terms such as “female offender,” “high risk
group,” “criminal behavior,” or “deviant lifestyle” is common in some articles. Such
terms are borrowed from the Corrections lexicon and load the text with particular kinds
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of meanings, which allow the authors to foreground an emphasis on individual behaviors
and choices. Pollack (2006) states that “accepting normalized criminal justice concepts
and categories and the widespread use of terms such as ‘women’s criminality’ and
‘female offenders’ helps to consolidate the deficit based individualism characteristic of
penal-welfare approaches” (p. 247). She goes on to argue that terms such as “offender”
reify “women’s identity as permanently criminal or offending…and can be used to
rationalize unjust correctional practices” (p. 247).
By contrast, other articles set up an entirely different lexical field through the use
of terms such as “criminalized women,” “justice involved women,” “vulnerable
population,” and “mothers who have an arrest history.” This is not to imply that these
terms are not also imperfect, but rather to illustrate the different orientations and
judgments that can be made visible through the use of language. “Criminalized women”
for example, alludes to the social construction of crime and allows for an analysis beyond
the individual toward larger social and political processes that criminalize (Pollack,
2006). “Vulnerable population,” on the other hand, reifies the individualist orientation of
the “offender,” yet it is void of the same sense of blame. Amongst data that is plagued
with value-laden and judgmental language, the lexical field of vulnerability allows for a
softening in the dataset. However, the discourse is once again focused on individual
characteristics and individualized understandings of crime, which are then linked to
practices aimed at reducing risk and bolstering resilience. It is to this framing of
vulnerability that I now turn my attention.
Object of Pity. In general, the articles (or pieces of articles) in this group highlight
women’s vulnerabilities and/or draw on discourses of empathy or pity. The object of pity
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is constructed through a lexical field that describes criminalized women as “vulnerable,”
“weak,” “invisible,” and “voiceless.” As women who struggle “fiercely with negative self
perceptions” and “low self-esteem,” who are “imprisoned by their own guilt and
remorse.” At the same time, they are “poorly served by systems that should be helping.”
Women’s criminal justice involvement is seen as a product of “troubled life histories.”
They are observed as suffering from “unresolved trauma” which leads to substance abuse
as a “means of self medication.” The object of pity is, therefore, unable to escape from
the “cycle of criminality.” Above all, she is “powerless.” The following excerpt from
Allen, Flaherty and Ely (2010) illustrates the expression of powerlessness found in the
data:
…these poor and incarcerated mothers also expressed feelings of profound
powerlessness: powerless at being separated from their children, powerless to
protect their children from sharing their same fate, powerless against the child
welfare system, powerless against their addictions, and powerless against the
society from which they have become so disenfranchised [emphasis added] (p.
165).
The authors’ exaggerated use of the word powerless enhances a representation of
criminalized women as tragic and vulnerable. It evokes feelings of empathy and pity.
From the title of the article “Throwaway Moms: Maternal Incarceration and the
Criminalization of Female Poverty,” one could assume the authors are trying to humanize
their participants and disrupt dominant narratives told about women in the criminal
justice system. However, the article minimizes discussions of poverty and oppression by
using emotive language and “feelings talk” as their main argumentation strategy. In so
doing, they inadvertently demean their participants, strip them of agency, and distract the
discussion away from larger structural issues. In many ways, it may be necessary to step
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back from this critique in order to see the political utility of conjuring up sympathy to
build support for a highly stigmatized and marginalized population. However, the
problematic of sentimentality remains: the authors changed the focus of the article from
one concentrated on inequity and injustice to one that is driven exclusively by
emotionality and misdirected sentiment, thereby depoliticizing the issue.
As is the case in the above excerpt from Allen, Flaherty, and Ely, the object of
pity is similarly portrayed throughout the dataset as having very little agency. Agency is
stripped in a variety of ways, but typically by making the case that a woman’s “criminal
behavior” is the result of an addiction, trauma, or mental health issue. The implication
being that she does not actively choose her behavior. Substance use, for example, is often
discussed as something used to self-medicate the untreated symptoms of trauma and
abuse. Therefore, it is understood as something requiring treatment, rather than a bad or
deviant choice the woman has made. In this way, women are constructed as passive
rather than active participants in their criminalized behaviors. Paradoxically, treatment
and intervention for the object of pity then centers on helping a woman heal so she can
make better choices. So while she is framed as powerless, she can be saved. She is the
“fallen woman” (Rafter, 1983; Zedner, 1991).
Note that criminalization or social structure is still not of concern here. The focus
remains steady on behaviors. Though there is some recognition of constrained choice, it
is recognized as being constrained by trauma or life circumstance that the individual, with
treatment, can widen. For example, in their article on improving pregnancy outcomes
during incarceration, Siefert and Pimlott (2001) state:

131
Issues that trigger substance abuse and criminal conduct, including physical and
sexual abuse and their sequelae, such as low self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and
self-destructive behavior, must be addressed (p. 129).
As was the case with much of the data, these and similar claims allow authors to
construct women as vulnerable. In so doing, they distract attention away from the
“criminal conduct” and onto an underlying psychological issue the authors believe to be
at play. However, her vulnerabilities (i.e. trauma and mental health issues) are
simultaneously turned into risks for “substance abuse” and “criminal conduct.” Women’s
trauma and lack of self-esteem then become the focal point of intervention: the
intervenable need. The construction of vulnerability in the data is also highly gendered—
lack of self-esteem and lack of skills (e.g. parenting, decision making, etc.) are typically
linked to experiences of trauma and gendered socio-economic issues (Hannah-Moffat,
2010). This is demonstrated in the following excerpt from an article by Mignon and
Ransford (2012), advocating for the maintenance of parent-child relationships while
incarcerated:
The difficult early life of many incarcerated mothers, coupled with their current
circumstances, can often have a negative impact on a woman’s self-esteem
(Houck & Loper, 2002; van Wormer & Kaplan, 2006) [emphasis added] (p. 70).
From this excerpt, “difficult early life” is understood to be code for abuse and neglect;
and “current circumstances” stands in for poverty, incarceration, and child welfare
involvement. Pollack (2007) argues that
When incorporated into corrections logics and discourses, the victimization
narrative becomes psychologized; that is, there tends to be a focus on the
psychological and emotional impact of such experiences and how impaired
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thinking, decision-making, and lack of emotional control lead women to commit
crimes. The psyche of the criminalized woman is the site at which reformation
occurs (p. 160).
Indeed, explicit recognition of victimization and trauma was used to construct
vulnerability in many of the articles in the dataset. However, it was highlighted in
different ways. In the articles that take a more transparent risk focus, trauma is generally
named as a characteristic when describing the population and then sidelined or not
discussed at all. Vulnerability, in these cases, is established by comparing criminalized
women to their counterparts including, for example, incarcerated men, non-incarcerated
women, and incarcerated women without children. For instance, Horton (2011) describes
incarcerated women as “a particularly vulnerable population” (p. 184) and strengthens the
case for vulnerability by reporting on the differential rates of childhood abuse among
incarcerated women, men, and the general population:
A greater percentage of incarcerated women report being physically or sexually
victimized before the age of 18 (37%) compared to their incarcerated male peers
(14%), as well as the general population (8% for men, 17% for women; Harlow,
1999) In addition, on every measure of drug use, female inmates report higher use
than their male peers (Greenfeld & Snell, 2000) (p. 184).
Here the meaning of “particularly vulnerable” is established through difference; thus, it is
through opposition to their “incarcerated male peers” and “the general population” that
the author is able to make incarcerated women’s vulnerability visible.
The articles that vigorously emphasize vulnerability over deviance tend to locate
victimization in the interpersonal violence of spousal or family abuse/neglect. Here,
trauma is understood as an underlying cause of “criminal” behaviors. These articles make
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a direct link between women’s trauma and her engagement in “crime.” For example,
Kubiak (2004) asserts that:
Attention to trauma-related disorders among incarcerated women may be pivotal
in preventing relapse and as a consequence, recidivism (p. 430).
By contrast, in the articles that I identified as part of a counter-discourse (more on
this later) the authors discuss victimization but they characterize it as a gendered social
issue rather than a personal one; in this way, they focus less on a woman’s victimization
and more on her marginalization. Further, while the general assumption in most of the
articles appears to be that trauma and mental health issues can be effectively treated in
prisons27, the articles that comprised the counter-discourse ardently disavowed such a
stance while also calling attention to the state sanctioned violence women experience
through interactions with penal-welfare systems.
As I have demonstrated, while most articles in the dataset deploy notions of risk
by emphasizing choice and responsibility, others emphasize vulnerability. Some do both.
An example may help illuminate this phenomenon. In their article on developing a
parenting program for jailed mothers, Miller et al. (2014) foreground the challenges
incarcerated mothers face that make it difficult for them to maintain their parenting roles
both in jail and upon release. The authors identify histories of trauma, abuse, and a
subsequent loss of confidence as things that interfere with a woman’s ability to parent.
The authors also emphasize the distress mothers feel upon being separated from their
children. In this way, they highlight criminalized women’s vulnerabilities. She is not
constructed as “deviant,” but rather a woman who cares and is up against uniquely
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Indeed, with few exceptions, the violence of prison was left unexamined in the dataset.
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gendered challenges. Later in the same article, while advocating for the effectiveness of
jail-based parenting interventions, the authors assert that:
A jail stay may function as a “wake up call” for some mothers, offering a chance
to prevent them from falling deeper into the system (p. 164).
Though the authors first position the mothers within powerlessness, the
symbolism of a “wake up call” indicates the need and ability for women to take
responsibility for themselves and their actions; through this symbolism, crime is firmly
re-established as a fact rather than a social construction (Pollack, 2006). Miller et al.
(2014) end their article by pulling both of these constructions (risky and vulnerable)
together:
Although challenging, implementing parenting programs in jail settings represents
an opportunity for high-risk mothers to focus on and develop their parenting
skills. Although the setting may prevent practicing new skills with children,
offering parenting sessions in jail may be an effective way to reach this
vulnerable population of women [emphasis added] (p.169).
Whether deployed exclusively or simultaneously, the language of both risk and
vulnerability accomplish similar things. They individualize the reasons for committing
crime and divert attention away from a woman’s social context, locating both the
problem and solution within the individual (Hannah-Moffat 2010; Maidment 2006).
Indeed, throughout the dataset, the redefinition of the structural into the individual has the
effect of constructing women as both the cause of and solution to not only crime, but also
the increasing rates of women’s incarceration. The supposition being that to decrease
incarceration rates, you have to deal with problematic individual behaviors, not
problematic policies or the conditions of inequality that facilitate “crime.” This will be
discussed more in depth in relation to research question #2.
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The Unfit Mother. The representation of the unfit mother is another way the
construction of risk plays out in the dataset. Many women in the criminal justice system,
about two-thirds, are mothers (Kajstura, 2018). Not surprisingly then, my sample
included a number of articles with an emphasis on children and motherhood. Specifically,
such articles focused on either incarcerated/criminalized mothers/pregnant women or
children with incarcerated/criminalized mothers. This category is significant for analysis
because over half (n=25) of the sample is comprised of articles with a focus on children
and mothers. Indeed, if I had not used the word “mother” in my keyword search, my
sample would have been reduced by about half.
In a significant proportion of these articles, the welfare for children is framed as
the primary concern and is bolstered through the construction of the unfit mother, and
through a strong focus on negative outcomes for children and an infant determinism for
such negative outcomes—children are framed as being “at risk” and bound for
problematic life trajectories. These outcomes are further attributed to the mother, not the
larger social context. The mother herself is then framed as risky because she is
responsible for the creation of damaged children, or worse, future criminals. This plays
out in a number of ways.
Attachment. 11 of the 25 of articles in this part of the sample (i.e., those focused
on children and mothers) deploy narrowly defined conceptualizations of attachment that
emphasize the mother-child relationship, and exclude an analysis of contextual issues,
such as poverty, that may lead to poor outcomes for children. For instance, in an
attachment-based study on the relational health of infants who live in a prison-based
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residential parenting program with their incarcerated mothers, Condon (2017) introduces
their28 article by stating:
Many infants in the United States have incarcerated parents (Pattillo, Weiman, &
Western, 2004; Rebecca Project, 2010; Villanueva, 2009) and are at risk for poor
social outcomes, partially as a result of disrupted attachment relationships
(Cassidy, Poehlmann, & Shaver, 2010; Kjellstrand & Eddy, 2011; Lange, 2008;
Myerson, Otteson, & Ryba, 2010) [emphasis added] (p. 5).
Here, the author links poor outcomes for children (at least partially) to the only named
variable of “disrupted attachment relationships.” Through the remainder of the article
Condon hints at how social context could lead to “disrupted attachments,” but remains
squarely focused on the mother child-attachment as the site of intervention and asserts a
very clear idea of what a “normal” and “healthy” relationship between mother and infant
should be. Failure of the dyads in this study to achieve normative standards for bonding
and attachment is then attributed to the mother’s individual characteristics, not the prison
environment or other possible factors. For instance, while listing the constructs under
study, Condon looked for:
(d) moments in which mothers showed awareness of their own and their child’s
inner worlds (reflective capacity); and (e) high-stress moments during which it
was very difficult for mothers to be anything but self-centered, reactive, selfprotective, or dismissive of their children’s experiences (pg. 12).
To begin, “high stress” is not defined, but given the context of the prison environment
one can assume it may involve experiences that trigger a mother’s trauma29. Next, the use
of such value-laden language regarding a mother’s response to these “high stress
moments” implies judgment and implicitly asserts a norm for mothering that involves not
28

Gender-neutral pronouns are used when an author’s pronoun is unknown.
It is interesting to note how in this article and others like it, the discourse of attachment becomes
entangled with the discourse of trauma. I wonder in some ways if trauma is the new shiny thing that has
come in to replace attachment. But that’s another paper.
29
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only awareness and engagement (as in point d) but also selflessness. These types of
lexical choices implicitly assert universal norms for parenting and were prevalent
throughout the data set. In juxtaposition, it could have been just as easy to look for “high
stress moments during which it was difficult for mothers to be present.”
Later in this same article, Condon (2017) doubles down on the implications of the
mother-child relationship for a child’s future:
Over time, their experiences during interactions with their parents become a
blueprint or inner working model for their developing sense of self, and set the
stage for later relationship patterns [emphasis added] (pg. 19).
The imagery of a blueprint harkens back to Beck’s notion of “colonizing the
future.” Similar to Condon’s article, it was common among the other articles that drew on
notions of attachment to include little to no discussion of how culture, socio-economic
status, or the prison environment itself may impact a child or the context of parenting.
Ghenie and Wellenstein (2009) refer to this as a “context stripping view of attachment”
and assert,
Larger issues of poverty, racism, social exclusion, and violence become reduced
to blaming birth parents who fail the test of proper parent-child bonding. Through
diagnosis and treatment of their children in care, the problem is further reduced to
one located in the “detached” child, who has one therapeutic shot at connection
before being written off as a future sociopath (pg. 161).
Ghenie and Wellenstein contend that such an application of attachment theory moves the
focus away from the larger social context that plays a role in child development, and
lends itself to a form of infant determinism—the assumption that problems in childhood
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will inescapably lead to poor outcomes across the lifespan30. Indeed, throughout the data,
there is a strong focus on problems predetermined for children of criminalized mothers
and an emphasis on women’s deficits as mothers, which constructs them as a deviant risk
group because she is seen as being at risk of (or responsible for) causing her children
future harm or creating “risky” children and future criminals. Similar to Cruikshank’s
(1999) argument regarding self-esteem discourses, I argue that by linking the motherchild bond to larger societal goals of eliminating crime and reducing incarceration,
attachment becomes both a normalization strategy and a “political obligation.” Through
the discourse of attachment, the mother-child bond becomes a relationship that is
governable. “Here the social sciences can be seen as productive sciences; the
knowledges, measurements, and data they produce are constitutive of relations of
governance as well as the subjectivity of citizens” (Cruikshank, 1996, p. 237).
Intergenerational Risk. The construction of the unfit mother was also evident in
the way many of the articles on maternal incarceration drew on assumptions of
“intergenerational crime" (n=14). Typical statements in this regard include the following
by Miller et al. (2014):

30

Traditional developmental models, such as attachment theory, take inherent biological and psychological
processes as a starting point for analysis of people and provide a rationale for notions of “normative” to
which all others are deviant or “at risk.” They work off of a foundational assumption of human
development based on the idea that all people go through a series of universal and natural developmental
stages, and if the developmental tasks of one of those stages are compromised, the window of opportunity
closes and it is difficult, if not impossible, to recover. However, at this point in time a large body of
interdisciplinary literature integrating the discovery of neuroplasticity has complicated, if not refuted, the
foundation of developmental models. It is interesting to me that social work still persists in centering
traditional and outdated developmental theories in both research and education. I would argue that by now,
rather than being scientific, the discourse around attachment is largely symbolic. In so being, it can be
deployed in a resistive manner.
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Parents, particularly mothers, in the correctional system have also often
experienced poor parenting role models and experience multiple associated
challenges that make it difficult to break the intergenerational cycle of
incarceration [emphasis added] (p. 163).
Similarly, Hanlon et al. (2005) state:
Noting that children of mothers in prison are vulnerable to the adoption of a
deviant lifestyle because of the risk factors to which their families’ difficult life
circumstances have exposed them, Greene, Haney, and Hurtago (2002) point out
that many of these children experience the very same criminogenic conditions that
contributed to their mothers’ incarceration—ultimately giving rise to an
intergenerational cycle of criminality [emphasis added] (p. 68).
Not only do statements such as these impose an inevitable “cycle” of generational
incarceration (or criminality), but the language around “poor parenting role models” and
“adoption of a deviant lifestyle” strips away all social context and locates the problem of
incarceration solely in the behavior of individuals. In this way, incarceration is implicitly
linked to problematic behaviors rather than problematic sentencing policies and/or
unequal application of the law. The logic of this link relies on an assumption that when
people are incarcerated, 1) they are guilty, and 2) they have violated some universal (i.e.
normal) standard for behavior, and 3) they deserve to be incarcerated. The underlying
notion of “criminal behavior” and the logic of punishment goes unquestioned; and
deservingness remains firmly embedded in the discourse around criminalization.
These types of arguments rely on cultural ideologies about crime that take crime
to be a stagnant, fixed category. However, as has been discussed previously in this
dissertation, plenty of research shows that crime is a social and historical construct,
which arises through discourse and is applied differentially across lines of gender, race,
and class (Boyd, 2006; Comack & Balfour, 2004; Faith, 1993; Laberge, 1991; Pollack,
2007). Cultural myths about crime and criminality are deeply embedded in the dataset,
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conflicting with and constraining the profession’s most aspirational values toward social
justice. A risk framework that pre-determines future criminal justice involvement leads to
responses that always include more surveillance and intrusion into the lives of those
under its gaze.
Relatedly, in an attempt to establish relevance for a study on the relationship
between maternal incarceration and school dropout rates for children, Cho (2010)
introduces their paper by discussing the limitations of previous research on children of
incarcerated mothers and states:
…such studies are not able to examine the cumulative process of
intergenerational disadvantage [emphasis added] triggered by a mother’s
incarceration, and this process may eventually lead to the social exclusion of their
children as adults (Foster and Hagan 2007) (p. 258).
The notion of “intergenerational disadvantage” is reminiscent of the “culture of poverty”
theory, which suggests that poor people have certain innate characteristics (psychological
and behavioral) and values that perpetuate poverty. The culture of poverty rhetoric is
often invoked in media and political debates on the welfare state, but has been largely
cast aside in the social sciences.31 This type of rationality sidelines the major economic
and political systems that place various groups at risk for poverty and disadvantage, in
favor of individual level explanations. Similarly, by proposing that “intergenerational
disadvantage” is “triggered by a mother’s incarceration,” the author is ignoring a large
body of research which shows that many families are disadvantaged prior to the mother’s
incarceration, and that such disadvantage is likely to shape one’s entry into the criminal
justice system. Certainly, incarceration exacerbates disadvantage, but it is notable that
31

Its explanatory power, in the social scientific sense, is both problematic and weak because it centers
culture, rather than poverty, as the explanatory variable.
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Cho frames incarceration as the cause of disadvantage and social exclusion and not the
other way around. Despite nodding to structural factors throughout the paper, this initial
framing exposes the underlying neoliberal logic embedded in Cho’s research.
Cho (2010) further establishes relevance for this study by discussing concerns
related to the “intergenerational transmission of crime” (p. 267). Transmission, like a
message from space or the plague. Cho cites research that:
finds that maternal incarceration is associated with high rates of incarceration
among those mothers’ children when they reach adulthood (p.267).
Cho’s study then examines school dropout rates among children in relation to length of a
mother’s “incarceration spell” (“dosage”) and the “developmental stage” of the child
during the mother’s incarceration (“timing”). Cho asserts that dosage matters because as
dosage increases so do disruption and stigma. The author then attributes greater
disruption and stigma to prison stays by stating:
About half of the inmates sentenced to jail are convicted of a crime and usually
receive a sentence of a year or less. They are admitted for light felonies,
misdemeanors, and probation violations....prison inmates generally have longer
sentences than jail inmates do and are convicted for more serious crimes” (p.
262).
Despite this being wildly inaccurate—mandatory sentencing policies send people
to prison for many of the same reasons people end up in jail, including violations of
probation32—by positioning severity of behavior as the factor for imprisonment this
statement inadvertently positions the mother as the sole explanatory variable for child
outcomes, despite all other obvious issues such as poverty, racism, or other contextual
32

In fact it has been widely recognized that probation often serves as a back door to incarceration.
Probation increases surveillance and monitoring on a person’s life. Therefore many probationers are sent to
prison for technical violations in regards to the terms of their probation, rather than re-offense.
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disadvantages empirically associated with incarceration. In the context of Cho’s study,
school dropout rates could likely have something to do with the type of school a child
attends. Further, the link between school dropout rates and a child’s own incarceration
could have something to do with zero tolerance policies and the school-to-prison
pipeline. When viewed through this wider lens, the association between a mother’s
incarceration and her child’s incarceration has less to do with the severity of a mother’s
crime and more to do with systems of inequity that perpetuate social exclusion.
Manufactured Risk. Like many of the studies in my sample, Cho’s found, at best,
mixed results and was ultimately unable to confirm their hypothesis (i.e. maternal
incarceration = destined detrimental outcomes for children)33. Still, by foregrounding the
paper with arguments related to the mother at the expense of a discussion on structural
issues, the article paints a misleading picture regarding correlation. It is as though the
researchers forget the most basic rule of statistics: correlation does not equal causation.
By conflating correlation with causation, authors are able draw on the symbolism of
“intergenerational crime,” which conjures up fears and insecurities regarding a child’s
“risk.” This then becomes a catalyst for perpetuating messages regarding the need for
increased surveillance.
I emphasize this, not to negate the correlation, but to suggest that perhaps the
focus is misplaced. Invoking a discourse of intergenerational crime narrows the
profession’s focus to that of assessment and monitoring of a child’s risk. A focus on risk
33

It is perhaps also notable that when this same study found better outcomes for children if their mothers
had longer stays in jail or prison, the researcher concluded that children (especially girls) might benefit
from being separated from their mothers via incarceration—a prime example of the active construction of
the unfit mother.
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loses sight of a child’s agency and potential. Scholars studying the “cultural politics of
childhood” call attention to the ways in which political and economic factors shape the
lives of children and youth (Nybell, Shook, & Finn, 2009; Qvortrup, 2005). They connect
their understandings of children and youth to shifting social, political, and economic
conditions rather than just biology and family of origin factors. Social work can take
lessons from such scholarship in order to shift the discourse on how we support children
from one defined primarily by the assessment and management of risk to one that
acknowledges agency and focuses on providing economic support to families in order to
support a less constrained form of agency.
Similar to Cho’s, many of the other studies on children in my dataset were framed
around the expectation of dysfunction. However, results did not always compellingly
support such expectations. At times, authors rationalized their unexpected results in ways
that reinforced their original expectations. For example, Hanlon et al. (2005) conducted a
study on 9–14-year-old children of incarcerated mothers in order to inform prevention
programming. The study was premised on the assumption that these children would be
“at-risk” for a variety of negative outcomes and, therefore, in need of targeted prevention:
We anticipated that most, if not all, of the children of mothers who have been
incarcerated, particularly substance-abusing mothers, would be highly vulnerable
to the development of a deviant lifestyle (p.80).
In the end, their results did not support these claims and the authors acknowledge that the
children in their study “were neither especially deviant nor maladjusted” (p. 79). They go
on to subtly qualify the disconfirmation of their expectations by stating:
The majority of the children had been able to avoid the adoption of a deviant
lifestyle at this point in their lives [emphasis added] (p. 79).
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The use of the phrase at “this this point” indicates an inherent predication that at some
point these children will indeed adopt a deviant lifestyle. Indeed, the authors then return
to the larger body of literature to support this predication:
In view of the positive relationship between age and delinquency noted in the
literature (Elliott, 1994; Moffett, Caspi, Dickson, Silva, & Stanton, 1997), the
vulnerability of all of the children is likely to increase during their teenage years
(p.79).
The authors then go on to disqualify their findings34 by emphasizing the smaller portion
of their sample that displayed “disquieting characteristics” (p.79) related to peer
associations and school performance, and state:
Along with family support services, these two problem areas, both of which have
an impact on the subsequent development of a deviant lifestyle, need to be
promptly and aggressively [emphasis added] addressed in interventions targeting
these and similarly disposed children (p.79-80).
This example illustrates a trend in the larger dataset wherein authors persist in
emphasizing deficits and calling for interventions related to risk despite not finding
particularly problematic patterns of behavior35. I argue that an investment in the logic of
risk is evidenced by such practices. Despite refuting their own expectations for riskiness,
Hanlon et al., like other authors in my sample, cling to their predictive powers and try to
re-invent risk. They legitimize their work by drumming up problems (i.e. risks) where
none are indicated. In this sense not only are they displaying an investment in the

34

Another way these authors, and others in the dataset, rationalized similar unexpected findings was
through a post facto analysis regarding the limitations of their study or sample.
35

This trend was also found in the articles on intervention research. When interventions were found to be
ineffective or inconclusive, authors rationalized the results by focusing on negative qualities of the
participants (e.g. lack of motivation, lack of insight, etc.) rather than the qualities of the intervention. A
prime example of this can be found in Buttell (2002) wherein the author attributes the ineffectiveness of the
intervention under study (treatment for “female domestic violence offenders”) to a low level of “morality”
among participants.
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discourse of risk, but they are also creating risk. They are manufacturing risk. This
speaks to the productive nature of social work research. Scholars produce a risky or “atrisk” subject, generate knowledge or truths regarding that subject, and then establish
expert interventions to regulate that subject (Cruikshank, 1996). In other words, we create
subjects that need us and our interventions.
Symbolic Use of Childhood. While some writers rely on symbolism around
intergenerational crime and attachment to propel a discourse on risk, others invoke
symbolism around childhood, and childhood lost, to tug at the heartstrings of readers.
Common sentiments include those extorted by Harris (2017):
Children are innocent and have not committed a crime (p. 39);
Miller et al. (2013):
Implementing such practices and policies takes time, and the resources for
implementation are not always readily available; nevertheless, the cost to children
is too significant to delay action (p. 412); and
Schlager and Moore (2014):
Ultimately, the brunt of the impact of incarcerating mothers is acutely felt by
children with both significant short and long-term consequences (p. 100).
In these statements (and others like them), symbolism around innocence and “an
endangered child” are used to conjure up images of subjects who are worthy of our
attention, our efforts, and our care. Such argumentation strategies are powerful because
they invoke symbolic consequences for children. As Sherr (1999) states, “Children are
the quintessential example of individuals placed in circumstances beyond their control.
The consummate victims, children are unable to overcome difficult circumstances
without the assistance of caring adults” (p. 52).
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Arguments that invoke the symbolism of childhood draw on larger cultural
debates about deservingness (Cousins, 2013) and legitimize calls for advocacy and
intervention on behalf of children. In this way, such argumentation can be seen as
strategic and productive in the sense that it broadens the perspective regarding who is
harmed by the carceral state and opens up spaces for resistance. However, I would argue
that it also conceals larger questions regarding the underlying moral justifications that
uphold the carceral state which ultimately deem it acceptable to lock those Other people
(i.e. not innocent) in cages. The harms of incarceration are reduced to the level of
platitude. Furthermore, I would argue that positioning children as symbolic victims
justifies the continued regulation of their mothers. In over-emphasizing the welfare and
worth of children, mothers are inadvertently positioned as undeserving (i.e. not innocent
but guilty) and there is concurrently a persistent disregard for her traumas and needs, as
well as her ability to be a loving parent. Social workers are, in turn, positioned as the
caring adults, the guardians of the vulnerable.
The Idealized Mother. In a smaller portion of the articles related to children and
motherhood, the welfare, experiences, and opinions of mothers are discussed, and women
are framed as being good or capable mothers. Typically, however, this is accomplished
by using the binary of the good/bad mother which positions criminalized mothers in
opposition or comparison to an idealized mother. For example, in their results section,
under a theme labeled “Parenting: The Shame of Maternal Failure,” Allen, Flaherty, and
Ely (2010) summarize their results by stating:
Perhaps, the most outstanding quality of these interviews was how deeply
reflective—often philosophical—these women were about all the subjects they
covered but particularly with regard to the topic of motherhood. Many of the
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women also struggled fiercely with their negative self-perceptions as parents. In
many ways, the women expressed the same themes one would expect from any
mother, including the aforementioned idealized mother. These themes included
love for their children, pride in their children’s accomplishments, and worry about
their children’s circumstances and future challenges. However, unlike idealized
mothers, these poor and incarcerated mothers also expressed feelings of profound
powerlessness: powerless at being separated from their children, powerless to
protect their children from sharing their same fate, powerless against the child
welfare system, powerless against their addictions, and powerless against the
society from which they have become so disenfranchised [emphasis added] (p.
165).
Notice how the authors frame the first sentence in a way that presupposes the expectation
that criminalized mothers would not be reflective and philosophical in regards to
motherhood. The use of the phrase “most outstanding” rather than an evidentiality36 such
as “of course” propels certain assumptions about the women and has the effect of
denaturalizing their participants as good mothers. A question to ask ourselves is: if these
participants were middle class women (or non-criminalized women), would this even be
considered a finding? Further, the authors work from an assumption that “idealized”
mothers do not feel powerless. This again speaks to the normative
constructions/expectations around motherhood. Though the authors appear to set the
women up in this dichotomy so as to challenge the construction of criminalized mothers
as unfit, it ultimately ends up reinforcing the bad/good mother dichotomy and the
construct of an idealized mother as legitimate and achievable. Similar normative
gendered expectations around mothering were deployed throughout the dataset. Rarely

36

Evidentialities are phrases that suggest factuality (e.g. “of course”). Such discursive moves have the
effect of naturalizing certain statements as common sense. It is notable that the authors use of “most
outstanding” in effect worked off of a “commonsense” notion that women in the criminal justice system
could not possibly be thoughtful, engaged mothers. In trying to dispel such narratives they make space for
their sample to be considered “exceptional.” And though I would love it if the adage were that the
exception complicates the rule, it is generally understood that the exception proves the rule.

148
was the criminalized mother discussed as being a complicated mother, who is neither
idealized nor demonized (see Vandermause, Seversten, and Roll (2013) for an important
exception37). Throughout the data there was a heavy emphasis on how one’s ability to
meet (or not) these expectations is shaped by substance use and mental health issues and
the subsequent lack of mental health and addictions treatment. In honing in on the lack of
services and treatment, I believe the authors think they are looking at social justice and
structural issues; however, without including a discussion related to how a woman’s
ability to meet expectations for parenting is shaped by things such as poverty and racism,
it ultimately reifies the focus on individual deficit and fault and holds steady the
underlying logic of punishment and control.
Similar to the use of normative constructions of motherhood, guilt was deployed
as a gendered strategy of responsibilization. The articles on incarcerated mothers pull on
guilt in different ways. For instance Allen, Flaherty, and Ely (2010) emphasize the guilt
and shame mothers do feel in statements such as the following:
Perhaps, the most powerful and heartbreaking themes were those of the maternal
love that these women consistently expressed for their children and the profound
sense of guilt and staggering remorse they were all struggling with when they
discussed the impact of their actions on their children. It became abundantly clear
that their substance abuse problems and criminal justice involvement were
symptomatic of extremely troubled life histories (p. 170).

37

It is perhaps noteworthy that these authors are nursing scholars rather than social work scholars. I
debated whether this constituted a discourse outside of social work, but in the end because it was published
in an explicitly named social work journal (QSW), with an editorial board consisting of mostly social work
scholars, I decided that it contained something important related to how social work discourse is/can be
shaped by interdisciplinary scholarship.
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Here, the focus on guilt emphasizes the action of taking responsibility and renders the
women worthy of our empathy and understanding. In contrast, Gilham (2012) also
deploys guilt but emphasizes the lack of remorse mothers feel.
It seemed clear that these mothers were attempting to protect their children, but by
denying their incarceration, they were able to save themselves from further
embarrassment and shame. When asked whether their children had experienced
negative consequences related to their incarceration, all of the women expressed
that their children had indeed experienced at least some negative consequences.
Many of the women seemed to minimize the impact of their behavior on their
children, and several stated that they had not done drugs or committed any illegal
activity in the company of their children. Three women in particular spoke at
some length about their positive parenting skills and concern for their children
despite their other actions. One mother was quoted as saying, ‘‘My kids are my
life. I’m not a bad mom.’’ Incidentally, this participant was separated from her
two children and two step-children, and her two sons had entered mental health
counseling since she was jailed. Another mom, a newly admitted heroin and crack
addict, spoke at length about the positive relationship she shared with her 6-yearold daughter even though she had not seen her in more than a year. It is
noteworthy that these three women were more recent admissions to the facility
and had not had the benefit of the treatment the other women had received, which
may account for their responses (p.94).
Now, the focus on guilt emphasizes the absence of taking responsibility and renders the
mothers unfit and no good for their children. However, in the last sentence readers are
reassured that therapy can fix them right up. Indeed, Gilham goes on to say:
From the women who had been in the facility for longer periods, we found that
releasing them from their denial enabled them to have a somewhat different
understanding of their family situation. The women who had served more of the
typical 6-month sentence at the facility when interviewed made us aware that
once a woman was able to admit to and begin to address her personal issues,
including her addiction, she was able to re-examine her parenting behavior and
how her problems affected her children (p. 96).
In many ways, these two examples highlight the two primary constructions of
criminalized women found in this study, the former being the vulnerable woman (object
of pity) and the latter being the straight up risky woman. Despite the distinction, I don’t
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necessarily see these two constructions as being completely oppositional, in that they
both draw on neoliberal notions of responsibilization (for changing the self) and exert a
reliance on the needs/risk paradigm (Hannah-Moffat, 2005). One portrays riskiness
through the use of psychological language, which emphasizes a “fallen” or pitiful woman
in need of help and treatment. The other frames a pattern of riskiness through the use of
criminogenic language and needs, which ultimately paints a picture that emphasizes
deviance and criminality. Though one highlights a woman’s vulnerability and the other
her culpability, they both expose the underlying neoliberal ideology that is at work across
constructions. Juxtaposed to one another, we can see that they come from different sides
of the same needs/risk coin. Further, the distinction between risk and need is reminiscent
of the historical binary of criminal woman/fallen woman, which is not only gendered, but
also highly raced (Colvin, 1997).
Concluding Thoughts. Throughout this section I have shown how the
construction of risk operates through processes of normalization. In this way, risk
becomes self-evident and taken for granted as an appropriate conceptual framework
through which to view criminalized women and their children. Garrett (2016) discussed
how dominant texts and popular ideas within social work “are frequently riddled with
take-it-for-granted assumptions reflective of a particular historical and economical
conjuncture” that show up in the “verbal categories that social workers are apt to use,
promote, and reify” (p. 1912). I argue here that risk is one such verbal category.
Risk saturates the discourse in this dataset in a manner that is reflective of (and
reinstates) a neoliberal hegemonic order. The unquestioned reliance on risk is so strong
that it is frequently hard to distinguish what constitutes a need from what constitutes a
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risk. The persistence of risk as a totalizing discourse cannot be denied. Its subjects are
caught up in a form of discursive capture and risk is turned into a scholarly platform and
a profession. A closer look at the knowledge claims underlying and enabling the rampant
use of risk helps to expose and rupture the places where neoliberalism hides out in the
discursive production of risk. These knowledge claims are the focal point of the next
section.
Knowledge Claims
Question #2: What particular knowledge claims about criminalization and criminalized
women are made through these constructions?
The following analysis is heavily influenced by Foucault’s concern with the
production of knowledge through discourse. For Foucault, power does not exist outside
of the production of knowledge (1995). He theorized the connection between power and
knowledge in terms of not simply producing certain understandings of social reality but
actively shaping reality. In other words, discourse produces knowledge claims that, in
turn, shape what can be said and known about any topic. Jäger and Maier (2009) explain,
“Discourses exert power because they transport knowledge on which collective and
individual consciousness feeds. This knowledge is the basis for individual and collective
action, which in turn shapes reality” (p. 39). In this way, discourses are tied up with
power because they are ultimately capable of inducing ways of thinking and behaving. As
modes of power, discourses not only construct reality but do so in unequal ways,
privileging some as legitimate and normative while rendering others illegitimate and
abnormal. Which, of course, circles us back around to Foucault's (1991) idea of
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governmentality and the importance of examining knowledge claims for how they
produce objects of governance.
My examination of knowledge claims in the dataset revealed a consistent use of
depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement throughout the
data. From a Foucauldian perspective, such knowledge claims serve as normalizing
technologies through which the discursive production of “criminal behavior” and a
“criminal self” emerge. Being productive of neoliberal ideology rooted in selfdetermination and responsibilization, depoliticized knowledge claims promote
individualized discourses which then serve as the basis for governing through the
regulation of conduct. More broadly, depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal
justice involvement can be seen as a way of legitimizing the logic of punishment and
control. As I outlined in the previous section, when it comes to social work, depoliticized
knowledge claims emerge from a preoccupation with vulnerability and risk. In this
section, I outline how depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal justice
involvement are made through three primary neutralizing mechanisms: 1) an overriding
emphasis on women’s individual choices; 2) an absence, or relegation, of issues related to
structural context (decontextualization); and 3) a strong reliance on the language of the
“psy” professions.
Emphasis on Individual Choices. Depoliticized knowledge claims were exerted
through a strong emphasis on choice and responsibility present throughout the dataset.
Notions of choice and responsibility reflect neoliberal assumptions about individual
autonomy and presuppose an “empire of choice” (Rose, 2000) in which all people have
access to the same choices and opportunities. Like risk, choice rhetoric was deployed in
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both implicit and explicit ways throughout the data. For example, in their article on the
challenges of conducting research with women in prison, O’Brien and Bates (2003) state:
And most important, how can we make use of these women’s experiences to help
us construct better alternatives for holding women accountable for the crimes
they commit while recognizing their potential to make different choices and
enhance opportunities to make these positive choices? [emphasis added] (p. 223).
In the above excerpt, we can see that the authors are being critical in that they are
suggesting “alternatives” to prison. Their use of the modality “most important” even
suggests a sense of urgency and serves as a call to action. Yet the suggestion for
alternatives is not premised on questioning the underlying logic of criminalization; rather,
alternatives are suggested in order to “hold women accountable.” The authors thus frame
crime as a problem of the self. However, a strengths-based rhetoric also shines through in
the authors’ desire to “recognize the potential” for women to make better “choices.” For
Foucault, reformation of the self is a key aspect of governance. In this way, the authors’
utilization of a strengths-based position can be seen as upholding the mantel of
neoliberalism. The above excerpt provides an exemplar of the sneaky ways in which
neoliberal ideology is embedded in social work discourses and how it undercuts claims
toward social justice. The authors clearly recognize that all women do not have access to
the same choices, hence the need to “enhance opportunities.” However, despite this
acknowledgement, their focus on individual choice still locates the cause of crime and
criminal justice involvement in individuals and their intrapersonal concerns related to
substance use, mental illness, poor self-esteem, and poor decision-making (i.e. choices).
In so doing, the authors’ calls for “alternatives” fall short. Because the discursive
production of the individual as the problem remains intact, “alternatives” simply relocate
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punishment and control to the community. Similar assumptions of choice show up
consistently throughout the data. Typically, they are explicitly gendered. I understand this
as a strategy of gendered responsibilization.
Decontextualization. Similar to the emphasis on individual choice, depoliticized
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement were further developed through
various methods of decontextualizing the content. Decontextualization is a process
whereby women’s actions, choices, and circumstances are predominantly represented as
disconnected from larger social, institutional, and historical contexts. Such
representations act as a mode of reasoning which legitimates research and interventions
fixated on naming and changing personal and behavioral characteristics of individuals at
the expense of those aimed at understanding and unsettling the discourses of the penalwelfare state. Analyses of criminalization that do not engage with the political economy
not only are incomplete, but function to promote discourses of individualization.
Decontextualization, then, overlaps with a discussion on normalization in that individuals
who are unable, or unwilling, to meet socially prescribed (read: normative) rules and
expectations are understood as individuals who fall outside the bounds of what is
considered normal and natural, and thus are in need of fixing. Within social work, this is
enacted through processes of responsibilization (Rose, 2000). Therefore, I understand
decontextualization as an enactment of neoliberal ideology: it discounts the social,
political, and economic factors that account for women’s involvement in the criminal
justice system in favor of explanations focused on individual deficit and choice.
Women are the fastest growing segment of the correctional population, and this
fact appeared to be widely acknowledged within the data. Consequently, most of the
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articles in the dataset touch on the causes for the increasing rates of
incarceration/criminalization; however, they do so in different and often conflicting ways.
While some articles recognize sentencing policies as playing a part in the growing rates
of incarceration, many others do not. For example, Gilham (2012) opens their article by
acknowledging women’s growing rates of incarceration and then states:
This ballooning incarceration rate for women has been associated with drug and
alcohol addiction (Alleyne, 2006; Arditti & Few, 2008) (p. 89).
What Gilham’s discussion lacks is any acknowledgement of the social and
sentencing policies related to the war on drugs that lead to the criminalization of
substance use. Instead, the author focuses solely on addiction as the driving factor for the
mass incarceration of women. This was a common discursive strategy within the dataset
whereby the larger context of mass incarceration is highlighted only to establish
significance for research, which, conversely, explains rising incarceration rates through
the lens of addiction or other individualized discourses. In this way, substance use and
addiction become understood as the cause not only of individual crime, but also of mass
incarceration. Such discursive framings obscure the fact that drugs (use, possession,
proximity to) are in fact the crime, and not the cause of crime; and presuppose that crime,
rather than policy, is the causal factor leading to punishment and incarceration, an
assumption that has been effectively disputed by sentencing experts (Tonry, 2007).
To take the discussion further, it is prudent to hone in on the word addiction.
Gilham, like other authors in the dataset, associates increasing rates of women’s
incarceration with addiction rather than drug use or involvement in the drug trade.
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter 3, the criminalization of drugs has less to do with
actual addiction than it does with systemic racism and how that racism plays out on a
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national stage. Certainly, many individuals involved in the criminal justice system are
managing issues related to addiction, but many have also been arrested and prosecuted
for recreational and periodic use and/or their proximity to drugs. Conversely, many
people with addictions (depending on their classed and raced social locations) never
become criminalized. To characterize women who are caught up in the drug war as
“addicts” is a gross misrepresentation of the actual political and economic forces at play
in the carceral state. The focus on addiction = mass incarceration is a discursive strategy
that obscures the social and historical production of crime, and thereby reconstructs
gendered, raced, and classed social exclusion as being the result of individual behaviors
and deficits. By now, there is a large body of research that challenges the notion that
drugs cause crime. Rather, it is recognized that the link between drugs and crime is part
of a broader problem generated by poverty and racism. Further, Taylor (2016) notes the
othering effect that the drugs = crime discourse has in purporting dominant notions of
criminality and simplifies understandings of drug use as dangerous.
In general, I am concerned about the overall lack of engagement with the political
economy that I saw in the data. Lack of awareness regarding the political economy leads
to incomplete understandings and overreached knowledge claims. For instance, in their
study on the role of gender in post-jail homelessness, Fries, Fedock and Kubiak (2014)
state:
Screening for CODs upon jail intake is perhaps the first and most crucial step
social workers can take to reduce homelessness among the incarcerated
population (p. 113).
When reading this statement, and others like it that are strewn throughout the dataset, I
wonder: how far away from any understanding of the political economy does one need to
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get to not only make this statement, but also make it intelligible? And it is not just a
problem related to the authors. This article passed the editor’s desk, went through the
process of peer review, and was ultimately published. According to Google Scholar, it
has been cited 27 times. The authors, the gatekeepers, and other scholars have deemed
the above excerpt a reasonable and logical assertion. I take this to be indicative of a
broader lack of engagement with both gender and the political economy in social work at
large.
Leaving behind the articles that completely exclude contextual and policy factors
related to women’s involvement in the criminal justice system, at least 40% of the articles
in the dataset acknowledge systemic issues, such as punitive sentencing policies and the
war on drugs, as the cause of women’s mass incarceration. However, a contradiction
emerges whereby despite acknowledging systemic issues, most of these articles
ultimately fall back on individualized understandings of crime and/or scale their
suggested intervention down to the level of the individual. For example, in a study testing
an intervention for “female batterers,” Buttell (2002) explains that:
Women are increasingly being arrested and prosecuted for domestic violence
offenses under mandatory arrest statues (p. 349).
Buttell then goes on to use that as evidence for the existence of, and increasing rates of,
women’s violence, which the author explicitly links to morality. Buttell’s project then
studies the relationship between moral reasoning and recidivism. To establish relevance
for this investigation, the author asserts:
In summary, there is an abundance of empirical support indicating that (a) the
structure of moral development is universal (e.g., equally applicable to men and
women) (Kohlberg, 1984; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Rest, 1993; Snarey, 1985;
Snarey, Reimer, & Kohlberg, 1985; Walker, 1994); (b) offenders most often employ
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a preconventional level of moral reasoning (Blasi, 1980; DeWolfe, Jackson, &
Winterberger, 1988; Jennings, Kilkenny, & Kohlberg, 1983; Jurkovic, 1980); (c)
moral education programs are effective in raising the level of moral reasoning (Blasi,
1980; MacPhail, 1989; Rest, 1986; Rest & Navarez, 1994; Thoma, 1984); and (d)
enhancing moral reasoning results in decreased criminal activity (Blasi, 1980;
Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Ma, 1989; MacPhail, 1989) (p. 350).
Notwithstanding the many normalizing knowledge claims based on dated and limited
data, Buttell effectively de-genders women’s use of violence by defining such violence as
an issue related to individual morality. Further, linking the use of violence to immorality
in such broad strokes creates (ironically) moralistic claims that violence is never
warranted, even in the case of self-defense. Though this is a somewhat extreme example,
it was a common practice in the dataset. Few of the articles in the dataset locate the cause
of crime as rooted in issues of inequity and oppression, and fewer problematize the
category of crime at all.
When policy and structural issues were acknowledged by authors, they were
commonly relegated to the margins of the texts, given a nod in the introduction, literature
review, or conclusion, and then ignored in the substance of the article in favor of a focus
on individual level factors such as feelings, behaviors, and relationships. For example, in
their introduction, Berry et al. (2009) introduce a number of structural issues that impact
criminalized women, such as:
punitive public welfare structures, low-paying and unstable jobs, husbands and
boyfriends who cannot or will not provide adequate financial support, and the
absence of community-based supports (p. 294).
However, the authors immediately frame these as,
factors that can push women into lifestyles that bring them in contact with the
criminal justice system [emphasis added] (p.294).
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Here we see a key responsibilization strategy in what Rose (2000) calls the politics of
conduct, where the “problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral or ethical
problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and
conduct themselves and their existence” (p. 334). In this way, women are understood as
not just making one bad choice or engaging in a specific crime, but rather living a
criminal lifestyle. This provides an exemplar of how power is exercised throughout the
data. The discursive shift to lifestyle produces a “truth” in which a woman’s whole
identity (i.e., existence) is constituted through the notion of criminal lifestyle.
The discursive reformulation of choice into lifestyle “opens the possibility for a
whole range of psychological techniques to be recycled in programmes for governing the
excluded” (Rose, 2010, p. 334). Through the remainder of Berry et al.’s (2009) article,
the aspects that make up this lifestyle are then identified and targeted for intervention.
The authors specifically implicate women’s personal relationships for interfering with
“self sufficiency” and invoke a dependency discourse which renders political and
economic impacts on women’s “lifestyles” and law-breaking obsolete. In their conclusion
Berry et al. make several suggestions for programs that could improve women’s selfsufficiency, including education, job training, pregnancy prevention programs, and
substance abuse treatment. At the very end, they tag on the need for “changes in the laws
mandating prison sentences for drug-related crimes” (p. 299).
Such nods to social, political, and economic factors give an illusion of invoking
social justice. And perhaps they do. My students often argue that providing individual
level services is indeed linked to social justice. They assert that systems level change
takes time and, while we wait, it is important that people receive services in order to meet
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their needs. I am drawn to the openness and certainty of such argumentation. And I
would say they it is without merit. Still, I argue that for social justice to be social justice,
a practice/analysis needs to be firmly rooted in a scrutiny of power. Perhaps this brings us
to a larger ambiguity within social work: what exactly constitutes social justice and who
gets to decide? Relatedly, there is lack of consensus in social work regarding what
constitutes power and how it is exercised in practice. Which, of course, leads us back to
the ambiguous nature of the undecidable. The space of undecidability is where Foucault’s
conceptions of power may have particular significance for social work. Foucault invites
us to think about power as diffuse, not in terms of who possesses it and who does not, but
rather in terms of how it is exercised in context specific situations (Foucault, 1991). In
this sense, power is discursive and produced in multiple, conflicting ways. Power then
functions through the production of knowledge, or regimes of truth, which shape subject
positions and dominant ways of knowing and seeing.
For my analysis, then, rather than thinking in terms of social justice as being
either present or absent, it seemed more helpful to think in terms of shades of social
justice. Along these lines, I would argue that many of the articles in the sample exercised
power through engagement in apolitical invocations of social justice, which can be just as
dangerous as apolitical deployments of empathy and love. Just as a discourse of empathy
and love can mask the power involved in the helping relationship (Margolin, 1997), so
too can the discourse of social justice (Badwall, 2015), thereby allowing social work to
function under a veil of innocence.
Textual Silence: Racism. A stark example of decontextualization can be found in
the textual silence around racism. Huckin (2002) describes textual silence as being “the
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omission of some piece of evidence that is pertinent to the topic at hand” and by its
omission provides or inhibits certain views (p. 348). As I read and re-read through the
data, I started to notice that a conversation about racism was starkly absent. To confirm
this observation, I counted the occurrences of the word racism using the word cruncher in
ATLAS.ti. As a comparison, the word risk (and its derivatives risks, risky, etc.) appears
783 times in the dataset; the word racism appears only eight. The concept of risk shows
up in virtually every article, whereas racism is discussed in only four. In Chapters 2 and
3, I reviewed the profound racial disparities that plague corrections and argued that we
cannot talk about the criminal justice system without talking about and centering race and
the historical legacy of racism through which it emerged. As I have illuminated
previously, racism is one of the largest structural issues causing and impacting high
incarceration rates in the United States, yet the discursive practices of scholars in the
dataset enable racism to be disregarded or completely silenced. The question remains,
when racism goes unacknowledged and unchallenged, what is enabled and what is
constrained? First, inattention to racism inherently limits any analysis of the criminal
justice system. Second, it also serves as a powerful neutralizing technology allowing
authors to claim objectivity. Deployment of objective, apolitical analyses allow authors to
bolster their legitimacy in a knowledge production enterprise that privileges the value
neutral objectivity of positivism. Further, the erasure of racism reinscribes individualizing
discourses and reveals how neoliberalism and whiteness remain at the heart of knowledge
production and social work praxis.
Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes the racial ideology of the post-civil rights era as
one marked by colorblindness and “apparent non-racialism.” He explains how under an
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ideology of colorblind racism, racial inequalities are rationalized through cultural rather
than biological explanations. From this understanding, the overwhelming explanations
for criminal justice involvement related to individual and familial traits, found in the
dataset, can be seen as naturalizing the racial inequities embedded in the criminal justice
system. Bonilla-Silva (2014) asserts that this “is the central way in which contemporary
scholars contribute to the propagation of racist interpretations of racial inequality. By
failing to highlight the social dynamics that produce these racial differences, these
scholars help reinforce the racial order” (p. 8).
Scholars have also examined the production and erasure of racism in social work
education and practice settings (Badwall, 2015; Jeffery, 2005). Badwall (2015), for
example, examines how the historical production of the kind, charitable helper intersects
with neoliberalism to shape contemporary practice. Badwall shows how the social work
as “helper” identity is built upon colonial scripts of whiteness and argues that whiteness
then serves as a centralizing organizing principle for practice. Badwall further argues that
acknowledging the function of racism and social work’s participation in perpetuating
racist systems requires disrupting a professional identity defined by “goodness.”
Therefore, under discourses of helping and empathy, racism necessarily disappears so
that social work may maintain an image of itself as a “good helper,” a place of innocence
in processes that perpetuate racialized exclusion and oppression. Badwall states, “The
very naming of racism disrupts both the ideals of the profession and the neoliberal
underpinnings of the state. Being seen as moral subjects requires an erasure of race” (p.
19). If knowledge production is the site in which such helping practices are legitimized,
whiteness can be seen as operating through the erasure of racism in my data as well.
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There are three primary types of articles in which this textual silence manifests: 1)
articles that make no mention of racialized issues, by either avoiding it entirely or
implicitly disavowing it as an explanatory variable related to criminal justice
involvement; 2) articles that make note of racial disproportionality in the criminal justice
system, but include no further mention or analysis around racism; and 3) articles that
focus on a specific racial group but include no analysis around racism. I will address each
of these in turn.
Complete Silence. 26 articles include no analysis of criminal justice involvement
as a racialized issue, and mention race only when describing sample demographics. This
omission of race and racism is explicit in the following excerpt from Allen, Flaherty, and
Ely (2010):
These women are already marginalized by their gender, class, and victimization
status and the systemic barriers they consistently face (p. 162).
Note the missing category of race. Throughout this article, the authors name gender and
poverty as axes that are pivotal to understanding the criminalization of women, but they
remain silent on race. Despite almost half of their sample being composed of women of
color, neither race nor racism is discussed. The only time the authors mention anything
related to race is when they name the White racial identity of participants in their study,
as in the following statement:
Margie, a 24-year-old White woman, has a 14-month-old son who is in state
custody [emphasis added] (p.168).
Moreover, phrases such as “crack subculture” and “America’s poor struggling
communities” (p. 166) appear to operate as proxies for race in this study. The effect this
has is to whitewash the study and its participants and subsequently neutralize (i.e.,
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depoliticize) the analysis. By not considering race as a factor that shapes gendered
experiences and women’s interactions with the various systems that impact their lives,
women are then homogenized. Historically this has meant women = white women.
The silence on race and racism is so stark in this article that it is hard to believe it
is unintentional. The blatant omission of race and the use of coded language throughout
make me think there was some effort involved in this process. But the question remains,
why? Are the authors drawing on colorblind ideology of “goodness” and in so doing
making their expressed feminist intentions more appealing to a broader (i.e., racist)
audience? If so, what good does this do given that racism is so firmly embedded in the
criminal justice system? Here, it is interesting to note that this article draws heavily on
the construction of vulnerability discussed earlier in this chapter. This article and many
others that also draw on the construction of vulnerability are similarly silent on this issue
of racism. “Vulnerability,” then, can also be read as white. Vulnerable (i.e. white) women
are worthy of our empathy and can be redeemed. In this we see social work drawing on
an historical discourse regarding the “fallen” woman. While in the time of the
reformatories the fallen woman was constructed as childlike and led astray, in the 21st
century she is recast as vulnerable. However, as has historically been the case, women of
color are excluded from this construction and consequently deemed more “criminal,”
further justifying their imprisonment.
Racial Statistics. The issue of racial disproportionality is mentioned as a matter of
fact, but is left unproblematized and not linked to processes of racism in 15 articles. For
example, in the introduction to an article on gender responsive programming in prisons,
White (2012) states:
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The number of women arrested and incarcerated is at an all-time high. As a result
of two distinct arms of the War on Drugs (legislative changes and the social
construction of the drug user as a criminal), women have become more vulnerable
to arrest for drug crimes than they were in the past. Add to this a group of
conspiracy laws used to prosecute women who are acquainted with a drug dealer,
and the numbers escalate even more (Merolla, 2008). Poverty and a lack of
education often lead women to make poor choices and engage in high-risk
behavior; it happens that the majority of these women are Black and Latina. The
number of women admitted annually to the Illinois Department of Corrections
quadrupled between 1990 and 2005, and women of color make up 90% of that
number (CLAIM, 2006) [emphasis added] (p. 284).
A number of neutralizing strategies merge in the above excerpt. First, the author frames
the high rates of criminalization as a direct result of sentencing policy and the war on
drugs. However, White immediately casts that aside in favor of a discussion on individual
“high-risk behaviors” and “poor choices,” which the author then links to women of color.
The use of the phrase “it happens” allows her to treat racial disparities as a matter of fact,
as a somewhat natural occurrence for which there is no responsibility to be had. Finally,
White calls attention to racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system, but never
once throughout the entire article does she mention racism. Racism is effectively
disregarded as a factor contributing to high rates of incarceration, poverty, and lack of
opportunity, or “high-risk behavior.”
Ferraro (2008) argues that presenting racial statistics without reference to the
historical, social, and political context from which they emerged has the potential to reify
“racial realist” notions about the deficiencies and pathologies of people of color. She
astutely notes, “Without careful contextualization of data, these analyses can obscure the
social processes of domination and lead to spurious conclusion about race as a cause” (p.
194). Ferraro (2008) asserts that within a neoliberal context where widespread
“individualistic and moralistic interpretations of social problems” is common, it is
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important not only to present racial statistics, but to also consider how they will be
received. Therefore, the concern with discussing racial disparities in the criminal justice
system but leaving them unexamined is that it reinforces dominant notions of people of
color as being inherently more "criminal” and uses the power of positivity to undercut,
rather than promote, racial justice. In so doing women of color are, once again, framed as
“criminal” while white women are framed as "fallen."
Race without Racism. Race was the explicit factor of analysis in four articles.
However, even when this was the case, the naming and analysis of racism was still
bypassed (with the exception of Epperson et al., 2009). For example, in their study on the
moderating effects of race on the behaviors of children with criminal justice involved
mothers, Miller and Bank (2013) explicitly compare the effects of maternal criminal
justice involvement on “Black” and “non-Black” children. Though the main point of
analysis is clearly centered on the racial category of Black, and it could be assumed that
this choice was made based on the gross overrepresentation of Black women in the
criminal justice system, the authors include no discussion of the role that racism plays in
shaping these racial disparities or the results of their study. Rather, the authors draw on
culture as a protective factor in shaping Black children’s outcomes. Thereby, a discussion
of racism is circumvented through a discussion of culture. Given women of color’s
disproportionate representation in the criminal justice system, the absence of a discussion
and analysis around racism feeds into depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal
justice involvement, thereby producing a limited vision regarding the space for social
work intervention. Engagement with racism as a cause for mass incarceration would
render incoherent rationales for individual level interventions and the program
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evaluations that ensue. At the very least, engagement with racism would require scholars
to admit to the limits of individual level interventions and evidence-based practice
knowledge. Silence around racism, therefore, depoliticizes the issue and helps to not only
secure a place of innocence, but also legitimize a fundable research enterprise in social
work.
We need to talk about gender. I’m deeply unsatisfied with the way gender is dealt
with in the data set. I will start by noting the simplistic analysis of gender that was
prevalent throughout the data. It is actually quite remarkable how little gender is dealt
with in the dataset. In fact, there was a striking un-discussion of gender. In most of the
articles, gender is only discussed or explained in relation to naming demographic
characteristics that criminalized women share as a group. For instance, women were
typically defined in relation to men; as not men. Specifically, women were most often
described as distinct from men in three primary ways: they are mothers, they have more
extreme experiences of victimization and trauma, and they have higher levels of
substance abuse. It appears then that gender is operationalized along the lines of trauma,
substance abuse, and motherhood. In this way, gender is privileged as an analytic
category and the differences that exist between women are largely ignored. It is
presupposed that criminalized women have more in common with other women than with
criminalized men. Issues of race, class, sexuality, disability, age, nationality, etc.38 are
subsequently erased or ignored.

38

Notably, the data marginalizes women who do not have children (or in some cases pathologizes them),
and completely ignores older women, trans women in men’s prisons, and women with disabilities.
Furthermore, there is an assumed heterosexuality inherent in the discussions of gender, particularly in the
ways in which women’s intimate relationships are pivoted around men.
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Vis-à-vis a simplistic framing of gender, many articles in the dataset deployed the
notion of “gendered pathways” as an explanatory framework for understanding women’s
crime and criminal justice involvement. The discourse on gendered pathways came about
in the 90s as feminist criminologists sought to explain the gendered nature of women’s
trajectories into crime (Comack, 2006). The pathways discourse looks at specific factors
that put women “at risk” for ongoing criminal involvement. Trauma and victimization are
central concerns under a pathways umbrella; victimization is understood as leading to
mental health concerns, which lead to substance use as a self medicating strategy, and
ultimately living in poverty—factors that are all assumed to lead to criminal activity. The
pathways approach was successful in drawing attention to the violence women face
before, during, and after contact with the criminal justice system, and thus complicating
presumed knowledge regarding criminalized women. In other words, by turning trauma
into a risk factor, the pathways discourse essentially reframed women as victims instead
of criminals. However, as some feminist criminologists have since pointed out, when
women are equated with trauma, and trauma is equated with crime, risk is uniquely
gendered (Hannah-Moffat, 2004). As I have already demonstrated, this discursive chain
of logic (trauma = substance abuse = crime) was common throughout the dataset.
Furthermore, the pathways approach was deployed throughout the data in such a
way as to highlight pathways to individual acts of crime, not pathways to criminal justice
involvement. For example, in a study on the effect of maternal criminal justice
involvement on children, Miller (2014) states:
While the purpose of the current study was not to examine the association
between children's outcomes and risks for intergenerational criminal justice

169
involvement, these findings speak to the literature on the link between female
traumatic life experiences and pathways of delinquency and crime [emphasis
added] (p. 76).
Similarly, in a systematic review of the effects of correctional-based programs for
“female offenders,” Tripodi et al. (2011) state:
Substance abuse, a criminogenic factor, is one of the most prevalent pathways to
crime for female offenders [emphasis added] (Chesney-Lind, 1998; Covington,
1998).
Such discursive framings naturalize crime as a fact rather than a social construct (Pollack,
2006). Indeed, except for the counter-discourses (which I will discuss later in this
chapter), the underlying construct of “crime" is rarely questioned in the data. This clearly
circles us back around to the emphasis on choice and the ways in which choice is bound
up with gender and neoliberalism. Within a neoliberal framework, concepts such as
choice, gendered pathways, and the gender-responsive strategies that flow from them are
depoliticized and deployed as regulatory strategies of self-governance.
At this point, I have reviewed two reasons for why a pathways framing is
inadequate. First, it genders risk; and second, it takes crime to be a stagnant category
located within individual behaviors. This brings me to a third reason. In an era of mass
incarceration and “new penology,” dominant narratives of gendered pathways are no
longer logical. Let me elucidate. The pathways approach emerged prior to the passage of
welfare reform and Clinton’s crime bill, two pieces of legislation that collided to
exacerbate mass incarceration and to propel an unprecedented growth in the female
correctional population. As such, pathways rationality is notably void of any analysis
regarding the impacts of the neoliberal political economy on women’s lives.
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As I discussed in Chapter 2, the context of neoliberalism produces a rolling back
of the welfare state and the rolling out of the carceral state. This simultaneous “rolling
back and rolling out” has been documented as a key dynamic in bringing increasing
numbers of women into contact with the law (Sudbury, 2000). While I do not disagree
with the fact that violence is a gendered issue and that women face a disproportionate
amount of violence, pathways analytics, which center on experiences of trauma and
victimization, do not adequately explain the current levels of women’s criminalization
and incarceration under a rubric of neoliberal globalization.
A brief discussion on the concept of “new penology” is warranted here. Feely and
Simon (1992) introduced the term new penology to describe a distinct shift in the
apparatus of corrections that occurred in the late 20th century. This time period marked a
shift away from a focus on the individual in criminal justice toward an overwhelming
concern with aggregates. The rationalities undergirding the new penology have brought
forth a conglomeration of actuarial policies concerned not with the rehabilitation of
individual offenders, but rather with the identification, classification, and management of
selected risk groups. The logic of new penology relies on discourses of risk, which seek
to assess and predict probability of offense and re-offense. Such logic is apparent in
sentencing policies, such as three strikes you’re out and mandatory minimums, which
allocate punishment indiscriminately rather than on a case-by-case basis. The logic of
new penology is also evident in an overreliance on a number of other practices that entail
targeted policing and surveillance. As such, scholars have identified the emergence of
new penology as the fuel for mass incarceration.
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The data suggest that social work appears to draw on notions of individual choice
and responsibility, indicative of the old penology, while simultaneously deploying the
discourses of risk prevalent in new penology. It is as though social work is attempting to
hold on to the rehabilitative ideals of the previous penal ideology (which is perhaps better
aligned to the ideals of social work) while also clinging to the promise of the evidencebased movement. The contradiction produces a paradox in which social work continues
to individualize and responsibilize under a ‘new’ penal regime which classifies, targets,
and criminalizes entire groups of people based not on their individual behaviors and
choices, but on the characteristics they share: for having black and brown bodies; for
being poor, homeless, unemployed, uneducated; for experiencing violence or mental
illness; the list goes on.
There are two problems I see here. First, the logic does not hold. If gone are the
days when individuals were criminalized for their individual acts alone, and not because
they were caught up in a system of surveillance and regulation (though it is contestable
whether this was ever the case), then to continue to focus on individual choices and
behaviors is clearly misguided. Second, and following the same line of reasoning, the
focal point of intervention should not be the individual behavior of so called “criminals,”
but rather the systems levying their powers of prediction and surveillance and the
discourses that enable them. Even if we were to agree that crime is a real thing, and that
trauma leads women (for whatever reason) to engage in such crime, and even if we
agreed that treatment for trauma could then prevent criminal behavior, trauma treatment
is not going to keep women from being classified in a risk category and subsequently
regulated because of that classification; it is not going to stop mass incarceration, or even

172
put a small bandage on the gaping wounds caused by mass incarceration. Under the logic
of new penology, the purpose of punishment is not rehabilitation; the purpose of
punishment is deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. Social work’s continued
discursive framing of punishment as rehabilitation is ultimately dehumanizing to those
caught in the apparatus of new penology. New penology also parallels broader trends in
the professionalization of social work. Like social work, corrections is caught up in the
rise of managerialism and the scurry toward “evidence-based” practice (EBP) and
research. Both managerialism and EBP prize objectivity and emphasize a reliance on
economic efficiency. Privileged then are research and practice activities that advance
predictability, consistency, and effectiveness. Scholars highlight the danger this holds in
terms of shifting the focus of criminal justice from retrospective penalty to prospective
regulation and control, thus widening the carceral net of control (Balfour, 2006; Carlton
& Segrave, 2016; Maidment, 2006). Social welfare systems are intimately caught up in
such prospective processes of regulation and control.
Language of the Psy-Professions. Depoliticization is further enhanced through a
reliance on the language of the “psy-professions.” Rose (1998b) refers to the discourses
of the “psy-complex” as “ways of understanding and responding to human concerns
using psychiatric terms, logics, and practices” (p. 101). Drawing on Rose, feminist
scholars analyze how psychiatric and psychological discourses play out in correctional
systems to organize how criminalized women are constructed, understood, and therefore
managed (Hannah-Moffat, 2001; Kendall, 2000; Pollack, 2006). These discourses play
out in my study’s data as well, and can be understood as ideological narratives that
depend on psychological understandings of criminalized women and their behaviors. Psy-
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discourses establish a discrepancy between a normative or “ideal” and the
person/behavior under analysis, which then prompts individuals to adjust their behavior
in order to achieve the ideal. In this way, the narratives of the psy-professions can be seen
as a governing through self-determination. Foucault would describe this as a productive
rather than repressive power; a power that induces behavioral change and pre-supposes
unconstrained agency and flexibility of “choice.”
When used to explain the behavior of women involved in the criminal justice
system, psychological discourses presuppose that errant behavior causes criminal justice
involvement. Similar to risk thinking, the ideology of the psy-professions works on the
assumption that criminalized women have psychological, emotional, or thinking deficits
that lead them to engage in “criminal behavior.” Therefore, interventions are aimed at reorienting one’s thinking in order to promote emotional regulation and, thereby, change
behavior. These techniques rely on notions of individual responsibility and thus allow
women to be governed in ways that are aligned with neoliberalism. Psy-based
interventions play nicely with the demands of funders for measureable outcomes, such as
improved self-esteem, decreased depression, and, ultimately, lowered rates of recidivism.
When deployed in a carceral context, psy-based interventions presuppose that the purpose
of corrections is rehabilitation rather than incapacitation and retribution. The narratives of
the psy-discourse effectively elide attention to the broader social context within which
criminalization flourishes and allow social work to do the control work of the state (what
in many ways it has always done) under the guise of treatment instead of punishment. As
such, psy-based interventions are steered by social work’s investment in
professionalization.
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Though the discourses of the psy-professions were evident in most of the data, I
focus the majority of the following discussion on one specific article that represents an
exemplar of typicality in deployment of the psy-discourses. In an article titled, “Women’s
Psychological Adjustment to Prison: A Review for Future Social Work Directions,”
Fedock (2017) reviews research findings from the perspectives of deprivation theory (the
effects of the prison environment on a prisoner’s well being) and importation theory (the
effects of a prisoner’s history and personal characteristics on their well being while
incarcerated) in order to build a case for a research agenda that integrates both
perspectives. The author claims that such a research agenda is important because:
Psychological adjustment has been understudied…however, psychological
adjustment is a core issue for determining the mental health needs of prisoners,
preventing worsening mental health, and promoting lowered recidivism [emphasis
added] (p. 33).
The sneaky issue of recidivism rears its head once again. Linking psychological
adjustment, or lack thereof, to risk for recidivism once again assumes an individualized
understanding of the factors that lead to recidivism and (re)entanglement with the
criminal justice system and keeps the discussion located at the site of individual choices
and feelings. The individual, rather than the prison, is centralized as the explanatory
variable for recidivism. Such explanations ignore the research that shows that
incarceration itself actually works to increase recidivism (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007). The
author proceeds to define and discuss psychological adjustment in prison:
Initial psychological distress on entry into prison is considered normal and
typically decreases after the first few weeks (Islam-Zwart, Vik, & Rawlins, 2007).
However, persistent psychological distress is viewed as abnormal and indicative
of a potentially long-term, chronic concern labeled “prison adjustment
depression” (Reitzel & Harju, 2000) [emphasis added] (p. 34).

175
Here, the discourse invokes normalizations regarding how a prisoner should adjust to
prison, which presupposes that prison is a place one should adjust to, or that one would
naturally adjust to. What’s left out of such conjecture is the possibility that prison may
actually be an impossible place for healthy adjustment or that not adjusting to such a
violent atmosphere might actually be a healthy response. What is also left out is the
possibility that depression may actually be the only normal response to being locked in a
cage. What this author calls “prison adjustment depression,” others might call posttraumatic stress disorder.
After discussing deprivation theory, which does indeed connect inmate distress
and mental health issues to the prison environment, Fedock presents critiques of the
perspective and states:
Also, in regard to social work practice models, this perspective ignores active
ways that individuals cope with difficult environments. There is limited research
about prison-specific ways that women cope in prison (for example, Negy,
Woods, & Carlson, 1997), and research has not examined resiliency within prison
life for women and a potential mediating role of individual-level coping with
deprivation factors [emphasis added] (p. 36).
In this excerpt, the author effectively disavows concerns with the prison and returns to
typical social work focus on an individual’s ability/responsibility to “cope” with the
deprivation of prison. Here, resiliency is aligned with coping, rather than resistance or
even survival. Coping thus becomes a moral imperative and personal resilience is
positioned as the remedy for “difficult environments.” Garrett (2016) argues that with its
overemphasis on individual adaptation, resilience operates as a “keyword” of
neoliberalism. From this perspective, a resiliency discourse, when deployed in the
manner illustrated above, can be seen as complicit with the demands of neoliberalism as
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women are charged to take responsibility for the impact of prison through the use of
coping skills. Simultaneously, the role of social work is reduced to one of fostering or
facilitating the capacity for coping and becoming resilient. The author then moves on to
talk about importation theory, which
posits that an inmate’s demographics and past experiences determine his or her
psychological adjustment to prison (p. 37).
When linked to the previous critique of deprivation theory, the inmate’s personal
characteristics and past experiences become an important focal point in assessment and
intervention because such factors determine an individual’s ability to be resilient and
cope. In Foucauldian terms, resiliency, then, works as a “technology of the self.”
Fedock makes various critical, seemingly social justice oriented, points
throughout the article while also relying on the logic of positivism to erase a point of
view. The author appears to be utilizing normalizations (perhaps strategically) to make a
case for improving prison conditions, without ever actually claiming an advocacy
position. Though a neutral, apolitical stance was not exclusive to this author, or rare in
the data set, I had to spend a lot of time with this specific article trying to unpack it in
order to understand its purpose and what it accomplished. The article exerts a veil of
objectivity that I find confusing but not at all compelling. Driven by the logic of
positivism, objectivity requires measurable outcomes which, I argue, drive the creation of
intervenable needs. This raises concerns for me regarding how success is conceptualized
and what is expected from humane treatment. I am of the mind that people should be
provided humane treatment regardless of how they respond to it. Arguments such those
provided in Fedock’s article, though in some ways strategic, inadvertently imply that
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humane treatment is valuable only if it produces certain outcomes (i.e., healthy
psychological adjustment). These outcomes may be unrealistic and overly demanding of
individuals, given the inherent violence of the prison. The danger, then, lies in the
possibility that politicians and funders will discredit the need for humane treatment if the
externally defined outcomes for success are not met. The question remains: what use and
whose interests does objectivity actually serve in this article?
The discourse deployed throughout the dataset was one that allowed authors to
appear progressive in intent while ultimately remaining neutral. Through the use of subtle
contradictions, detached descriptions, and passive language, authors manage to not claim
any perspective at all, and to stay politically neutral. For instance, when presenting
common critiques of importation theory, Fedock (2017) states:
Importation factors are often described as prisoner risk factors, and the conflation
of needs into risk factors has shifted the responsibility from system solutions to
individual-level factors (Hannah-Moffat, 1999; O’Malley, 1996) (p. 38).
In the above excerpt, the author cites feminist (Hannah-Moffat) and post-structural
(O’Malley) scholarship in order to provide a critique of risk thinking. However, a
reliance on risk is simultaneously re-inscribed throughout the article, demonstrating a
subtle contradiction as well as a lack of sophisticated engagement with the feminist and
post-structural perspectives she invokes. For instance, Fedock explicitly names a range of
risk factors (for poor psychological adjustment and recidivism) throughout the article,
including: “chronic mental health distress,” “poor psychological health,” and being a
“woman of color.” Despite presenting a discussion of how deprivation theory accounts
for emotional distress, the author never once names the prison itself as a risk factor (a
feminist critique); nor does she ever question the notion that women should adjust to
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prison (a post-structural critique). Nor does the author acknowledge the very real
possibility that one might be depressed precisely because they are in prison. In fact,
despite calling for an integration of importation and deprivation theories, the author uses
the discourses of the psy-professions to reconfigure disciplinary control through a lens of
rehabilitation. Such discursive sleights of hand were a common way that the authors in
my dataset remained neutral and undermined their professed alignments with social
justice.
Fedock also maintain neutrality through the use of objective description:
The prison environment is a physically, socially, and psychologically distinct
location with intentional deprivations (such as loss of privacy), with adjusting and
adapting to this environment as challenges [sic] for inmates (Owen, 1998).
Prisons are total institutions in that they operate within a contained space,
dictated by their own set of rules, regulations, surveillance, and consequences and
maintained by authoritative custodial staff (Goffman, 1961) [emphasis added](p.
32).
As in other discussions in this article, the author provides no critique or commentary of
prisons as a “total institution.” Rather, she presents a detached, matter-of-fact description.
Further, when discussing the “dynamics of women’s prisons” the author gives a brief
historical overview and then states:
It has been argued that gendered ideas of corrections persist in how women’s
prisons function [emphasis added] (p. 32).
The use of the passive phrase “it has been argued” allows the author to remain neutral, to
not take a stance. While the use of depersonalized, passive language may be in line with
the norms of the genre of academic literature, such tactics are also indicative of a
positivist epistemology that privileges objectivity in revealing “truth.” Why, you might
ask, is a critique of the prison necessary when examining psychological adjustment?

179
Precisely because the concepts this discourse invokes to describe adjustment (i.e. coping,
resilience) presuppose a certain level of control and flexibility of choices, which in prison
do not exist (Hannah-Moffat, 2000). The effect of such neutralized discourses on and
about the prison reduces the purpose of social work to one in which our mandate is to
simply teach people to cope with mechanisms of oppression so they can be better
managers of their own risk.
Furthermore, throughout the article, Fedock establishes a need for a future
research agenda by emphasizing the lack of research on a number of issues related to how
women respond to and cope with prison.39 However, there is in fact significant feminist
engagement on a number of fronts that the author purports as lacking. For instance, there
is thoughtful scholarship on how women form relationships, navigate power, and resist
oppression and loss of personhood while incarcerated (e.g. Bosworth & Carribine, 2001;
Rowe, 2015; Smoyer, 2015). Likewise, there is substantial research on the violence of
prison and the inhumane conditions/treatment women experience in prison (e.g. Law,
2012; Rafter, 2017). There is also research documenting how the era of ‘new penology’
impacts women and how it is taken up in women’s prisons (e.g. Hannah-Moffat, 2001;
McCorkel, 2013). Emphasizing a lack of research when there is indeed research was
common throughout the data.
Perhaps by “lack of research,” authors really mean lack of quantitative, positivist
research. Or perhaps the overarching point of this particular article is that the research
that is done is not explicitly linked to mental health outcomes. However, the harms of
39

The criminalization and mass incarceration of women has gained substantial scholarly attention over the
last decade. Fedock’s claim regarding the lack of research in this area may be attributable to the fact that
most of the research she cites is from the late 20th century and the first decade of the 21st.
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prison are, in fact, well documented, which begs the question: why are scholars investing
their time in making a case for more research on what we already know, rather than
advocating hard for policy change and alternatives to prison? After all, wouldn't not
going to prison in the first place better support the goal of improving women’s mental
health? Whose interests are actually served through scholarship of this sort? Pollack and
Rossiter (2010) argue that under neoliberalism, the academy, and by consequence
individual scholarly agendas become instruments of the state; in social work, a profession
that has been historically aligned with the public good, the position of scholars thus
changes to “one of self-interest rather than contribution to the common good” (p. 160). I
would argue that scholarship of the sort that is advocated for throughout the dataset
supports a fundable research agenda more than it supports criminalized women’s actual
needs, and leaves the fundamental machinery of the carceral state untouched.
I also find it notable that a couple of the authors in the dataset hold positions of
leadership on social work’s national Smart Decarceration Initiative. Though intentions
may be pure—after all, many authors present a case for either improving prison
conditions or attending to women’s complex needs, which is both necessary and noble—
it is important to remember that the powerful function of discourse lies outside of
intention. Individual intention has little bearing on the operation of disciplinary power
which “works through and upon the individual and constitutes the individual as an object
of knowledge” (O’Malley, 1996, p. 189). Therefore, advocating for improvements to
prison so that women can better “adjust” invokes a strategy of normalization and engages
a logic that fortifies the existence of the prison. In essence, it is calling for “kinder,
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gentler cages,” which can be likened to rearranging the furniture on the Titanic. Yet, as
Hannah-Moffat (2006) reminds us, “prisons, by any name, or in any form, are limited in
their ability to respond to the needs of women offenders or to appreciate the context of
their offenses” (p. 30). Fedock’s discussion then ultimately supports the logic of
punishment, and her neutrality puts her out of alignment with the goals of Smart
Decarceration, a discursive tendency within the dataset that is by no means exclusive to
this author. I argue that neutrality on issues related to the carceral state allows social work
scholars to shirk ethical and moral responsibility for promoting social justice and aligns
social work with carceral systems in troubling ways. It seems that, in line with a
neoliberal agenda, social work has engaged a depoliticized mandate for Smart
Decarceration that operates through discourses of risk and psychological treatment rather
than engaging ways of thinking and speaking that could enable solutions geared toward
systems responsibility and change. Indeed, within the discourses of the psy-professions40,
social justice and social change are rendered irrelevant and obsolete.
Concluding Thoughts. De-politicized explanations for crime are dominant in
social work discourse. As such, women’s involvement in crime and the criminal justice
40

On a final point regarding the overreliance on the “psy” discourses, I feel as though it is important to
draw attention to the way in which an escalated focus on the psychological and emotional has led to what
appears to be an abandonment of physical bodies. If we are talking about prisons and jails, I would argue
that we also need to talk about the bodies that inhabit them. Bodies matter. However, while psychological
interventions are advocated for because of their perceived ability to reduce and prevent recidivism, I found
little to no concern for incarcerated bodies in the data set. For all the talk about substance abuse and
addictions treatment, there is no discussion of what it might be like to detox in prison or jail. For all the talk
of motherhood and parenting programs, there is very little about the physical experience of being pregnant
and giving birth in a prison (the pregnancy pieces are primarily focused on the emotional aspects of having
one’s child taken away after giving birth). Similarly, there is nothing said about managing menstruation or
going through menopause while incarcerated. And there is not even a slight acknowledgement of bodies (or
gender for that matter) outside of the binary—what happens to the physical bodies of trans women in men’s
prisons (or trans men in women’s prisons). Through the use of the discourses of the psy-professions, it
seems that social work has abandoned bodies in order to colonize minds. I see this as another place in
which neoliberal ideology hides out.
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system becomes framed as pathological rather than a product of discursive systems of
oppression and disadvantage. The effect this has is to erase the link between inequality
and criminality. Further, a reliance on individualized understandings of crime and
criminal justice involvement has the effect of destabilizing any attention given to
social/political issues in an article and undermining an author’s social justice claims.
Though my analysis was confined to social work high impact journals, referring
to high impact journals as producing social work discourse is not without grounding.
Foucault (1972) recognized that the power of discourse is reinforced through institutional
support, thereby producing systems that enable, constrain, and govern discourse.
Ultimately, what comes to be seen as legitimate knowledge or “truth” is a product of both
discourse and power. Thus, with their conferred status and legitimacy, academic journals,
and high impact journals in particular, can be understood as governing social work
discourse. The institutional support behind high impact journals merges with the
totalizing power of “the scientific” to (re)produce and reinforce specific knowledge
claims which in turn shape social work practice. In other words, the knowledge claims
made in academic journals become naturalized through the use of scientific discourse and
cemented in practice.
That being said, I would be epistemologically remiss if I grounded my analysis of
social work discourse solely in the texts themselves. While it is necessary to consider the
structures and practices underlying the production of knowledge, it is also necessary to
account for the larger context of social work discourse in order to properly assess the
power it holds. In that, my analysis is not without reference to the larger trends in the
profession. The discursive patterns I see unfolding in the profession at large (and which
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others have astutely traced) are similar to the neutralizing mechanisms I have outlined
above. The dominance of individualized and depoliticized discourses on crime and
criminal justice involvement looms large in social work. Such dominance marginalizes
and constrains other ways of knowing and alternative possibilities for addressing the
carceral state. From my analysis, it appears that the privileging of positivism and
evidence-based practices accounts, in part, for the depoliticized engagement with the
carceral state throughout the data. In the economy of knowledge production,
neoliberalism has resulted in a competitive drive toward funding, proliferation of
evidence-based practices, and professionalization (Pollack & Rossiter, 2010). Under this
rubric, scholarship that questions and seeks to alter the fundamental structure of
institutions is not recognized as valuable because, often, it is not fundable41. While
counter-discourses and ways of understanding are certainly evident, both in my data and
in the profession at large, the forms of knowledge and the practices that emerge from
them are not institutionally supported through publishing and funding mechanisms. The
dominant knowledge claims that flow from social work discourse are connected to power
because, through dominance, they gain a discursive advantage and, thereby, inform how
the profession addresses issues related to criminalization and mass incarceration. It is to
the specific impact on practice and research that I now turn my attention. Though much
of this has already been reviewed, in the following section, I will attempt to synthesize
key points of my analysis.

41

There is much to be said regarding the conflation of funding and worth in the academy. Here, I will
simply say that when it comes to high quality, intellectual endeavors, just because something is not
fundable does not mean it is not worthwhile.
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Governance and Resistance
Research Question #3: How have these constructions and knowledge claims impacted
social work practice and research with criminalized women?
This section brings the analysis together and examines the implications for social
work practice and research with criminalized women. I outline the various interventions
and practice modalities offered in the data. With the exception of the systems and multilevel interventions offered by the counter-discourses, I’ve noted a clear preference for
individual level service delivery. Through analysis of the interventions called for and the
specific outcomes they privilege, I argue that social work functions as a form of
government at a distance. As such, there are very obvious ways in which dominant
societal discourses and practices are reproduced. However, a close examination of the
ways in which the data construct criminalized women and the implications for social
work also show that the discursive limits of social work can be, and are currently being,
stretched to embody a site of possibility and resistance. I begin this section by reviewing
social work as a site of governance and end by considering social work as a site of
resistance.
Social Work as Governance. There are two primary ways in which the discourse
in the dataset approach criminalized women. One is focused explicitly on risk and risk
reduction and the other is focused on the enhancement of a psychological self (selfesteem, skill development, parenting, etc.). As I have previously elucidated, these two
approaches are distinct in some ways and overlap in others. Additionally, authors do not
always draw on one or the other exclusively, but often pull on both. I do not see this as
contradictory in that they both rely on depoliticized understandings of the nature of
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women’s crime, which creates the conditions of possibility for individualized discourses
and interventions rather than efforts aimed at addressing policy issues and structural
inequity to emerge as the “natural” and logical response. As such, the data call for a
variety of such practices that monitor and surveil criminalized women while
simultaneously encouraging them to become experts on themselves and work to change
themselves. Alongside this, however, is a clear discourse of empathy and what some
might call an ethic of care. These discourses interact in a contradictory manner, in some
ways reinforcing neoliberal discourses and in other ways challenging them. As such,
social work emerges as a form of governance and therapeutic surveillance.
In an examination of drug treatment courts, Moore (2011) presents the concept of
“therapeutic surveillance” and describes it as a “seemingly benevolent form of
monitoring which also troubles the ‘care/control’ dichotomy” (p. 255). Throughout
Moore’s discussion we are introduced to the ways in which practices of care and
discourses of empathy exist alongside practices of regulation and control. Surveillance is
typically thought of as oriented explicitly toward disciplinary purposes. The concept of
therapeutic surveillance provides us with a more nuanced view of surveillance, of what it
means to watch and be watched, and, I believe, accurately reflects what I see in the data.
Like Moore’s, my analysis shows that strategies aimed at control and those aimed at care
do not sit in opposition to one another. For instance, earlier in this chapter I distinguished
the varying ways social work constructs risk. This helped illuminate the less obvious
ways that social work is implicated in surveillance and control and how this involvement
is not always antithetical to elements of care. Therapeutic surveillance, then, can be seen
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as a manifestation of Foucault’s conceptualization of governance, which accounts for the
multifaceted, discursive nature of power.
Risk Management Practices. Flowing seamlessly from the construction of risk,
the majority of articles include a strong reliance on risk frameworks, with a focus on risk
assessment and risk reduction as the intervention, and reduced recidivism as the
preferable outcome. The logic of risk management rests in a framework of assessment
and prediction that determines future criminal justice involvement (i.e., recidivism). Such
determinations then lead to responses that always require more intrusion into the lives of
those who are marginalized. In this we see a positivist, neoliberal rationality that defines
social work’s role as that of assessor and manager of risk. In so doing, such articles often
call for expansion of programs and services both in and out of the criminal justice system
to act as surveillance mechanism for criminalized women and their families. Such
surveillance is often coded through the language of helping. For example, Jung and
LaLonde (2016) state:
We conclude that incarcerated women with foster care experiences need more
attention and extra support [emphasis added] from the appropriate institutions
upon their release (p. 41).
The discourse throughout the data often identifies risks women face and then, like Jung
and LaLonde, proceeds to call for increased “attention and support.” Such calls
presuppose benevolence in attention and support rather than an element of intrusion and
surveillance. Increased surveillance of any sort, even the professed benevolent type,
paves the way for more criminal justice interventions and sanctions. Indeed, technical
violations while on parole and probations account for the largest proportion of recidivism
rates (Sawyer & Wagner, 2019).
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Jill McCorkel (2017) writes about profiteering in relation to for-profit carceral
drug treatment. “Alternatives” to incarceration are implemented under the guise of
treatment, yet they work by inserting constant surveillance into the lives of those
convicted, and are backed up by the looming threat of incarceration for technical
violations. In this way, community based alternatives can be said to expand rather than
displace the carceral net of control. When social work blindly advocates for and
implements such interventions, they are effectively supporting the expansion of carceral
institutions into the community, rendering social work a transcarceral agent of control.
The issue of working with and for the criminal justice system was present
throughout the dataset. Authors in the data accomplish this in a number of ways,
primarily by: calling for collaboration of various sorts between criminal justice and social
work; emphasizing what social work can offer the criminal justice system; and discussing
the “opportunities” for practice and research that are available in carceral systems. For
example, Fedock (2017) advocates for the increase of social workers in carceral settings
and states:
Given the inherent tension between prison goals of security and the mental health
needs of prisoners, social work may serve as a field for mediating this tension (p.
39).
These and similar statements throughout the data assume that social work will, or can,
exert a therapeutic, perhaps humanizing quality on the criminal justice system. Such
statements do not account for the danger that the influence will work in the inverse
direction and that the goals and values of social work will be consumed under
correctional logic. Fedock’s sentiment functions to align social work with the interests
and goals of carceral institutions.
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Discourses of Empathy. As I moved through the various phases and layers of
analysis, it was interesting to see how I began to read into the depth of the discourse(s).
For instance, there is a group of articles which I initially labeled “social justice light.”
These articles named, and provided more than a simple nod to, policy and structural
inequality. Many also claimed social justice values, albeit often in an apolitical way,
usually falling back on individualized understandings and interventions. The “social
justice light” articles were, in my mind, what one would expect from a “typical” social
work discourse. They emphasized a preference for micro-level service delivery while also
claiming a space, through discourses of empathy and social justice, for social work to
perform the identity of “helper.” An article by Epperson et al. (2009) investigating HIV
risks for Black female defendants provides a good example of this type of article. The
following excerpt illuminates the discursive trends of such an article:
Investigating policies that support alternatives to standard criminal justice
practices in reducing recidivism is a key element of social work with this
population. The empowerment of Black criminal justice-involved women through
HIV prevention and other culturally sensitive social work interventions is greatly
needed (p. 269).
This was the kind of statement and article I expected to see more of when I began
this project. Though there are some obvious places of critique that align with discussions
presented previously in this dissertation (specifically in regard to the use of correctional
outcomes [i.e., recidivism] and the flaccid use of terms such as “empowerment” and
“culturally sensitive” that imply a politics of social justice), I initially thought of these
articles as being relatively benign, and as “on board” with social work’s mandate toward
social justice. However, upon deeper inspection of this type of article, I began to see how
deployment of social justice, despite being politically infused, at times operates as a
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screen and a mechanism of innocence. For instance, authors claim good intentions and
social justice values while simultaneously eliding the profession’s responsibility toward
enacting those goals through textual silence. Here I began to see how deeply intertwined
the textual silence on racism is to the project of innocence; whiteness as goodness
becomes re-inscribed through depoliticized discourses of empathy.
The various grammar elements utilized in texts, such as the use of passivity and
agentivity, also helped illuminate the maintenance of innocence. For example, many
articles discuss child welfare policies that are linked to the increase in termination of
parental rights for incarcerated mothers, but never acknowledge who is responsible for
policy implementation or the role of the social worker in perpetuating disparate outcomes
in child welfare. Similarly, many authors do not claim their arguments in their pronoun
use. They often say “it,” as in “it can be argued,” rather than “we,” as in “we argue.”
Authors are thereby able to remain relatively neutral on the topic at hand despite bringing
up the issue for inspection.
Other articles drew on empathy discourses in a more overt way to propel an image
of goodness. The typical “social work as savior” or good helper narrative was propelled
through empathy in a number of ways. Stark examples are found when researchers
defined themselves as on a “mission” to help the powerless, or “give voice to this
invisible population.” The positive qualities of the researchers (and social work) were
also emphasized through the use of participants’ quotes. For example, in an article on
group therapy in a prison for women, Harris (2014) stated:
I was constantly reminded each week by the women of what the group meant to
them. For example, one woman in the group stated, “This group has been
something sent from God himself. I never thought I had a chance for any program
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from the prison. You gave me the skills to go through with my Family & Offender
Sentencing Alternative Program application” (p. 50).
The excerpt above provides an example of how authors can draw on a discourse of
empathy and compassion by specifically choosing words from participants that
emphasize gratefulness. This is a discursive strategy which propels the image and
narrative of helping as a place of innocence. This article, and many like it, is strengthsbased and respectful. Throughout such articles the authors make it clear that they are on
the women’s side. Yet, they simultaneously obscure power relations. The tensions that
exist between the goals of social work and the goals of criminal justice are, thus,
minimized or ignored under a depoliticized discourse of empathy.
Gender Responsive Strategies. Discourses of empathy also emerged through the
promiscuous use of “gender responsive/specific” interventions found throughout the data.
Drawing on the “pathways” discourse discussed in earlier in this chapter, most of the
articles in my sample called for gender specific/responsive interventions in some way.
However, what is meant by gender responsive or gender specific is often vague and left
undefined. One is generally left to assume what it means through the context of the text.
Revisiting the way gender is dealt with in the data helps illuminate the key assumptions
guiding the use of gender responsiveness in the data set. Primarily, gender responsiveness
appears to parallel understandings of gender embedded in the pathways approach, which
relies on a binary of men/women, and is focused on trauma, mental health, parenting,
substance use, self-esteem, choice, and decision making.
“Gender specific” interventions, then, appear to be primarily focused on
therapeutic strategies for bolstering self-esteem as well as skill building around decision
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making and parenting. When deployed in this way, gender specific strategies can be seen
as an exemplar of practices that work with the “transformative risk subject” (HannahMoffat, 2005). The transformative risk subject relies on creation of intervenable needs—
the process through which needs are constituted as intervenable by way of a risk
management framework and then targeted for intervention—interventions which draw on
the “psy” discourses and, ultimately, perpetuate depoliticization. As Nikolas Rose (2000)
notes, interventions focused on personal fulfillment and personal development are closely
aligned with risk management, and in their reliance on “self-surveillance” and “selfregulation” also serve as another form of governmentality.
It appears as though the discourse on gender responsiveness has largely escaped
critical scrutiny in the social work discourse. As such, it has been ubiquitously taken up
as a “commonsense” framework for thinking about social work interventions with
criminalized women. Given the concerns I have outlined earlier in this chapter regarding
the discourse on gender that is deployed in the data, as well as the almost universally
accepted framework of risk, there is reason for alarm. Essentialized and psychologized
notions of gender function in tandem with risk discourses to reduce gendered
sociopolitical realities as a problem of the self. I argue that the notion of gender
responsiveness in this data operates as a “screen discourse” (Garrett, 2016) to provide a
veneer of progressiveness/social justice, while simultaneously minimizing or erasing the
importance of economic oppression and racism. Further, when deployed in this way, it
ultimately justifies the existence, and expansion, of carceral institutions.
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Prison as Opportunity. There are many ways in which the existence of the prison
is bolstered throughout the data. I have spoken to some of these already, but the most
troubling trend I observed in the data is the explicit framing of prison, or criminal justice
involvement, as an opportunity (n=17). Flowing from the construction of women as
“risky” and de-politicized explanations of crime, prison and supervision are subsequently
constituted as an opportunity for growth, reflection, and skill building. For example, after
discussing the challenging life experiences many incarcerated women face, Miller et al.
(2014) assert that:
Jail may at some level provide—if not a respite—an opportunity to reflect
[emphasis added] (p. 168).
Similarly in an article on substance use, Hepatitis C, and service availability among rural
incarcerated women, Staton-Tindall et al. (2015) discuss the dearth of substance abuse
treatment facilities in rural areas and state:
In the absence of these available and accessible services, the rural jail may
provide an opportunity to “sober up” and return to the street where relapse and/or
overdose is a significant risk. Thus, jails provide a valuable and often untapped
opportunity to provide drug abuse and related health interventions to this highrisk population [emphasis added] (p. 393).
In the above excerpt, the authors not only frame jail as an opportunity for women
to “sober up,” but they also frame it as an opportunity for service providers. They
reinforce the use of incarceration as a way to accommodate for neoliberal eviscerations to
the welfare state. Through the assertion that jail is an appropriate venue for providing
treatment, the authors implicitly affirm that it is also an appropriate way to compensate
for the lack of treatment and services in the community. This statement highlights the
very real ways in which jails and prisons are used to manage the social issues that
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manifest as a consequence of social exclusion under neoliberalism. Furthermore, the
research that is conducted to support such statements effectively constrains social work’s
advocacy efforts. Rather than advocating for appropriate treatment availability in the
community, Staton-Tindall et al. activate a logic that works to sustain the use of
incarceration as a means for dealing with substance use. Through the propagation of
social service/criminal justice alignment, they also ensure their own (i.e., social work’s)
legitimacy in a rapidly disintegrating welfare state. The question remains: what happens
when services that are designed to “help” are dictated in and through (and perhaps
depend on) the carceral system?
In another explicit framing of incarceration as opportunity, Gilham (2012) states:
Preparation for and return to life beyond the institution requires a corrective
treatment experience that is based on exploration of past behaviors, skill
development, and enhancement of the individual’s self-confidence and selfefficacy to meet the demands of the future. These women must capitalize on the
opportunity they have while incarcerated [emphasis added] (p. 100-101).
There are obvious ways in which the above statement reflects the ideological positioning
of the psy-discourses and activates technologies of the self to initiate self-governance. As
with other examples I have provided throughout this dissertation, the authors presuppose
that the purpose of incarceration is treatment and rehabilitation rather than incapacitation
and punishment. As I have previously discussed, with the advent of new penology, this
assumption has been widely discredited. This discussion dovetails onto previous
conversations presented in this dissertation questioning the purpose and ethics of prison.
In a less explicit framing of incarceration as opportunity, Schlager and Moore
(2014) state:
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Mothers who use incarceration constructively as a time of self-reflection can have
more successful reunification with their children [emphasis added] (p. 100).
In this statement, the authors implicitly assert that there is a right way and a wrong way to
“use incarceration.” For them, the correct way involves “self-reflection.” It leaves one to
wonder if self-reflection is really all that is needed to support reunification with children?
There is a inherent responsibilizing quality to their assertion. Women are held responsible
not only for the behavior that fostered their incarceration, the behavior for which they
presumably need to “self-reflect” (sit in the corner and think about yourself), but they are
also held responsible for what reunification looks like. If reunification does not go well, it
can then be reduced to a problem of the self—an individual woman’s lack of effort or
inadequate self-reflection.
My discussion here is not meant to diminish a woman’s agency, but to point to the
factors that constrain agency and therefore limit the logic of the author’s assertion. The
reality is that there are many reasons that reunification is challenging post-incarceration,
and many fall outside of the control of individual women. Child welfare requirements for
employment, housing, and childcare all interact with policies that disenfranchise and
restrict the upward mobility of “offenders.” There are also factors related to gender, class,
and racial biases embedded in the child welfare system, as well as assumptions regarding
“criminals” and the danger they pose to children, that influence worker discretion in
promoting or inhibiting reunification. Workers are not just influenced by dominant
cultural ideology in this regard. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, dominant
discourses regarding crime and the welfare of children are actively reproduced in social
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work. This speaks loudly to the need to shift the discourse around crime and criminal
justice involvement in social work knowledge production.
The framing of incarceration as an opportunity is troubling for many reasons.
First, it requires infusing the discourses of treatment and “helping” with those of
punishment and control, a process Carlen and Tombs (2006) dub “thera-punitive.”
Second, thera-punitive rationality assumes that women are getting effective treatment and
support in carceral settings, which has been widely critiqued as a contradiction in terms
given the violent and often traumatizing nature of correctional involvement (HannahMoffat, 2001; Pollack, 2010). Third, a discursive framing of incarceration as a
therapeutic “opportunity” elides moral and political concerns regarding the carceral state,
and upholds the use of prisons and jails as an appropriate response to social exclusion.
Further, it passively accepts the logic of punishment and aligns social work with carceral
institutions in concerning ways. The effect this has is to ultimately depoliticize social
work itself.
Social Work as Resistance. Though not dominant by any means, there was a
small subset (n=4) of my sample that I would consider as offering a counter-discourse
(i.e., Heidemann et al., 2016; O’Brien & Ortega, 2015; Smith & Young, 2003; Willison
& O’Brien, 2017). Counter-discourses are examples of resistance that contest prevailing
representations and ways of knowing (Hall, 1997). In that, lies the possibility of multiple
identifications and interpretations of both dominant and counter-discourses. My
discussion of counter-discourses here is gleaned from my analysis of the major discursive
themes and strategies that I have problematized so far throughout this dissertation. As I
moved through analysis, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between what
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constituted a true contestation to the dominant discursive patterns found in the data and
what simply stretched them. In other words, I made an effort to distinguish between what
served simply as a “less problematic” enactment of the dominant discourse and the truly
counter-discursive. In so doing, I identified, and discuss here, pieces that present a
significant challenge to the dominant ways of constructing, knowing, and working with
criminalized women that were prevalent in the dataset. The meaning of a counterdiscourse is revealed only in juxtaposition to the dominant discourse. Therefore, the
counter-discourse does not seek to simply supplant the dominant discourse; it exists in
the same discursive space and by virtue of that existence exposes and questions the logic
and strategies of the dominant discourse, and thereby undermines it.
In contrast to the discursive themes and strategies that are dominant in the data
(and which have been discussed thus far), the articles that form the counter-discourse
firmly anchor their analysis in explanations of structural inequity and construct
criminalized women as subjects of structural oppression and disadvantage. As such, they
rely on explicitly politicized explanations of crime and criminal justice involvement and
expand the discursive limits within which social work operates and, thus, the possibilities
for resistance. Unlike the majority of articles in my sample, the pieces I identify as a
counter-discourse disrupt the underlying construction of crime and question the logic of
punishment. Accordingly, they move away from reliance on the criminal justice system
as a means of dealing with social problems. They call on social workers to engage in
policy advocacy, utilize anti-oppressive practice frameworks, and consider prison
abolition as a viable option. In this counter-discourse, social work defines itself
politically, as an advocate and an agent of social change.
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There is very little behavior talk in the counter-discourse. When a discussion of
individual level issues or behaviors is presented, the articles of the counter-discourse tend
to situate behaviors within a sociopolitical context and examine them as manifestations of
larger structural issues related to inequality. For example, in a discussion regarding the
impact of the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 on women, Willison and O’Brien (2017) state:
When women turn to survival behaviors, these are criminalized, stripping the
contextual factors of poverty and institutional racism from the analysis (p.41).
This short sentence gives you a sense for how the flavor of the counter-discourse differs
from the majority of what has been reviewed thus far in this dissertation. There are a
number of factors worth noting. First, behaviors are discussed as being criminalized, not
inherently criminal. Second, behaviors are also contextualized within, and as an
inevitable product of, the political economy. The use of the adjective survival also
depathologizes women without stripping them of their agency; it alerts us to the fact that
in a neoliberal political economy, not everyone has the same choices, and the choices that
people make may be among the best that are available to them. In other words, the term
“survival behaviors” creates space to conceptualize behavior that is criminalized as a
form of resistance to poverty and oppression. Third, sociopolitical factors are emphasized
and racism is explicitly named. And finally, because the sentence was linked to a
discussion of the impact of welfare reform, the authors attend to the nuanced ways in
which seemingly disparate policies (i.e., social welfare and criminal justice) intersect in
complex ways to impact the lives and criminalization of women. As you can see, this
little sentence packs quite a punch and provides an excellent example of how, in the
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counter-discourse, women are constructed as criminalized and marginalized rather than
risky.
Though the term risk is used very little in this portion of the data, when it is
utilized, the locus of risk as well as the site of intervention is firmly grounded in systemic
issues and the need for systemic change. Smith and Young (2003), for example, do a
deep dive policy analysis on “The Multiple Impacts of TANF, ASFA, and Mandatory
Drug Sentencing for Families Affected by Maternal Incarceration.” After providing an
overview of the intention and impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, they state:
There is a societal obligation to address risk factors related to poverty, and
concurrent planning does not address this reality [emphasis added] (p. 544).
In this statement they not only name poverty as the problem (i.e., risk), they also address
the failures of policies such as ASFA when they are decontextualized. The authors often
move beyond description to call for action, with intervention situated at the site of
poverty. Further, the use of the term “societal obligation” creates a sense of urgency and
responsibility. In this way, the authors are taking an explicit political stance.
Similarly, recidivism is not framed as the definition of “success” in the counterdiscourse. When recidivism is discussed, it is linked directly to structural barriers. By
way of example, Heidemann, Cederbaum, and Martinez (2016) state:
The vast majority of women incarcerated in the United States will eventually be
released (Visher & Travis, 2003). Hoping to build a new life for themselves and
their children when they come home, formerly incarcerated women (FIW) instead
return to their communities to face an array of barriers to successful reentry,
including barriers to employment, housing, education, civic participation, and
income assistance, and difficulties reuniting with children and families. These
barriers contribute to a staggering rate of recidivism (p.24).
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Rather than framing recidivism as a result of individual deficit or deviance, as is typical
of the discourse on recidivism that runs through most of the dataset, the focus here is
squarely on political and economic barriers. What is particularly notable about this article
(as with the others in this subset) is that the authors do not move on from here to simply
relocate the solution for recidivism in individual level interventions. In fact, this article is
specifically about redefining outcomes and indicators of success for formerly
incarcerated women, beyond that of recidivism. This type of scholarship creates space for
the nuanced ways in which success can be conceptualized. Rather than attaching the label
“criminal,” “offender,” or “at-risk,” this work opens space for a variety of subject
positions and in so doing is deeply humanizing.
Generally, interventions and outcomes in this subset of the data are aimed at the
systems level. Smith and Young (2003), for example, call for changes in sentencing
policies, and also target TANF and ASFA as the site of intervention. They call for
administering financial assistance (i.e., money) to women and their families, rather than
skill building, in order to promote reunification, reduce recidivism, and foster well-being.
Smith and Young, like the others in the counter-discourse also stress that “substance
abuse should not be considered primarily a criminal justice problem” (p. 549). Such
statements shift the discourse on substance use and urge for a public health approach
rather than a criminal justice response to substance use.
O’Brien and Ortega (2015) call for a complete dismantling of the criminal justice
system and emphasize the politics of prison abolition:
Decarceration and/or prison abolition requires an emphasis on building
community accountability for responding to harm rather than reliance upon
policing, surveillance, and the criminal processing system. Prison abolition
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exposes the racism and institutionalized oppression inherent to the prison system
and challenges the ideological ‘need’ for prisons. Advocates and activists within
the prison abolition movement recognize that prison does not make us safer and
calls for shifting resources to reinvestment in community-based empowerment,
community-led education, and radical activism as alternatives to the prison
system (p. 143).
Similarly, Willison and O’Brien (2017) call for a number of changes at the economic and
policy level:
Durable change to the mechanisms of the Prison Nation and its resulting mass
incarceration requires that we address the early criminalization of girls and
women by rebuilding the safety net of economic supports that can provide quality
education, fair wages employment, and the structural supports for health and wellbeing. In addition, we must advocate for the retooling of sentencing policies in
response to women’s criminalized behaviors to incorporate treatment and
supports for recovery and for the expansion of in-prison programs available to
currently jailed and incarcerated women. Finally, we argue for the creation of
realistic pathways to citizenship after release from prison. Feminist social work
practice requires that we address the outcomes of institutional sexism, racism, and
class injustice in the lives of marginalized women who are impacted by the Prison
Nation (p.46).
The above excerpts are both from articles co-authored by Patricia O’Brien. O’Brien’s
body of work in this dataset includes articles from various projects spread throughout the
sample timeframe; the first was published in 2003 and the last in 2017. This provides the
opportunity to examine the work of a single scholar over the course of almost two
decades. What stands out from this analysis is how deeply politicized O’Brien’s
scholarship has become over the years. If you contrast the two excerpts above, from 2015
and 2017, to the one analyzed on page 153 from 2003, you can see a stark difference in
the flavor of the scholar’s work. Whereas I placed the piece from 2003 in the “social
justice light” category because it simultaneously drew on notions of choice and
responsibility as well as discourses of empathy and social justice, I included the later
pieces as part of the counter-discourse as they are explicitly critical and political. I
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believe this illustrates a stretching of discursive limits. In this way, I find O’Brien’s work
to be amongst the most exciting in the dataset. It shattered my preconceptions and draws
my attention to a genuine capacity for change in the social work discourse. It also raises
many questions regarding the mechanisms that politicize social work scholars and,
thereby, allow us to re-think the discourse on criminalization.
The articles in the counter-discourse all, in some way, actively undermine, rather
than bolster the use of the prison and criminal justice system. For example, Heidemann,
Cederbaum, and Martinez’s (2016) interviews with formerly incarcerated women
highlight the dehumanizing nature of interactions with criminal justice authorities:
Tina went on to describe the humiliation she feels when her female parole officer
stands in the door of the bathroom and actually watches her urinate when she is
drug tested. The feeling of being under constant surveillance—which has been an
increasing function of parole in recent decades (Solomon, Kachinowski, & Bhati,
2006)—and the constant fear of ‘messing up’ and violating strict parole
conditions, which were often arbitrarily enforced, greatly hamper FIW’s ability to
feel free and to fully live their lives. For those still on probation/parole, success
was defined not solely as the desire to discharge but more as an opportunity to
fully live their lives no longer under the oppressive surveillance and control of
criminal justice authorities (p. 32).
In their description and analysis of Tina’s predicament, the authors address the
problematic nature of surveillance, and thereby subtly interrogate the benevolence of
community. The counter-discourse carries not just a critique of the criminal justice
system, but also of social work and the ways in which social work research, policy, and
practice perpetuate mass incarceration. The counter-discourse actively implicates social
work in processes of criminalization and demands that social workers engage morally and
politically. In short, all of the articles in the counter-discourse have goals related to
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building social justice. Though just a small subset of my sample, I see these emergent
counter-discourses as critical to fostering spaces of hope and possibility.
Concluding Thoughts.
Throughout the data, there is a strong focus on “what works,” with what works
defined primarily in terms of managing risks and reducing recidivism. Indeed, risk
assessment and risk management strategies as well as individualized interventions which
focus on individual choice and therapeutic treatment appear to be the dominant model of
service delivery in social work with criminalized women. The legitimacy for such
interventions is bolstered through a discourse of neutrality. Neutrality surfaces when a
stance is not taken on the issue of incarceration, when the issue of incarceration and
criminalization is discussed in neutral or psychological terms, and when interventions are
focused solely on individuals.
Furthermore, very little explicitly political language is used in the data. For
example, despite being a large-scale issue that is recognized by our national professional
organizations as an urgent social justice issue, mass incarceration is named in only two
articles. This is the primary tension in the data whereby many authors invoke yet,
ultimately, undermine social justice values. When terms such as social justice,
empowerment, and oppression are used, they are immediately undermined by the
suggested use of individual treatment, which effectively drains these words of their
political and ideological meanings. Though I did not find any of this particularly
surprising, I was caught off guard and deeply troubled by the calls, both explicit and
implicit, for social service and criminal justice alignment that I found in the data.
Through the acceptance of risk discourses and eager alignment with carceral systems, the
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profession functions as a instrument of state sanctioned governance and is depoliticized
far too easily. Social work’s imbrication in the carceral state brings into stark relief the
profound ethical ramifications of doing business as usual. Our ability to contribute to the
common good is thwarted by reckless engagement with neoliberal rationalities. I worry
that we are too far removed from the moral and political discourses that are necessary for
promoting social justice and social change.
By contrast, the articles of the counter-discourse provide an alternative way of
seeing criminalization and social work’s role. They also helped deepen my own analysis
and lift my spirit of generosity. As I saw scholars become increasingly politicized in their
scholarship over time, I thought about the notion of discursive limits: how they constrain,
but also, how they can be stretched. I began to rethink how I was viewing the use of (or
lack of) social justice in the data. Social justice may not be an all or nothing concept; like
most things, it may be more usefully conceptualized as existing in shades. In this, the
tension of the undecidable might also include a struggle to define social justice. Perhaps
social work’s inclination toward the individual and individual level treatment serves as a
way of (re)defining social justice in neoliberal terms.
Though it is beyond the scope and epistemological assumptions of this study to
speculate different interpretations, throughout this project, I often wondered how the
interpretations of those with more clinical/micro orientations in the profession might
differ from mine. I believe many clinicians would say, without a doubt, that they support
and uphold social justice values, just as I do. Similarly, I believe many of the authors in
my dataset would also claim social justice values, and perhaps ardently so. Which begs
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the question: within social work, is “helping talk” synonymous with social justice talk? If
so, what are the implications for the profession’s ability to effect social change?
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This project examined social work’s engagement with criminalized women. Using
a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) I looked at how criminalized women are constructed
in social work high impact journals and the implications this has for research and
practice. In line with what Laura Nader calls “studying up,” this project puts the gaze on
a governing technology of social work in order to examine how the profession
participates in maintaining and/or resisting the carceral state. Critical Discourse Analysis,
informed by critical and post-structural frameworks, is premised on the notion that
analysis and meaning making are both political and subject to multiple interpretations. As
such, the interpretations and analyses in this dissertation are shaped by my subjectivity as
a social work scholar who holds a pointed social justice perspective and strong
commitments to advancing and strengthening macro thinking/practice in social work. In
this chapter, I summarize the analysis and arguments of the dissertation and speak to
what I see as some of its most pressing implications.
The overarching finding is that social work privileges a psychological discourse,
and that the assessment and management of risk has supplanted a holistic approach to
meeting client needs and addressing mass incarceration. There is a substantial emphasis
on framing criminalized women and their children as “at risk” individuals who can be
helped by social service and criminal justice alignment. I argue that social work’s
growing dedication to practices that seek to adjust the psychological fortitude of
criminalized women relies on broader cultural discourses of responsibilization, which
reproduce rather than interrupt criminalization, and divert attention away from the need
for social and economic change, leading ultimately to the profession’s depoliticization.
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My results show that approaches to practice which fail to address historical and
structural contexts are dominant in the social work scholarship. This is achieved through
a variety of what I have termed “neutralizing strategies,” including decontextualization,
the erasure of racism, and an overreliance on the languages of the psy-professions. These
neutralizing strategies actively produce depoliticized understandings of gender, crime,
and social justice. Depoliticized understandings shape social work practices that center on
risk and responsibility, which undermine (or perhaps redefine) social work’s professed
commitments to social justice and to addressing mass incarceration. I have specifically
begun to refine my understanding of and stance on gender specific/responsive
interventions. My analysis shows that social work draws upon essentialized notions of
gender to demarcate women from men, identify lifestyles, and produce ideas about risk,
all of which drive the implementation of gender responsive assessment and intervention. I
have thus become more skeptical of “gender responsive” approaches since completing
this research. As other feminists have noted, gender responsive approaches tend to
prescribe, rather than respond to, gendered notions of risk (Hannah-Moffat, 2010). If
gender is going to be operationalized in this manner, then perhaps gender needs to be
abandoned, or at the very least reworked as an analytic category.
Further, if our larger attempts as a profession toward addressing mass
incarceration, such as the Grand Challenge of Smart Decarceration, are built upon
discourses of risk and responsibilization, then we risk simply relocating the punishment
and control of marginalized populations into the community. Social work’s alignment
with carceral systems and the subsequent call for prison based treatment programs and
community “alternatives” leaves out a critical analysis of the underlying culture of
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punishment. Indeed, as critical and feminist criminologists have argued, many
“alternative” programs often reproduce rather than displace the reach of the criminal
justice system and create countless new spaces of governance.
My analysis therefore exposes how social work is implicated in processes of
criminalization, and propels a shift in emphasis from individualized service delivery,
aimed at changing the behavior of individuals, to launching interventions that tackle
structural injustice and inequity. I do not intend to imply that social work cannot or
should not provide individual level supports and treatment, but there are some serious
questions our profession must grapple with regarding: 1) how we can provide effective
support when aligned with carceral institutions and 2) how we sustain our values and
ethical imperatives for social justice if some of the most influential scholarship coming
out of our field is bound up in individualizing and pathologizing discourses.
The implications of this analysis are many. First, this work has sought to provide
an account of social work discourse in relation to criminalized women. I explored and
exposed the power function in social work knowledge production to produce subjects of
governance and fortify the carceral state. Because power is beyond individual intention,
we need to pay close attention to the ways in which it manifests and reproduces itself in
the specific discourses and knowledge claims that form the foundation of our professional
practices and knowledge. Neutralizing strategies make it difficult to identify
responsibility for the continued existence of the carceral state and inspire doubts about
the possibilities for change. Understanding the subtle and productive work of power to
undermine our “good intentions” and aspirations for social justice requires us to rethink
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explanations for crime and our understandings regarding the purpose and necessity of the
criminal justice system.
It is here that I discovered a profound ethical dissonance between social work’s
engagement with criminalized women and social work values. Specifically, I found that
social work discourse passively accepts the logic of punishment and supports dominant
ideology surrounding gender and crime, while concurrently attempting to redress the
consequences of such constructions through social justice values. I conceptualize this as
discursive struggle over the meaning and purpose of social work; a struggle that
embodies some of the most salient historical and contemporary tensions in our field
related to our professional identity and an increasing drive toward professionalization.
Though I knew upon setting out that I was studying the entwined aspects of
criminalization and social work, I did not quite see that what I was examining was much
bigger than that specific interaction. As I moved through this project, I found that my
project felt less and less about criminalization, and more about confronting the soul of
social work. And I am left wondering, what is the actual promise of social work? If it
does indeed include visions for social justice and social change, can those visions be
adequately met under an apparatus of neoliberalism, or only performed? Ethically
speaking, I see this as a fundamental crisis in contemporary social work. Neoliberal
discourses of individuality and responsibility are ill suited for addressing the harms
caused by the carceral state, and when deployed through the process of knowledge
production serve only to deepen our participation in it. In this sense, I believe ethics may
be at the crux of my work.
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In examining the need for an ethics that accounts for trespass as an inevitable
consequence of being, Orlie (1997) tells us that:
“Ordinary evil is the product of trespass, not sin; of thoughtlessness, not
wickedness. Prevalent notions of ethical conduct—performing contracts, being
reasonable, behaving predictably—do not necessarily diminish ordinary evil, but
in fact often reinforce and extend it. Moreover, predominant rationalities often
make us thoughtless rather than thoughtful agents of the governing powers that
multiply trespasses” (p. 11).
Consequently, we face a crisis of the undecidable borne out by our difficulty in living up
to our aspirational values while justifying our profession’s continued existence. This
raises serious questions worth our consideration: What does it mean to engage in
responsible social work practice and research in the context of neoliberal globalization
and mass incarceration? How do we proceed in ethical decision making within the
discursive space of undecidability? Is the enactment of hegemonic discourses the
inevitable consequence of the undecidable? Perhaps, but I think it is also within the
terrain of undecidability that possibility emerges. Orlie (1997) calls for “transgressive
thinking.” Like Foucault, she argues that discursive limits cannot be transcended, but
they can be transgressed. She asserts that “judgment is an insufficient way to care for the
world. Rather, thinking (in contrast to judgment) cares for the world by attending to the
effects of the limits through which we constitute the world” (p. 7). Thinking that
questions the inevitability of crime and the carceral state expands our vision of the
possible and re-centers social work as a political profession.
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Throughout this project, I kept returning to the same questions: Why has the
prison and carceral state become such an inevitable, or necessary, feature in the social
imagination of our profession? And why does social work seem to continuously fall back
on individual level skill development as the answer for systemic issues? Do we simply
lack imagination? Foucault reminds us that wherever there is power, there is resistance.
In fact, the sustenance of power, in part, relies on the tension produced through
resistance. Resistive ideas, then, are not suppressed but remain marginal, because in
comparison to what passes for “truth” or common sense, they often seem illogical and
irrational. Indeed, under a rationality of neoliberalism, resistance to the carceral state
seems not only illogical, but also untenable.
Although the discourse of risk seems to be firmly entrenched in the contemporary
social work lexicon, it should not be treated as infallible or inevitable. Neither should the
use of punishment as a means of dealing with social problems. As the articles comprising
the counter-discourse in my sample illustrate, it is possible to push beyond dominant
narratives toward abolition. Just because what is, is, does not mean it must be. I argue
here that the project of social work may benefit from claiming space for imagination: a
stance of radical imagination. When we begin to imagine what is possible, even if it
appears improbable, we also begin to create the conditions for its existence. In other
words, only through radical acts of imagination can the improbable become possible.
The question remains, what does this analysis mean in terms of better
understanding and responding to criminalized women? In thinking about how to shift the
decontextualized and depoliticized approaches to understanding and working with
criminalized women that emerged in my analysis, one place we can look is to education.
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However, as recent research shows, issues related to the criminal justice system are
scantly covered in the literature and inadequately addressed in schools of social work
(Epperson et al., 2013; Jemal & Graham, 2017; Wheeler & McClain, 2015). This has
serious implications for the education of future social workers who are quite likely at
some point to come into contact with criminalized populations (Wilson, 2010).
With what seems like an ever-increasing emphasis on professionalization and
licensure in social work, it’s crucial that we retain a focus on the historical and structural
processes and discourses that contribute to production and reproduction of the carceral
state. It is not enough to simply integrate material related to criminal justice issues in
social work education, research, and training; I argue that in order to adequately respond
to the “ordinary evil” in which Orlie implicates us we must also engage ethical and
political discourses—the forms of thinking and speaking that cannot accommodate
neutrality and which shatter certainty.
In her book Getting Lost, Patti Lather (2007) talks about the difference between
“lovely knowledge” and “difficult knowledge.” She tells us that lovely knowledge comes
easy and “reinforces what we think we want from what we find” (p.13). Difficult
knowledge, in comparison, works against affirming claims through data and “induces
breakdowns in representing experience” (p.13). Throughout this project, lovely
knowledge flourished in the data as social work confirmed, over and over again, what it
thinks it knows, thereby limiting what can be known. Meanwhile, I found myself buried
in difficult knowledge, burning with confusion, lost in paradox; working within and
against my own (in)competence. This project forced me to re-think aspects of my
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intellect that I thought I had figured out: gender, social justice, the box I put all “those”
social workers in, where I thought this research would lead me and where it did lead me,
and ultimately my own identity within the profession. Through this, I have learned to be
less strident, and in many ways I am left with more questions than answers. Questions
that I suspect, if I am brave enough and strong enough, will pave the road for the difficult
knowledge that is to come. It is a humble, yet hopeful position.
The temptation of lovely knowledge is strong, but the intellectual rapture that
emerges from the depths of difficult knowledge is the very force of ethical scholarship. It
is from the rigor of difficult knowledge that possibilities for change arise. As Lather says,
“what one loves when lovely knowledge is lost is the promise of thinking and doing
otherwise” (p.13). I believe it is here, in the abandonment of lovely knowledge, that we
may begin to reimagine the carceral state. My challenge to social work is this: resist the
seductions of the lovely knowledge found in the tools of assessment and prediction and
on well-worn paths to funding and tenure. Engage the questions and conundrums found
in the places where difficult knowledge dwells. It is here that we might begin to think
what hasn’t been thought and do what hasn't been done. It is here that we may begin to
engage in what Ferguson and Lavalette (2006) call a “social work of resistance.”
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Youth Services
Review

2008

Quantitative
Research

Salina, D. D.,
Lesondak, L. M.,
Razzano, L. A., &
Parenti, B. M.

Addressing Unmet Needs in
Incarcerated Women With Cooccurring Disorders

Journal of Social
Service Research

2011

Quantitative
Research

Schlager, M. D., &
Moore, B.

Risk and Resiliency of
Incarcerated Mothers

Families in
Society

2014

Mixed
Methods

Scudder, A. T.,
McNeil, C. B.,
Chengappa, K., &
Costello, A.

Evaluation of an existing parenting
class within a women's state
correctional facility and a
parenting class modeled from
Parent-Child Interaction Therapy

Children and
Youth Services
Review

2014

Quantitative
Evaluation

Siefert, K., &
Pimlott, S.

Improving pregnancy outcome
during imprisonment: A model
residential care program

Social Work

2001

Descriptive
Review with
Quantitative
Evaluation

Smith, C. J., &
Young, D. S.

The multiple impacts of TANF,
ASFA, and mandatory drug
sentencing for families affected by
maternal incarceration

Children and
Youth Services
Review

2003

Conceptual

Smoyer, A. B.

Feeding Relationships: Foodways
and Social Networks in a Women's
Prison

Affilia

2015

Qualitative
Research

Staton-Tindall, M.,
Webster, J. M.,
Oser, C. B., Havens,
J. R., & Leukefeld,
C. G.

Drug Use, Hepatitis C, and Service
Availability: Perspectives of
Incarcerated Rural Women

Social Work in
Public Health

2015

Qualitative
Research

Strozier, A. L.,
Armstrong, M.,
Skuza, S., Cecil, D.,
& McHale, J.

Coparenting in Kinship Families
With Incarcerated Mothers: A
Qualitative Study.

Families in
Society

2011

Qualitative
Research

Tripodi, S. J.,
Bledsoe, S. E., Kim,
J. S., & Bender, K.

Effects of Correctional-Based
Programs for Female Inmates: A
Systematic Review

Research on
Social Work
Practice

2011

Quantitative
Research
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Author(s)

Article Title

Source

Year

Type of
Article
Quantitative
Evaluation

Valentine, P. V., &
Smith, T. E.

Evaluating traumatic incident
reduction therapy with female
inmates: A randomized controlled
clinical trial

Research on
Social Work
Practice

2001

Vandermause, R.,
Severtsen, B., &
Roll, J.

Re-creating a vision of
motherhood: Therapeutic Drug
Court and the narrative

Qualitative
Social Work

2013

Qualitative
Research

White, G. D.

Gender-Responsive Programs in
U.S. Prisons: Implications for
Change

Social Work in
Public Health

2012

Conceptual

Willison, J. S., &
O'Brien, P.

A Feminist Call for Transforming
the Criminal Justice System

Affilia

2017

Conceptual

Woodard, T., &
Copp, J. E.

Maternal incarceration and
children's delinquent involvement:
The role of sibling relationships

Children and
Youth Services
Review

2016

Quantitative
Research
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APPENDIX C: Number of Articles, Per Journal, Included in Sample
It is notable that of the 25 journals I searched, my final sample came from only half (n=12) of the
original list. The other half did not contain articles meeting inclusion criteria from the specified
time period. The breakdown is listed below.
Journal
Children and Youth Services Review

Number of
Articles in Sample
10

Research on Social Work Practice

10

Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work

8

Social Work in Public Health

6

Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social
Service

3

Smith College Studies in Social Work

3

Social Work Research

3

Social Work

2

Health and Social Work

1

Journal of Social Service Research

1

Social Service Review

1

Qualitative Social Work

1

The following journals did not contain articles that met inclusion criteria:
Administration in Social Work
British Journal of Social Work
Child and Family Social Work
Clinical Social Work Journal
European Journal of Social Work
Human Service Organizations Management Leadership and Governance
International Journal of Social Welfare
International Social Work
Journal of Social Work
Journal of Social Work Education
Journal of Social Work Practice
Social Work in Health Care
Trauma, Violence, and Abuse
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APPENDIX D: Detailed Breakdown of Articles per Journal
Children and Youth Services Review – 10
Hanlon, T. E., Blatchley, R. J., Bennett-Sears, T., O'Grady, K. E., Rose, M., & Callaman, J.
M. (2005). Vulnerability of children of incarcerated addict mothers: Implications for
preventive intervention.
Jung, H., & LaLonde, R. (2016). The relationship between re-incarceration and their own
childhood foster care experience of women.
Kjellstrand, J. M., Cearley, J., Eddy, J. M., Foney, D., & Martinez, C. R. (2012).
Characteristics of incarcerated fathers and mothers: Implications for preventive
interventions targeting children and families.
Miller, A. L., Weston, L. E., Perryman, J., Horwitz, T., Franzen, S., & Cochran, S. (2014).
Parenting While Incarcerated: Tailoring the Strengthening Families Program for use with
jailed mothers.
Miller, K. M. (2014). Maternal criminal justice involvement and co-occurring mental health
and substance abuse problems: Examining moderation of sex and race on children's mental
health.
Miller, K. M., & Bank, L. (2013). Moderating effects of race on internalizing and
externalizing behaviors among children of criminal justice and child welfare involved
mothers.
Phillips, S. D., & Erkanli, A. (2008). Differences in patterns of maternal arrest and the
parent, family, and child problems encountered in working with families.
Scudder, A. T., McNeil, C. B., Chengappa, K., & Costello, A. H. (2014). Evaluation of an
existing parenting class within a women's state correctional facility and a parenting class
modeled from Parent-Child Interaction Therapy.
Smith, C. J., & Young, D. S. (2003). The multiple impacts of TANF, ASFA, and mandatory
drug sentencing for families affected by maternal incarceration.
Woodard, T., & Copp, J. E. (2016). Maternal incarceration and children's delinquent
involvement: The role of sibling relationships.

Research on Social Work Practice – 10
Buttell, F. P. (2002). Levels of moral reasoning among female domestic violence offenders:
Evaluating the impact of treatment.
Buttell, F. P., Powers, D., & Wong, A. (2012). Evaluating Predictors of Program Attrition
Among Women Mandated into Batterer Intervention Treatment.
Carney, M. M., & Buttell, F. P. (2004). A multidimensional evaluation of a treatment
program for female batterers: A pilot study.
Carney, M. M., & Buttell, F. P. (2006). An evaluation of a court-mandated batterer
intervention program: Investigating differential program effect for African American and
White women.
Ferreira, R. J., & Buttell, F. P. (2016). Can a "Psychosocial Model'' Help Explain Violence
Perpetrated by Female Batterers?
Kubiak, S. P. (2004). The effects of PTSD on treatment adherence, drug relapse, and
criminal recidivism in a sample of incarcerated men and women.
Kubiak, S. P., Kasiborski, N., & Schmittel, E. (2010). Assessing Long-Term Outcomes of
an Intervention Designed for Pregnant Incarcerated Women.
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Kubiak, S. P., Kim, W. J., Fedock, G., & Bybee, D. (2015). Testing a Violence-Prevention
Intervention for Incarcerated Women Using a Randomized Control Trial.
Tripodi, S. J., Bledsoe, S. E., Kim, J. S., & Bender, K. (2011). Effects of Correctional-Based
Programs for Female Inmates: A Systematic Review.
Valentine, P. V., & Smith, T. E. (2001). Evaluating traumatic incident reduction therapy
with female inmates: A randomized controlled clinical trial.

Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work - 8
Allen, S., Flaherty, C., & Ely, G. (2010). Throwaway Moms: Maternal Incarceration and the
Criminalization of Female Poverty.
Epperson, M. W., Platais, I., Valera, P., Barbieri, R., Gilbert, L., & El-Bassel, N. (2009).
Fear, Trust, & Negotiating Safety HIV Risks for Black Female Defendants.
Heidemann, G., Cederbaum, J. A., & Martinez, S. (2016). Beyond Recidivism: How
Formerly Incarcerated Women Define Success.
Mason, L. G. B. (2013). The Journey of One Pregnant Incarcerated Woman Through
Systemic Bias: How Family Support Workers Can Positively Affect Change-A Case Study.
O'Brien, P., & Bates, R. (2003). Negotiating the waves: Challenges of conducting in-prison
and follow-up research with women.
O'Brien, P., & Ortega, D. M. (2015). Feminist Transformation Deconstructing Prisons and
Reconstructing Justice with Criminalized Women.
Smoyer, A. B. (2015). Feeding Relationships: Foodways and Social Networks in a Women's
Prison.
Willison, J. S., & O'Brien, P. (2017). A Feminist Call for Transforming the Criminal Justice
System.

Social Work in Public Health – 6
Gilham, J. J. M. (2012). A Qualitative Study of Incarcerated Mothers' Perceptions of the
Impact of Separation on Their Children.
Horton, A. (2011). Heroin Users: The Need for Improved Treatment for Incarcerated
Women.
Kubiak, S. P., Kasiborski, N., Karim, N., & Schmittel, E. (2012). Does Subsequent Criminal
Justice Involvement Predict Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights for Children
Born to Incarcerated Women?
Mignon, S. I., & Ransford, P. (2012). Mothers in Prison: Maintaining Connections with
Children.
Staton-Tindall, M., Webster, J. M., Oser, C. B., Havens, J. R., & Leukefeld, C. G. (2015).
Drug Use, Hepatitis C, and Service Availability: Perspectives of Incarcerated Rural
Women.
White, G. D. (2012). Gender-Responsive Programs in U.S. Prisons: Implications for
Change.

Family in Society – The Journal of Contemporary Social Service -3
Berry, M., Johnson, T., Severson, M., & Postmus, J. L. (2009). Wives and Mothers At Risk:
The Role of Marital and Maternal Status in Criminal Activity and Incarceration.
Schlager, M. D., & Moore, B. (2014). Risk and Resiliency of Incarcerated Mothers.
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Strozier, A. L., Armstrong, M., Skuza, S., Cecil, D., & McHale, J. (2011). Coparenting in
Kinship Families With Incarcerated Mothers: A Qualitative Study.

Smith College Studies in Social Work – 3
Condon, M. C. (2017). Early Relational Health: Infants' Experiences Living with Their
Incarcerated Mothers.
Harris, M. S. (2014). Group Therapy at a Prison for Women: A Therapist's Perspective.
Harris, M. S. (2017). Incarcerated Mothers: Trauma and Attachment Issues.

Social Work Research – 3
Fedock, G. L. (2017). Women's Psychological Adjustment to Prison: A Review for Future
Social Work Directions.
Fries, L., Fedock, G., & Kubiak, S. P. (2014). Role of Gender, Substance Use, and Serious
Mental Illness in Anticipated Postjail Homelessness.
Miller, K. M., Orellana, E. R., Johnson, A. B., Krase, K., & Anderson-Nathe, B. (2013).
Maternal Criminal Justice and Child Welfare Involvement: Associations between Risk
Exposures and Childhood Mental Health.

Social Work – 2
Kernsmith, P., & Kernsmith, R. (2009). Treating Female Perpetrators: State Standards for
Batterer Intervention Services.
Siefert, K., & Pimlott, S. (2001). Improving pregnancy outcome during imprisonment: A
model residential care program.

Health and Social Work –1
Fedock, G., & Sarantakos, S. (2017). Physical and Mental Health Disparities for Young
Women with Arrest Histories.

Journal of Social Service Research – 1
Salina, D. D., Lesondak, L. M., Razzano, L. A., & Parenti, B. M. (2011). Addressing Unmet
Needs in Incarcerated Women With Co-occurring Disorders.

Social Service Review – 1
Cho, R. M. (2010). Maternal Incarceration and Children's Adolescent Outcomes: Timing
and Dosage.

Qualitative Social Work – 1
Vandermause, R., Severtsen, B., & Roll, J. (2013). Re-creating a vision of motherhood:
Therapeutic Drug Court and the narrative.
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APPENDIX E: Template for Structural Analysis
Title:
Author(s):
Year:
Journal:
Section:
Type:
Topics Covered:
Special Characteristics:
Topics/Themes/Subtopics:

Vocabulary/ Word Choice:

Theoretical Orientation:

Collective Symbolism:

Argument/framing (Overarching explanations/goal?):

Attitudes/ Tone:

Discursive Entanglements:

Overall Discourse Position:

Other Notes:
• Depoliticizing Social work: Yes/No?
• Strategies for staying neutral/depoliticizing topic?
• Contradictions
• Binaries
• Omissions
• Reliance on risk
• Goals and values of social work or other fields?
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APPENDIX F: Illustration of Structural and Detailed Analysis
Allen, S., Flaherty, C., & Ely, G. (2010). Throwaway Moms: Maternal Incarceration and
the Criminalization of Female Poverty.
Structural Analysis
Title: Throwaway Moms Maternal Incarceration and the Criminalization of Female Poverty
Author(s): Suzanne Allen, Chris Flaherty, Gretchen Ely
Year: 2010
Journal: Affilia
Section: Articles
Type: Qualitative Research Study
Topics Covered: Maternal Incarceration; Issues Faced; Causes; Interventions/Responses
Sub-Topics/Themes: Impact on Mothers, Impact on Mother-Child Relationship; Poverty,
Substance Use Issues, Mental Health Issues, Abuse/Victimization, Marginalization,
Custody/Child Welfare; Sentencing Policies, Structural Barriers, Individual Level Factors;
Substance Use Treatment, Parenting Programming, Life Skills Development, Gender Specific
Programming, Advocacy, Recidivism
Vocabulary/word choice: “Drug Offending” “criminalization” “poverty” “victimization”
“addiction” “behaviors” “giving voice” “powerless” (a lot) “substance abusing” “policy
vacuum” “long ignored population” “troubled life histories” “impossible odds” “criminality”
“gender specific” “inflexible child welfare policies” “recidivism” “radical criminal justice
policies” “deeply reflective” “often philosophical” “struggled fiercely” “enthusiastic and
grateful” “profound powerlessness” “devastating cycle of poverty” “deep shame, remorse and
sadness” “prostituted themselves” “trade sex for drugs” “AFSA” “invisible population”
“maternal love” “mentors and advocates” “criminality” “life skills training” “treatment” “case
advocates”
Theoretical Orientation: Feminist Standpoint Epistemological framework
Collective Symbols: “imprisoned by their own guilt and shame” “giving the women a voice
makes the political personal" “impossible odds” “crack subculture in America’s poor
struggling communities” “deep layers of abuse and social problems the women endured”
Argument/framing (Overarching explanations/goal?): Policy issues propel increases in
incarceration. Criminal justice involvement and crime is caused by individual level factors.
Calls for gender responsive programming to better deal with these individual level issues.
There are structural barriers to “success” but these are framed as individual issues that can be
solved through individual level programming. Goal is to help women take personal
responsibility, which will then improve their circumstances and decrease recidivism.
Goals and values of social work or other fields?): Micro-level social work values and
emphasis. Compassion.
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Social justice?: No explicit mention. Ambiguity—social justice analysis of criminalization
but its undermined by the individual level analysis. The social justice analysis is also not
embedded in meaningful calls for action and because of the paternalistic discussion of women.
Attitudes: Generally positive toward women though fairly paternalistic
Tone: paternalistic
Reliance on risk?: Not overtly, but the framing of women’s powerlessness and vulnerability
ultimately constructs them as “at risk.”
What’s Missing?(omissions/textual silences): Race (even though half of their sample is
comprised of people of color). No discussion of racism. Completely silent on the issue of race
though they use a lot of coded language for it.
Depoliticizing Social work (Yes/No?) If yes, Strategies for staying neutral/depoliticizing
topic?): Yes. Decontextualize through a silence on race and racism. Undermines discussion of
structural issues with emphasis on individual problems and interventions. Also undermines
their assertions of a feminist social justice agenda through focus on individual choice.
Contradictions: Policy issues cause increase in incarceration, but substance abuse and mental
health issues cause crime. Despite recognition of policy and programmatic issues, authors still
primarily call for change at the individual level. Article focuses on poverty, yet does not
include implications/recommendations for dealing with poverty.
Binaries/Dichotomy: Idealized mother/incarcerated mother = expectation that incarcerated
mothers would be different than “normal” mothers. Authors are surprised when mothers
express love and fear for children.
Discursive Entanglements: Child welfare and criminal justice.
Overall Discourse Position: Women are powerless and tragic. Constructed as voiceless and
vulnerable. Social work framed as savior.
Other Notes: “crack subculture in America’s poor struggling communities” (code for black).
Lots of intently descriptive language to create symbolism and construct women as tragic.
Things that need further exploration/research: n/a
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Detailed Analysis
Context
1. Why was the article selected for detailed analysis? Why is it typical?
This article was chosen because it represented a variety of themes that emerged in the
structural analysis. It was particularly strong on the ‘object of pity’ and 'social work as
savior' themes. Though this is a distinct construction of criminalized women and social
work, it always relied on the rhetoric of risk and choice, ultimately showing a preference
for individualized service delivery. It also displayed the typical contradiction I saw
emerge in the structural analysis of mentioning policy issues and structural context as
causes for incarceration but falling back on individual level understandings and
responses. I would describe this as “well intentioned” article.
2. Who is the author? What is their position and status within social work? What is
their area of expertise, and so on?
Authors are Suzanne Allen, Chris Flaherty, and Gretchen Ely. At the time of the
publication, they were all based in Lexington, KY.
Suzanne Allen was a social work consultant and the other two were at the University of
Kentucky’s College of Social Work.
Chris Ely is still at UK and is an associate professor with a focus on mental health.
Gretchen Ely is now an Associate Professor at the University of Buffalo, SUNY. It
appears that her area of expertise is abortion and reproductive rights. These two have
written some other articles together on social justice education. I could not find more info
on the lead author.
3. What journal was it published in? What is the aim, scope, and political orientation
of the journal? In which section of the journal does the article appear? What kind of
article is it? (empirical, conceptual?) Is the article a part of a special issue?
Affilia: Journal of Women in Social Work. It is a journal oriented toward feminist
theories, social justice, and values qualitative research. The article is a qualitative
research study published in the ‘articles section of the journal.
4. What year was the article written? Was there a specific occasion or event that it was
written in relation to? How does this compare to newer/older articles in the sample
by the same author?
2010. Does not appear to be written in relation to anything in particular. Date is in the
middle of the sample range though. Three other articles are in my sample that were
published in the same year.

256
Surface of the Text
1. How is the information organized and structured? What are the headings and
subheadings? What role does the title, abstract, introduction and conclusion play in
the overall scheme of things?
The article is organized as most academic are: intro, lit review, methods, findings,
conclusion. It is interesting to note how the title implies a structural focus with the use of
the word “criminalization” and emphasis on poverty. Yet, the abstract immediately
contradicts this by the use of intense individualizing language and focus on behaviors,
The abstract (and intro and conclusion) draws on powerful imagery to frame women as
powerless to their own selves from which they need to be “rehabilitated”, which then
turns the focus on to the individual rather than the structural, such as poverty. Assumes
incarceration has rehabilitative aims that are worthy given women’s behaviors and
problem, rather than aims of punishment. Leaves logic of punishment and criminalization
unquestioned.
2. What topics are addressed in the article? What key themes are communicated about
it? Do the topics/themes relate to each other and/or overlap? (discursive
entanglements)?
Topics: Impact on Mothers, Impact on Mother-Child Relationship; Poverty, Substance
Use Issues, Mental Health Issues, Abuse/Victimization, Marginalization, Custody/Child
Welfare; Sentencing Policies, Structural Barriers, Individual Level Factors; Substance
Use Treatment, Parenting Programming, Life Skills Development, Gender Specific
Programming, Advocacy, Recidivism
Themes: Women framed as powerless: shame, remorse, guilt.
Policy issues propel increases in incarceration, yet criminal justice involvement and
crime framed as being caused by individual level factors such as substance abuse,
victimization. Even poverty is turned into an individual level issue that can be addresses
through increased access to individual treatment.
Call for gender responsive programming to better deal with these individual level issues.
There are structural barriers to “success” but these are framed as individual issues that
can be solved through individual level programming. Goal is to help women take
personal responsibility, which will then improve their circumstances and decrease
recidivism.
Women are framed as powerless, tragic, objects of pity while social work framed as their
savior.
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Rhetorical Means
1. What kind and form of argumentation does the article follow? What argumentation
strategy is used?
Stirring up emotions - main argumentation strategy used. Particularly in relation to
characterizing women - Lots of emotive language - Feels manipulative. This can be put in
contrast to the discussions of policy and structural issues, which use statistics and
“objective” facts and are discussed in dispassionate, descriptive, matter of fact way.
When reading these passages on policy and systems issues, I, as reader, am not asked to
have feelings or emotions. Inadvertently puts the emphasis on women’s tragic
circumstances in which we should ‘feel for them.’ Using empathy as a tool rather than
reason. Why am I not asked to have feelings or take a position when they write about
things that highlight structural inequity. Despite trying to make the “personal political,”
as they state, the authors are inherently depoliticizing the issue. Emotive language shapes
the argumentation.
Despite recognizing structural and policy issues, they primarily keep the discussion and
analysis of results located at site of individual choices, feelings, and behaviors.
Attribution of agency to crack cocaine and its use, not policies that criminalize crack in a
highly radicalized manner. Representation of crack cocaine is decontextualized, deracialized. Example: "Women’s rates of incarceration have increased...Much of this
increase is due to the advent of crack cocaine, which has had a huge impact on lowincome women and the resulting increase in nonviolent crimes that are typically
associated with its use.”
Binary of idealized mother vs. unfit mother. Example: "Perhaps, the most outstanding
quality of these interviews was how deeply reflective—often philosophical—these women
were about all the subjects they covered but particularly with regard to the topic of
motherhood. Many of the women also struggled fiercely with their negative selfperceptions as parents. In many ways, the women expressed the same themes one would
expect from any mother, including the aforementioned idealized mother. These themes
included love for their children, pride in their children’s accomplishments, and worry
about their children’s circumstances and future challenges. However, unlike idealized
mothers, these poor and incarcerated mothers also expressed feelings of profound
powerlessness: powerless at being separated from their children, powerless to protect
their children from sharing their same fate, powerless against the child welfare system,
powerless against their addictions, and powerless against the society from which they
have become so disenfranchised.”
It is as though they assume that idealized mothers don’t ever feel powerless? Setting them
up within the dichotomy so as to challenge their difference, but it only reinforces
dichotomy and notion of idealized mother. In this binary authors are still drawing on the
unfit mother narrative.
Example: "Although many may assume that these children would be better off without
their mothers, this may not be the case. With proper treatment and ample opportunity to
complete a case plan, these women may be able to achieve a life in which they can
nurture their children—the children they so desperately love."
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2. What implications and allusions/insinuations does the article contain?
Assumes that incarceration is about rehabilitation not punishment and if women could get
better access to treatment they could be rehabilitated to be the “better” selves they so long
to be. There is an emphasis placed on women rehabilitating themselves, which implies
responsibility and individual causes of crime and criminal justice involvement. Example:
"those who had lost custody of their children felt they had no remaining reason to
rehabilitate themselves."
Lots of implications that women are powerless and the all-powerful social worker can
help empower them.
Allusions to race without ever explicitly mentioning. Example: "Poor and marginalized
women, such as the participants in our study, do not fit the idealized portrayal of
motherhood.”. Color-blind discourse using coded language for race. One focus in article
is on crack cocaine and despite it being a highly racialized drug in the way it is
criminalized, there is no mention of race or racism. Example of coded language: "These
women are more likely to live in poverty, are less likely to have been employed, and are
more likely to have lower educational levels and lower household incomes than their
incarcerated male counterparts (Moe & Ferraro, 2006). They also have high rates of
recidivism (Alleyne, 2006; Richie, 2001). That most of these women live in high-crime
neighborhoods with increased levels of homelessness to which they must return on their
release from jail poses serious problems for successful reentry into the community and is
a contributing factor in the women’s high rates of recidivism.” Here a discussion of
racism is circumvented through a discussion of poverty. Dismiss race and focus on
neighborhood and poverty to explain involvement in CJ and recidivism.
Equates prison to treatment. Example: "The average prison sentence for a woman is 18
months (Women’s Prison Association, 2006), and the time frame for a woman to
complete treatment varies from woman to woman, but is often lengthy.”
Focus on guilt and shame in both their analysis and on the women’s narratives they
choose to include, implies that women’s behavior is the cause of their problems. It also
invokes normative expectations regarding mothering.
Authors discuss marginalization, yet he way they draw on structural issues, and then
emphasize personal ones implies that women and substance users cause their own
marginalization. They do this thru passive language as well. Example: "Those who are
addicted to crack are often the poorest of the poor and subsequently the most frequently
arrested, victimized, disabled, and marginalized by its use.” Marginalized by the use of
crack or by the criminalization of it? Implying that crack user brings on their
marginalization themselves.
3. What collective symbolism or ‘figurativeness’, symbolism, metaphors, etc. is used?
This article is wrought with symbolism and metaphorical language that creates a sense of
pity and tragedy, conveys representations of powerlessness.
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Examples:
“impossible odds the women face in terms of mothering.”
"women whose shame and regret were often palpable.”
Conjuring up images that equate these emotions with incarceration. Example: "Many of
the women were imprisoned by their own guilt and remorse.” - what does this legitimize?
Perhaps individual level services that focus on their feelings and individual failings?
Drug use and incarceration are depicted as cycles - conveys image that it is hard to
escape, which furthers their construction of women as powerless. Example: “revolving
door of incarceration, recidivism, and homelessness” - a bit passive and powerless.
"The repeated lament of all these women was that they were painfully snared in a tangled
web of addictions without the resources to help them find a way out.” – Addiction
depicted as web that they are stuck it.
Use of numbers and statistics to paint picture of context and larger structural issues.
4.

What idioms, sayings, and clichés are used?
”we can….give voice to this long ignored population”
“giving women a voice makes the personal political”
"“salvage their own lives for the sake of their children”
"ASFA clock would have already been ticking."

5. What are the vocabulary and style?
There is an exaggerated use of adjectives and adverbs to conjure images of powerlessness
and evoke feelings of empathy and pity throughout the article. Enhances authors’
representation of women as tragic and vulnerable.
Examples:
"The mothers expressed profound feelings of guilt and remorse for the impact that their
behaviors had on their children and expressed hope that their children would experience
better lives than they have.”
“extremely troubled and often tragic life histories in the lives of these women”
"Their multiple marginality, combined with the stigma and shame of incarceration,
renders this powerless population essentially disposable in the eyes of society.”
"these women’s stories indicate that more typically it is not as the women recount their
experiences of feeling powerless and ensnared in and betrayed by the child welfare and
criminal justice systems.”
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"The majority expressed feelings of profound powerlessness with regard to their status
and their rights within the system."
“bravely confided their experiences”
Doing something with adjectives…maybe trying to humanize but inadvertently also
being demeaning. Maybe trying to manipulate audience away from dominant narrative?
Strong emotive language is used to describe women and detached, descriptive language is
used to discuss context. This inadvertently deemphasized the context and emphasizes
women’s individual feelings and behaviors.
Example: "They talked at great length about their children, and the majority expressed
deep feelings of remorse, guilt, sadness, and love when talking about their children. Most
of these dialogues were extremely emotional, and most of the women told their stories
through tears and even sobs."
In this, the reader is not asked to have feelings or an emotional response to the policy and
structural issues but is asked to have a strong emotional response to the women.
"struggled fiercely” “powerless” ; “terrified"
The use of such emotive language also has the effect of being 0thering and patronizing.
Example: "Perhaps, the most powerful and heartbreaking themes were those of the
maternal love that these women consistently expressed for their children and the
profound sense of guilt and staggering remorse they were all struggling with when they
discussed the impact of their actions on their children. It became abundantly clear that
their substance abuse problems and criminal justice involvement were symptomatic of
extremely troubled life histories”
The nouns they use create a sense of risk. Example: “They are convicted criminals,
viewed by society as social outcasts"
Verbs used to create imagery and drum up sympathy. Example: “…was passed in
response to the growing number of children lingering in the foster care system"
Use of modifiers to emphasize researchers good intentions. Example: “project was
inspired by our strong desire to hear directly from incarcerated, substance abusing
mothers.”
Evidentialities or lack thereof. Example: "Perhaps, the most outstanding quality of these
interviews was how deeply reflective—often philosophical—these women were about all
the subjects they covered but particularly with regard to the topic of motherhood”
Sentence framed in a way that assumes that they would not be expected to be reflective
and philosophical. If these were middle class women, would this be considered a
finding? Use of “most outstanding” un-naturalized women as good mothers. Authors
could have also said “of course” which would have propelled a very different attitude
toward the women.
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Passive language: used to shirk responsibility of social work in implementing and
sustaining problematic policies (side note: also no mention of changing them. Example:
"Although termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings have increased more than
100% since the enactment of ASFA, the precise number of TPR proceedings that have
been filed against incarcerated women is not known (Women in Prison Project, 2006).
Child welfare policies on children of incarcerated women have not been modified to
adapt to the rapidly increasing rates of female incarceration” - Passivity - leaves out the
social worker’s part in this. Who is responsible? Action of social workers in policy
processes is hidden. After all, who is responsible for the policy implementation and thus
the possibilities for disrupting it? All of this talk regarding problematic policy but the
focus in the end is still on the individual and nowhere is social work’s responsibility
toward changing these policies mentioned. Leaves the profession untouched and
“innocent.”
Remain neutral through use of passive language. Example: "It can be argued, then, that
many of these women are suffering not only from radical criminal justice policies, but
from inflexible child welfare policies.” - here they are noting intersections of systems and
policies that impact women. On the surface this seems “progressive” but again, they
ultimately circumvent their argument but relying on individual levels of change. There is
also a level of passivity here, “it can be argued” by who? who does the arguing? This has
a bit of a neutralizing effect - Rather than saying “we argue” they are can “it can be
argued” - in this they are not claiming the argument, therefore remaining neutral on the
issue despite raising the issue.
Locus of attention is on the individual “plight" rather than structural injustice. Example:
"Through the telling of these stories, we hope to bring attention to the plight of these and
other incarcerated mothers, raise awareness of the obstacles that the women face because
of their incarceration and troubled life histories, and bring to the forefront the virtually
impossible odds the women face in terms of mothering their children by conveying their
subjective experiences to a larger audience.” - calling attention to individual life
problems.
Local coherence through article with the repeated use of guilt and shame. Example:
"Virtually all the women expressed deep shame, remorse, and sadness for the mistakes
they have made.”
Racially coded language. Example: "Although crack has been less popular in mainstream
culture, a crack subculture is found in America’s poor, struggling communities.”
mainstream culture - white; poor struggling communities - black
6. What actors are mentioned, and how are they portrayed/characterized?
Criminalized women: Portrayed as tragic and powerless. Terms used to describe: “long
ignored population” “vulnerable” “poorly served” "one thing that incarcerated women
share is their invisibility.”
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"The experiences reported by the women in our study certainly corroborate the notion
that the needs of children and mothers are often at odds with one another as a result of
the intersection of policy mandates. Indeed, as is evidenced by the following interviews,
the mothers’ experiences indicate that child welfare protocols operate, often incorrectly,
under the assumption that the welfare of the child is separate from the welfare of the
mother. Although this may sometimes be the case, these women’s stories indicate that
more typically it is not as the women recount their experiences of feeling powerless and
ensnared in and betrayed by the child welfare and criminal justice systems.” - Building
argument to create image of tragic mother - Are their needs at odds or are the policy
mandates at odds? Are the assumed needs embedded in the policies an accurate reflection
of their actual needs? Positioning women and children needs at odds not the mandates of
the policy. However, in next sentence, they clarify and put the focus on intersecting
welfare of mom and child, not just the child. Most pieces focus solely on narrowly
construed well being a child (and so do the policies to which these authors refer). In this
they are disrupting the bad or unfit mother narrative but along with the next sentence,
they are instead creating an image of a tragic mother.
"The stigma of women who use crack and other drugs is further deepened by cultural
expectations of women as nurturers and caretakers. As Campbell (2000, p. 3) stated,
‘‘When women violate gender norms by using illicit drugs, they are represented as
spectacular failures—callously abandoning babies or becoming bad mothers, worse
wives, or delinquent daughters.’’ - They use this gender analysis to challenge the
construction of the unfit mother yet at other times they draw on this construction to
construct them.
Use of adverbs and adjectives to create and emphasize image of loving mother. But why
are their feelings of grief defined as a problem of guilt and remorse? Focus on guilt
emphasizes their responsibility and renders them worthy of our empathy ad
understanding. Guilt used as a responsibilizing tactic?
Authors also deemphasize agency through article. Example: “Many women voluntarily
opt to place their children in the custody of others to protect them from…” – they could
highlight that this is a protective factor but they use this to point to powerlessness instead.
Consistently include narratives from the participants that emphasize failings,
psychological problems, and individual issues. Contradicts their expressed emphasis on
poverty and structural issues. Turns structural issues into individual ones
The researchers: portrayed as the ones who can empower the powerless.
Examples: “by listening to their stories, we began to understand and give voice...”
"Hence, it became our mission to learn more, and the best way to do so, we thought,
would be to hear from the women themselves.”
"Giving the women a voice makes the political personal.”
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The description of the research procedures (pg. 164) also has the effect of framing the
researchers as saviors/do gooders/helpers and continues to frame the women as
powerless.
Consistently textually emphasize researcher positive qualities. And often use women’s
own experiences in the research to do so. Example: "Nearly all the women expressed
gratitude for the chance to talk about their stories so freely.” or "all the women were
enthusiastic and grateful to have the opportunity to speak about their children in such an
open and nonjudgmental venue.” - Why is it important to include that they expressed
gratitude? Using women’s expressions to emphasize the researchers positive qualities and
do gooderness. Their positive qualities are textually emphasized through discussion of
this type of interaction.
"By giving voice to this invisible population through a standpoint perspective, we
revealed complex stories of unfinished lives, of victimization and abuse, of poverty and
exploitation, of cyclical and generational obscurity, of classism and sexism, and of
stigma and shame.” – researchers revealed, not the women.
7. What references are made? (e.g. cultural references, references to other
disciplines/professions, media or policy referenced, does the text imply knowledge
from other sources?)
I did not notice anything particularly notable about this. Lots of references to other
academic sources, as is standard for this genre. Draw on outside empirical and theoretical
literature to support their points and make their case. Draw on women stories to
emphasize their results. Noting seems particularly questionable about the sources they
used or how they used them, except that the excerpts from the data they used could be
interpreted differently, but research of this type is already subjective.
However, there are some notable quotations they use to support their point but they use
them in a way that does not appear to be supported by the quote. For example, on pg.
161, the authors assert, "By listening to these experiences, we can begin to understand
and give voice to this long-ignored population. As Comack (1999, p. 296) stated, ‘‘the
voices of women behind bars have for too long been silenced; it is time we begin to listen
to what they have to say.’’” - The authors frame themselves as giving voice to the
powerless and then use Comack’s words to support this as a noble endeavor, but what
Comack actually says is very different than “giving voice”. Her words imply that they
have a voice that has not been heard and our job as researchers is to listen to them, not
“give them their voice.”
Gender specific programming - but left undefined. Are we to know what this means?
With lack of discussion, the presupposition is that it focuses on parenting, trauma, and
substance abuse, the only characteristics they defined as gendered. And no discussion of
how gender interacts with race, so concept of gender is universalizing.
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Content and Ideological Statements
1. What notion of social work does the article presuppose and convey?
Social work: innocence. Portrayed as helper/do gooders. Savior - use of passive language
when describing policy creation and implementation shirks responsibility from SW to
disembodied “policies.” Lots of language of whiteness as goodness “give voice” “our
mission”
Purpose is to help individuals. "Raise them up” through individual level service delivery
and "giving voice.”
2. What notion of criminalized women does the article presuppose and convey?
Tragic and powerless. Victim and vulnerable. She wants to be a good, loving mother and
with enough treatment she can be.
3. What kinds of understandings of crime, criminality, and punishment does the
article presuppose and convey? What explanations for criminalization are given?
Where does the problem for a woman’s crime/criminalization lie? (i.e. individual?
structural? socially constructed? a pathology?) Who/what needs to change?
Ends up being individualized despite discussion of policy and professed social justice
intentions.
Constantly framing meaning in individual level understandings.
Does not question underlying logic of punishment and ultimately assumes problematic
behaviors are cause of crime and therefore solution rest in changing individuals and
providing them support so they can change.
4. What notions of normality\ does the article presuppose and convey?
Invokes normative expectations of motherhood
5. What notions of practice and intervention does the article presuppose and convey?
What is the focus of intervention? What is deemed as “effective” practice? How are
outcomes defined?
Fall back on individual problems that can be addressed through individual level treatment
and advocacy without systemic change. Nothing about addressing poverty to policies that
criminalize, focus is on increasing access to behavioral change programs.
Calls for community based programs and probation programs that do not question the
underlying logic of punishment.
“All the women had negative self-perceptions as mothers, because many expressed
feelings of inadequacy related to their motherhood. At the programmatic level, this
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finding indicates that these women could perhaps benefit from parenting classes and even
mentoring programs both in jail and after their release. Mentors and advocates could
also help the mothers negotiate other systems in which they and their children are
involved. Another thing to be addressed is the consistent lack of successful treatment
services, as reported by the women, that are geared specifically to crack cocaine
addiction in the jail setting and in the larger community that address the financial
barriers and obstacles related to social support, extensive waiting lists, and child care.
As the literature has demonstrated and indeed as these women verified, all programming
must be developed to be gender specific. In addition, because the women expressed so
much frustration and powerlessness in dealing with the systems, case advocates are
needed, who can help these women navigate both the child welfare and the legal systems.
Ideally, reentry programs that would implement all these elements in the form of wraparound services would be developed. These services could include treatment for
substance abuse and parenting and life-skills training to prepare the women for life on
the outside in an attempt to combat the high rates of recidivism reported herein. To
combat some of the issues surrounding reentry and recidivism, community-based
programs that help neighborhoods work with these women and connect them with needed
services could be most beneficial. Community probation programming should include
ways in which these women can explore what led them to incarceration by examining
their multiple marginality, family histories, and experiences of abuse as a means of
gaining a better understanding of the cycles and patterns that led them to criminality.”
"Although many may assume that these children would be better off without their
mothers, this may not be the case. With proper treatment and ample opportunity to
complete a case plan, these women may be able to achieve a life in which they can
nurture their children—the children they so desperately love”
Outcomes ultimately defined in terms of reducing recidivism.
6. What frameworks of thought/rationalities are these practices embedded in? (i.e.
Risk? Welfare? Morality?)
Neoliberal psychologizing framework with a concern for welfare. It's like there is this
discursive struggle between risk and welfare.
7. How are gender, race, and class discussed, explained, and exposed?
The article is completely silent on the issue of race and racism. Only time they even come
close to discussing race is in the following passage: "The ethnicity of the sample was
dependent on the ethnic makeup of the inmate population at the time of the study and did
not serve as a selection or exclusion criterion.” - Does ethnicity equal race here? Later
they describe their sample: “Of the 26, 15 were Caucasian, 9 were African American,
and 2 were other races.” Half of their sample were POC but they do not mention race or
racism anywhere in the article. Not even disproportionality. Is this sentence a way to
mention disproportionality without mentioning it? Does this operate as a proxy for
disproportionality?
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Lack of discussion on racism inherently limits their analysis and further individualizes
the issue by not focusing on perhaps the largest structural issue causing and impacting
high incarceration rates. Also serves as a way to stay neutral despite professed feminist
and progressive intentions. (social justice light). In the rest of the article the only time the
mention anything related to race is when they are naming the White racial identity of a
participant in some way. Despite describing their sample here, this really has the effect to
whitewashing the study and their participants.
What effect does this have? Definitely neutralizing but does it make it more appealing to
a broader (and racist audience)? Is that their intention? The silence on race and racism is
so stark in this article, it is hard to believe it is unintentional. The use of coded language
and how they blatantly leave out race, like in the following example, "These women are
already marginalized by their gender, class, and victimization status and the systemic
barriers they consistently face.” makes me think there was some effort involved in this
process. Are the authors drawing on colorblind ideology of “goodness”? Doesn’t matter,
it still rein scribes whiteness. What good does this do given the racism embedded in the
CJS?
Gender analysis is present around motherhood but they also draw on the analysis to
construct the women. Thereby they invoke normative standards for mothering and
naturalize them by “showing” that “these” women also fit into the box of the idealized
mother, rather than calling into question what it means to be a good mother. Gender
ultimately is defined through describing them as mothers, victims of abuse and trauma,
and people with substance abuse issues. The emphasis on the above aspects of “gendered
experience” are then assumed to lead to criminal behavior. “substance use, in turn, often
leads to criminal behavior” - gendering crime?
Gender specific - With lack of clarity on what constitutes gender specific, the
presupposition is that it focuses on parenting, trauma, and substance abuse, the only
characteristics they defined as gendered. Again, no discussion of how gender interacts
with race, or any other aspect of experience.
"these women’s unique needs may be addressed.” - seems to be in relation to guilt and
shame if they are building on their own discussion, which then leads directly to treatment
as mean of addressing incarceration. Behavior is problem, not prison.
Other peculiarities of the article.
Missing discussion of race and racism. Only mention race in demos and when describing
participants who are white. Sort of has this whitewashing effect on their whole
article. This whitewashing is significant given that they deploy the discourse of tragedy
and pity (similar to the fallen woman of the reformatories) rather than a discourse of risk
and danger. Though still limited given he population, this article has the most in depth
description of their consent process out of the whole sample (pg. 164).
Discourse position and overall message of the article.
Object of Pity.
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APPENDIX G: Categories for Analysis at the Level of Language
Discursive Device

Function/Purpose

Lexical Choices/Word Groups

Creates contextual reasoning. Regularities in
lexical choice can shed light on the kind of
logic the text implies. Reveals interests,
ideology, and positions.

Grammar Features

Adjectives and adverbs can illuminate
judgments in the text. Active or passive speech
can obscure relationships. Pronouns can
suggest protagonists and antagonists

Direct and Indirect
Speech/Attribution of Agency

Can be used to assert or shirk responsibility, to
take a stand or remain neutral.

Modalities

Used to create a sense of urgency.

Evidentialities

Suggest factuality. Naturalizes certain
statements as common sense.

Rhetorical and Literary
Figures/Symbolism/Metaphorism

Helps construct certain kinds of categories and
associations, which shape the argument. Used
to explain or enhance the representation of
something.

Modes of Reasoning

Used to justify or legitimate
arguments/ideology. Logic and rationale
behind meaning. Are representations
contextualized or decontextualized?

Characterization

Words and expressions used to characterize
events, people, and situations can be used to
justify ideological positions.
Used to justify arguments. What information
has been left out or only implied?
Level of detail in the presentation of
information used to legitimize claims. What is
emphasized/deemphasized (topically,
stylistically, rhetorically)? Look for
generalizations?
Used to establish meaning is established.
Meaning is made sensible through
differentiation—through oppositional and
hierarchical pairing. Binaries. Contradictions.

Exclusion
Specificity

Difference/Contrasts

